Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious activity involving Azure AD device registration followed by a sign-in from the same user and IP address, particularly when the user agent strings are indicative of non-standard clients (e.g., 'node', 'axios', 'undici', 'node-fetch'). This pattern can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or bypass multi-factor authentication by registering a new device and then immediately using it for access.
This rule detects potential cloud API access using a stolen token by monitoring HTTP requests to AWS S3, Azure management, or Google APIs that contain an 'Authorization: Bearer' header. A threshold of 50 such requests within 10 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, indicating a possible brute-force or high-volume access attempt with a compromised token.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to common cloud console login pages (AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud) that originate from a suspicious IP range. The rule uses a threshold of 5 attempts within 30 seconds from the same source IP to trigger an alert, indicating potential brute-force or credential stuffing attacks against cloud accounts.
This rule detects attempts to perform a mass device wipe or deletion using Microsoft Intune. It identifies devices that have been wiped or deleted within the last 24 hours and enriches this information with device details such as name, user, OS, and ownership. This can indicate a destructive attack or an attempt to remove evidence.
This rule detects suspicious device enrollment attempts via Microsoft Intune Company Portal from a country not previously observed in a user's 7-day sign-in history. It identifies two primary patterns: sustained successful sign-ins from a new country, indicating a potential active session and successful device enrollment (High Severity), or Conditional Access Policy (CAP) blocked attempts from a new country, suggesting an attacker probing with stolen credentials (Medium Severity). The detection aims to identify identity theft leading to unauthorized device enrollment.
Identifies suspicious token authorizations for the Google Chrome OAuth client. Tycoon 2FA operators frequently use this specific client and scope to proxy authentications and capture session cookies. In a complete attack sequence, this event occurs within a 1-second window alongside a login_success and a device registration event.
Flags Intune assignments to “All Devices” or “All Users,” which attackers may abuse for mass deployment.
This rule detects the creation of new service principals or the assignment of new role assignments to existing service principals in Azure Active Directory. It specifically looks for assignments that grant high-privilege roles such as "Contributor", "Owner", or "Global Admin". The rule aggregates these changes by target and time, highlighting instances where multiple changes or distinct initiators are involved.
Detects sign-in or Microsoft Graph API activity using user-agent strings characteristic of ROADtools and similar Python-based identity-attack tooling. The rule generalizes beyond ROADtools to catch AzureHound, MicroBurst, MFASweep, GraphRunner, and similar identity attack frameworks by looking for scripting user-agents (python, requests, urllib, curl) which signal non-browser, non-app authentication that is inherently suspicious for Entra ID admin operations.
This rule detects suspicious device enrollment attempts via Microsoft Intune Company Portal from a country not previously observed in a user's 7-day sign-in history. It identifies two primary patterns: sustained successful sign-ins from a new country, indicating a potential active session and successful device enrollment (High Severity), or Conditional Access Policy (CAP) blocked attempts from a new country, suggesting an attacker probing with stolen credentials (Medium Severity). The detection aims to identify identity theft leading to unauthorized device enrollment.
Sublime Threat Intelligence and Research (STIR) identified a phishing campaign using a recently published open-source Javascript virtual machine and obfuscation tool called KrakVM. The initial KrakVM-encoded HTML file arrives as an attachment in phishing emails. These emails are short, often not even including a body, with subjects and HTML attachment filenames suggesting the target has a new voicemail, a vendor credit, or unpaid invoices
Detects potential impossible travel activity by comparing location data
KQL Query
Kali365 PHaaS Device Code Detection
Cortex XDR
This rule detects potential device code phishing attempts by correlating a device code flow initiated from an unmanaged/non-compliant device with a suspicious user agent (e.g., 'python-requests' or '-live') and an 'unbound' signInTokenProtectionStatus, with a subsequent 'Cmsi:Cmsi' token replay event for the same user. This combination suggests a successful device code phishing attack where an adversary has obtained and is replaying a token after the victim has authenticated.
Detects when the same SessionId is used to sign in from more than one location across interactive and non-interactive sign-ins.
This rule detects attempts to perform a mass device wipe or deletion using Microsoft Intune. It identifies devices that have been wiped or deleted within the last 24 hours and enriches this information with device details such as name, user, OS, and ownership. This can indicate a destructive attack or an attempt to remove evidence.
Detects the creation of new connectors in Power Automate (formerly Microsoft Flow) that establish connections to external services. This activity is identified by monitoring 'PutConnection' operations within PowerPlatform or MicrosoftFlow audit logs. Such an event could indicate an adversary attempting to integrate malicious services or exfiltrate data.
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/04/18/crosstenant-helpdesk-impersonation-data-exfiltration-human-operated-intrusion-playbook/
Detect when users are authenticating without MFA being required.
Detects successful sign-ins using the axios/1.7.9 user agent. Storm-2755 uses this to replay stolen session tokens and maintain persistence via automated sign-ins approximately every 30 minutes. The rule filters for successful authentications and requires at least two authentications from the same user, IP, and user agent within the time window to identify the repeated automated persistence loop.
AWS Root Credentials
Sigma
Detects AWS root account usage
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