Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of interactive sign-ins to Microsoft management and profile-related applications from unmanaged devices occurring within a tight 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity, potentially associated with activity clusters such as UNC6671, where an attacker interacts with account settings shortly after compromising a session.
This rule detects user authentication events that deviate significantly from a 14-day historical baseline of known devices, operating systems, browsers, and network locations (ASN). It flags logins where at least two out of four key metadata signals (DeviceId, OS, Browser, ASN) have changed compared to the user's historical pattern, specifically targeting successful authentications that did not trigger a fresh multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge, potentially indicating token theft or unauthorized session reuse.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in events where a session token is reused without a fresh MFA challenge, originating from known residential proxy service providers. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using stolen session tokens (Session Replay) to bypass MFA protections.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events involving OIDC or external authentication tokens shortly after a known Coder registry compromise. The rule flags high-risk or at-risk single-factor authentication sessions, which may indicate the replay of stolen tokens harvested during the compromise window.
Detects a suspicious sequence of interactive sign-ins to Microsoft management and profile-related applications from unmanaged devices occurring within a tight 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity, potentially associated with activity clusters such as UNC6671, where an attacker interacts with account settings shortly after compromising a session.
This rule detects administrative changes (create, update, delete) to Cloudflare DNS records, load balancer pools, or origin pools specifically associated with 'registry.coder.com', as well as anomalous login and API token activity on the Cloudflare account. Such activity may indicate unauthorized configuration tampering, potential account compromise, or malicious modifications to critical infrastructure endpoints.
This rule detects administrative changes (create, update, delete) to Cloudflare DNS records, load balancer pools, or origin pools specifically associated with 'registry.coder.com', as well as anomalous login and API token activity on the Cloudflare account. Such activity may indicate unauthorized configuration tampering, potential account compromise, or malicious modifications to critical infrastructure endpoints.
Detects the creation of new AWS access keys or login profiles for a target identity immediately following the deletion or modification of a credential for the same identity, where the actors performing the two actions are different. This pattern indicates an adversary creating persistent access after a security incident responder or automated system has revoked a previously compromised credential.
Detects the creation of new AWS access keys or login profiles for a target identity immediately following the deletion or modification of a credential for the same identity, where the actors performing the two actions are different. This pattern indicates an adversary creating persistent access after a security incident responder or automated system has revoked a previously compromised credential.
Detects the creation of new AWS access keys or login profiles for a target identity immediately following the deletion or modification of a credential for the same identity, where the actors performing the two actions are different. This pattern indicates an adversary creating persistent access after a security incident responder or automated system has revoked a previously compromised credential.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to cloud resources or OAuth applications by identifying sign-ins or API calls originating from IP addresses or locations not previously observed for the user in the 30 days prior to a documented Coder registry compromise exposure window.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events involving OIDC or external authentication tokens shortly after a known Coder registry compromise. The rule flags high-risk or at-risk single-factor authentication sessions, which may indicate the replay of stolen tokens harvested during the compromise window.
Detects a GitLab personal access token used from multiple distinct source IPs or from IPs associated with the leaked gitlab-triage token, inconsistent with expected CI runner infrastructure.
Detects a GitLab personal access token used from multiple distinct source IPs or from IPs associated with the leaked gitlab-triage token, inconsistent with expected CI runner infrastructure.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in events where a session token is reused without a fresh MFA challenge, originating from known residential proxy service providers. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using stolen session tokens (Session Replay) to bypass MFA protections.
Detects instances where a user performs an interactive login followed by a non-interactive login within a 1-hour window, where the source IP address and geographical location of both sessions differ. This behavior is indicative of potential session hijacking or token theft where an attacker is using stolen session artifacts from a different location.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to cloud resources or OAuth applications by identifying sign-ins or API calls originating from IP addresses or locations not previously observed for the user in the 30 days prior to a documented Coder registry compromise exposure window.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events involving OIDC or external authentication tokens shortly after a known Coder registry compromise. The rule flags high-risk or at-risk single-factor authentication sessions, which may indicate the replay of stolen tokens harvested during the compromise window.
This rule detects administrative changes (create, update, delete) to Cloudflare DNS records, load balancer pools, or origin pools specifically associated with 'registry.coder.com', as well as anomalous login and API token activity on the Cloudflare account. Such activity may indicate unauthorized configuration tampering, potential account compromise, or malicious modifications to critical infrastructure endpoints.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to cloud resources or OAuth applications by identifying sign-ins or API calls originating from IP addresses or locations not previously observed for the user in the 30 days prior to a documented Coder registry compromise exposure window.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events involving OIDC or external authentication tokens shortly after a known Coder registry compromise. The rule flags high-risk or at-risk single-factor authentication sessions, which may indicate the replay of stolen tokens harvested during the compromise window.
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