Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects non-interactive sign-ins to Microsoft 365 using the OAuth Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) flow via the Azure CLI. This legacy authentication method enables attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) by submitting credentials directly to the authentication endpoint, a technique observed in password spraying campaigns.
This rule detects a correlation between an unauthorized IAM user access event and the subsequent execution of cryptocurrency mining tools within the same AWS account within a one-hour window. This is a strong indicator of an adversary leveraging compromised cloud credentials to perform resource hijacking.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) sign-in logs where a single user account authenticates from two different countries within a 10-minute window, which is indicative of potential account compromise or credential sharing.
This rule computes a composite risk score for user authentication events across multiple identity and network providers (Okta, Azure AD, VPNs, etc.). It flags suspicious patterns including impossible travel, credential stuffing indicators (multiple failures followed by success), new or unknown devices, and lateral movement attempts (concurrent access to both VPN and SSO services). Only users meeting a risk score threshold of 40 or higher with at least one successful authentication are reported.
Detects creation of Intune device management scripts, a potential privilege abuse vector.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in patterns indicative of an adversary bypassing Conditional Access device compliance requirements using an edge appliance proxy. The rule identifies successful authentication sessions from non-compliant or unmanaged devices that satisfy Conditional Access, often involving impossible travel or multiple source IPs, suggesting the use of an intermediary infrastructure to masquerade as a trusted location.
Detects unauthorized execution of AWS CLI commands within a shell spawned by Amazon Q or AWS language server processes. This activity typically involves the 'aws sts get-caller-identity' command being piped to 'curl' for remote exfiltration of cloud credentials, a behavior associated with the exploitation of CVE-2026-12957 in MCP auto-execution.
Detects high frequency administrative modifications, such as user creation/deletion, password resets, or group membership changes, performed by service accounts associated with Azure AD Connect or Microsoft Entra Connect. This behavior may indicate account compromise where a service principal is being abused to perform bulk identity management operations.
Detects when an application or service principal is assigned an app role containing sensitive permissions in Azure AD/Microsoft Entra ID. Such assignments can grant an application elevated access to mail, directory, or user management, which is a common tactic for persistence and privilege escalation in cloud environments.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by AI-powered IDE assistants (e.g., Amazon Q, Claude Code, Cursor) that perform AWS credential inspection combined with network exfiltration commands. This activity is indicative of exploitation of IDE extension vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2026-12957) where malicious configuration files force the IDE to spawn shell processes to steal and transmit cloud environment credentials.
Detects Microsoft Device Code grant type authentications in Entra ID sign-in logs, consistent with the EvilTokens phishing kit abusing the OAuth device code flow to steal tokens without capturing passwords. Flags DeviceCode protocol sign-ins from browser-based clients, which is atypical for legitimate device code usage.
Detects Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role activations that occur outside of standard business hours (before 07:00 or after 19:00 UTC, or on weekends) or involve high-privilege roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, Security Administrator).
This rule monitors Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) sign-ins for indicators associated with the 'Payroll Pirate' campaign. It identifies non-interactive OAuth/token-based authentication requests originating from residential Internet Service Provider (ISP) ASNs using devices marked as unmanaged. It further elevates risk by detecting impossible travel (same user accessing from multiple IPs in a short window) and the use of specific browser User-Agent strings (Firefox or Axios) characteristic of the threat actor's tooling.
Detects network activity and successful administrative logins to Cisco SD-WAN vManage devices originating from IPs associated with threat actor UAT-8616. The rule also flags any successful vmanage-admin logins originating from outside known trusted management network ranges, which may indicate exploitation of CVE-2026-20127 or CVE-2026-20182.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user successfully authenticates via SSH to a Cisco SD-WAN Manager (vManage) using the 'vmanage-admin' account, followed by REST API calls to enumerate device inventory (vedges or controllers) from the same source IP within 30 minutes. This behavior is indicative of potential post-exploitation activity or reconnaissance associated with the UAT-8616 campaign.
Detects anomalous activities targeting SaaS CRM applications (Salesforce, Microsoft Dynamics 365, HubSpot), including high-volume bulk exports, off-hours access, mass API queries for sensitive objects, and suspicious OAuth token grants.
Detects potential identity pivoting by correlating signs of developer workstation compromise (e.g., shell spawning from IDE/node processes) with subsequent anomalous cloud console or API access from the same or associated identity within a short timeframe. This rule monitors both Azure Sign-in logs and AWS CloudTrail activity for suspicious patterns following endpoint indicators.
Detects suspicious modifications to GitHub Actions workflows, such as unauthorized file overwrites, commits by bot impersonation identities (e.g., dependabot, renovate), or the upload of sensitive artifacts like 'format-results.txt'. These activities are indicative of IronWorm-style attacks targeting CI/CD pipelines to exfiltrate secrets via build artifacts.
Detects Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role activations that occur outside of standard business hours (before 07:00 or after 19:00 UTC, or on weekends) or involve high-privilege roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, Security Administrator).
Detects high frequency administrative modifications, such as user creation/deletion, password resets, or group membership changes, performed by service accounts associated with Azure AD Connect or Microsoft Entra Connect. This behavior may indicate account compromise where a service principal is being abused to perform bulk identity management operations.
Detects unauthorized access and command execution associated with MSP service accounts. The rule triggers on successful SSH authentication using specific service account names (e.g., egnyteservice) followed by the execution of interactive shells under those same service account contexts, which is indicative of potential lateral movement or compromise in downstream environments.
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