Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects GitHub OAuth authorization, repository cloning, or ZIP downloads from source IP addresses that have not been observed for the specific actor within the past 30 days. This rule helps identify potential account compromise or token theft where an attacker attempts to access repository data from a new location, while specifically excluding bot/service accounts known for rotating CI infrastructure IPs.
Detects GitHub OAuth authorization, repository cloning, or ZIP downloads from source IP addresses that have not been observed for the specific actor within the past 30 days. This rule helps identify potential account compromise or token theft where an attacker attempts to access repository data from a new location, while specifically excluding bot/service accounts known for rotating CI infrastructure IPs.
Detects multiple AWS API calls (Publish, GetCallerIdentity, ListTopics) originating from a specific IP address (23.234.84.102) associated with a Zapier SNS sender. This rule monitors for potentially unauthorized or anomalous API usage patterns by identifying repeated, successful, and non-error events from a known source that may indicate misuse or compromise of an integration account.
Detects multiple AWS API calls (Publish, GetCallerIdentity, ListTopics) originating from a specific IP address (23.234.84.102) associated with a Zapier SNS sender. This rule monitors for potentially unauthorized or anomalous API usage patterns by identifying repeated, successful, and non-error events from a known source that may indicate misuse or compromise of an integration account.
Detects multiple AWS API calls (Publish, GetCallerIdentity, ListTopics) originating from a specific IP address (23.234.84.102) associated with a Zapier SNS sender. This rule monitors for potentially unauthorized or anomalous API usage patterns by identifying repeated, successful, and non-error events from a known source that may indicate misuse or compromise of an integration account.
Detects multiple AWS API calls (Publish, GetCallerIdentity, ListTopics) originating from a specific IP address (23.234.84.102) associated with a Zapier SNS sender. This rule monitors for potentially unauthorized or anomalous API usage patterns by identifying repeated, successful, and non-error events from a known source that may indicate misuse or compromise of an integration account.
This rule detects unauthorized GitHub repository access or OAuth activity performed by a user account identified as terminated in the organization's HR system. It uses a watchlist to cross-reference GitHub audit logs against terminated employee records, applying a 2-hour grace period to account for potential log synchronization delays or final offboarding tasks.
This rule detects unauthorized GitHub repository access or OAuth activity performed by a user account identified as terminated in the organization's HR system. It uses a watchlist to cross-reference GitHub audit logs against terminated employee records, applying a 2-hour grace period to account for potential log synchronization delays or final offboarding tasks.
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Detects successful authentication events in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) that utilize the 'device code' OAuth flow. This flow is often used by command-line utilities and headless applications to authenticate users on devices without a web browser, but it is also frequently abused by attackers to perform phishing and session hijacking.
Detects anomalous activity in Azure AD/Microsoft Graph API logs, where a specific user or application performs a high volume of requests across multiple sensitive administrative categories (such as directory roles, authentication methods, applications, and service principals) within a 30-minute window. This behavior is often indicative of reconnaissance or privilege escalation attempts by an adversary who has compromised an identity.
Detects internal Microsoft Teams messages containing lures related to passkey or SSO enrollment, which is indicative of a compromised account attempting to perform lateral phishing to harvest credentials or bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects a successful VPN authentication event followed within 30 minutes by the execution of the MeshAgent RMM tool or its renamed variant mvtcs.exe. This behavioral pattern is associated with initial access via compromised VPN credentials followed by the deployment of remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools for persistence and command and control.
This rule detects administrative changes (create, update, delete) to Cloudflare DNS records, load balancer pools, or origin pools specifically associated with 'registry.coder.com', as well as anomalous login and API token activity on the Cloudflare account. Such activity may indicate unauthorized configuration tampering, potential account compromise, or malicious modifications to critical infrastructure endpoints.
Detects successful authentication events using known default or low-privileged Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) service accounts, or IDS alerts (Snort SID 66883) associated with credential abuse activity potentially related to CVE-2026-20316.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events within JFrog Artifactory where an account accesses sensitive code-signing material (rubygems/gemspec/signing keys) and subsequently performs administrative actions (user addition/role assignment/privilege escalation) within a one-hour window, indicating potential account takeover or exploitation.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events within JFrog Artifactory where an account accesses sensitive code-signing material (rubygems/gemspec/signing keys) and subsequently performs administrative actions (user addition/role assignment/privilege escalation) within a one-hour window, indicating potential account takeover or exploitation.
Detects successful sign-ins where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was approved using the 'PhoneAppOTP' method, specifically where the method was registered by the user prior to the observed sign-in timeframe. This pattern can indicate an adversary using an actor-controlled MFA device registered previously to maintain persistent access to a compromised account.
Detects login events to the 'My Sign-Ins' portal (mysignins.microsoft.com) by users. This portal is a high-value target for adversaries who have gained access to a session via token theft or session hijacking, as it allows them to modify or add authentication methods (such as MFA devices) to establish long-term persistence in the victim's account.
Detects suspicious reconnaissance or modification activity within Microsoft Graph API by identifying high volumes of requests targeting sensitive management endpoints (such as directory roles, authentication methods, service principals, or OAuth permissions) from a single actor within a 30-minute window.
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