Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a suspicious monetization pattern where a user account experiences a high-risk sign-in event, followed shortly (within 2 hours) by the creation or modification of inbox rules. This pattern is often indicative of account compromise, where an adversary configures mailbox rules (e.g., forwarding or redirection) to facilitate data exfiltration or financial fraud.
Detects a suspicious sequence where an account undergoes a help-desk-initiated password or credential reset, followed shortly (within 30 minutes) by the registration of a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device for that same account. This pattern is characteristic of social engineering attacks, such as those used by UNC3944/Scattered Spider, where an adversary impersonates a user to gain initial access and subsequently establishes persistence by adding an MFA device they control.
Detects anomalous large-volume file download or export activity from cloud repositories (SharePoint, OneDrive, or Salesforce) occurring shortly after a help-desk-mediated credential or MFA reset for the same user. This behavior is indicative of account takeover, specifically vishing-to-exfiltration patterns used by threat actors.
Detects high-privileged Entra ID accounts successfully reaching the verification stage of the Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process. While SSPR is automatically enabled for administrative accounts, this activity is anomalous and potentially indicates an attacker focusing on discovered privileged accounts after performing broader enumeration.
Detects the rare 'AssumeRoot' event in AWS STS followed by high-impact administrative or destructive API calls within a one-hour window. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to gain elevated, privileged access to perform unauthorized actions such as disabling logging, deleting infrastructure, or modifying IAM policies.
This rule detects potential unauthorized access to the 'My Sign-Ins' portal in Azure AD by monitoring for logins associated with multiple unique source IP addresses or Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) for a single user account. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking or account compromise where an adversary is accessing the account from a different network than the legitimate user.
Detects the use of the device code authentication protocol in Azure Sign-in logs, which is a common vector used in Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks to hijack OAuth tokens.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in events where the session is marked as compliant or trusted by Conditional Access policies, but simultaneously flagged by Identity Protection as originating from an anonymized IP (e.g., residential proxy, VPN). This indicates an adversary has bypassed location-based Conditional Access controls, likely in the context of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack.
Detects high-volume AI/LLM inference or GPU-compute provisioning activity from a single identity within a short duration. This behavior is indicative of LLMJacking, where compromised cloud credentials are used to spin up unauthorized, resource-intensive AI workloads for profit.
Detects high-volume AI/LLM inference or GPU-compute provisioning activity from a single identity within a short duration. This behavior is indicative of LLMJacking, where compromised cloud credentials are used to spin up unauthorized, resource-intensive AI workloads for profit.
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency MFA method resets, deletions, or updates performed by a single administrative account within a 15-minute window. This activity is indicative of a compromised support or helpdesk account being leveraged to bypass multi-factor authentication across multiple user accounts for unauthorized access or account takeover.
Detects an identity that performs a 'ListSecrets' operation followed by a high volume of 'GetSecretValue' or 'BatchGetSecretValue' requests within a short timeframe (15 minutes). This behavioral pattern is indicative of automated bulk exfiltration of secrets from AWS Secrets Manager, a common activity following an initial cloud environment compromise.
Detects successful VPN authentication events targeting SonicWall devices during non-business hours (between 20:00 and 06:00, or on weekends). This behavior is characteristic of initial access tradecraft often employed by ransomware affiliates to gain network entry with minimal operational noise.
Detects high-frequency, automated access to mail items via Microsoft Graph API (mail.read/MailItemsAccessed), consistent with automated scanning or exfiltration tools like ARToken's Inbox Monitor. The rule identifies suspicious patterns of repetitive access to mailbox folders or messages that may indicate Business Email Compromise (BEC) or automated credential-based harvesting.
Detects instances where a user signs in via a Device Code authentication flow and subsequently adds a member to a highly privileged group (e.g., Domain Admins, Global Administrators) within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential account compromise where an attacker uses an OAuth device code flow to establish access and then escalates privileges.
Detects successful authentication events using the OAuth 2.0 Device Code flow, which is frequently leveraged by adversaries to perform phishing attacks and bypass traditional interactive login requirements.
Detects potential privilege escalation in Entra ID (Azure AD) by monitoring for the assignment of high-privileged administrative roles to users or the granting of admin consent to applications, which can be leveraged to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity by monitoring specific Azure AD sign-in failure codes (50074: strong authentication is required, 50140: interruption of sign-in) in conjunction with logins from unmanaged devices.
Detects high-volume, automated access and download activity targeting sensitive data within Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, and Exchange) using the Microsoft Graph API. The rule identifies suspicious patterns of URI access associated with file downloading and mail item access, which may indicate automated data exfiltration by an adversary using compromised credentials or OAuth tokens.
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