Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications URI.
URIs for domain names that no longer exist (dangling URIs), not using HTTPS, wildcards at the end of the domain, URIs that are no unique to that app, or URIs that point to domains you do not control should be investigated.
URIs for domain names that no longer exist (dangling URIs), not using HTTPS, wildcards at the end of the domain, URIs that are no unique to that app, or URIs that point to domains you do not control should be investigated.
Detects when a user that doesn't have permissions to invite a guest user attempts to invite one.
Detects the change of user type from "Guest" to "Member" for potential elevation of privilege.
Detects when changes are made to PIM roles
Detects when a user is added to a privileged role.
Detects when a new admin is created.
Detect when a user has reset their password in Azure AD
Monitor and alert for device registration or join events where MFA was not performed.
Monitor and alert for sign-ins where the device was non-compliant.
Monitor and alert for Sign-ins by unknown devices from non-Trusted locations.
Detects when an account is disabled or blocked for sign in but tried to log in
Alert on when legacy authentication has been used on an account
User has indicated they haven't instigated the MFA prompt and could indicate an attacker has the password for the account.
KQL Query from file: Admin consent for M365 Connector for Claude
KQL Query from file: M365 Connector for Claude Detection
Detects Azure AD application registrations with redirect URIs pointing to known tunneling, reverse proxy, or attacker interaction/callback infrastructure. This can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or exfiltrate data.
Detects when an external user is invited to the Entra ID tenant. This could indicate legitimate collaboration or an attempt by an attacker to gain initial access or establish persistence by inviting a malicious external account.
Azure Suspicious Redirect URI Detection
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the modification or addition of redirect URIs for Azure Active Directory applications or service principals that point to suspicious domains. These suspicious domains include known reverse proxy/tunneling services (e.g., ngrok, cloudflare tunnel), callback infrastructure (e.g., burpcollaborator, interact.sh), or localhost/loopback addresses. Such modifications can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence, exfiltrate data, or redirect authentication flows to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
This rule detects unusual modifications to Azure Arc machine identities or Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) assignments following local activity. It specifically looks for 'Write', 'Update', or 'Assign' operations on resources within the 'Microsoft.HybridCompute' resource provider where the properties include 'identity' or 'roleAssignment'. This could indicate an attempt to establish persistence or escalate privileges on hybrid machines.
Detects programmatic token refresh activity using the BAV2ROPC user agent originating from Railway IP space. This indicates automated persistent token cycling mechanisms used by the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) campaign to maintain access to compromised Microsoft 365 accounts.
Detects a 'git push --force' event in GitHub audit logs. A force push overwrites the remote repository's history with the local history, which is a potentially destructive action.
This technique was notably used in the supply chain attack against the 'aquasecurity/trivy-action' repository, where attackers force-pushed malicious versions to existing version tags.
This technique was notably used in the supply chain attack against the 'aquasecurity/trivy-action' repository, where attackers force-pushed malicious versions to existing version tags.
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