Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects successful authentication attempts by the same user account from two different geographic locations within a timeframe that is physically impossible to travel between. This detection often highlights compromised accounts or session token theft, including scenarios where MFA mechanisms have been bypassed.
Detects potential help-desk impersonation or social engineering activity involving account credential or MFA method resets, followed shortly by a sign-in from an unknown device or geography. The rule excludes activity tied to established ticketing systems or standard automated password expiration processes.
Detects potential lateral movement or compromised account use where a single user identity authenticates to multiple distinct cloud or administrative resources within a short time window (15 minutes). The rule uses a threshold of six or more unique applications or resources to identify anomalous patterns typical of reconnaissance or mass resource access often associated with stolen credentials. Administrative, service, and automation-related accounts are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects activity from known Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaign IP addresses across Azure control-plane, sign-in, and App Service logs. The rule monitors for malicious indicators in Azure Activity logs, Azure Sign-in logs, and Service Principal sign-ins, as well as specific sensitive URI paths (e.g., shells, admin login paths) within App Service HTTP logs.
Detects activity from known Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaign IP addresses across Azure control-plane, sign-in, and App Service logs. The rule monitors for malicious indicators in Azure Activity logs, Azure Sign-in logs, and Service Principal sign-ins, as well as specific sensitive URI paths (e.g., shells, admin login paths) within App Service HTTP logs.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects anomalous use of an LLM provider API key by identifying successful API requests originating from multiple distinct countries within a one-hour time window. This activity often indicates the potential theft and concurrent unauthorized use of an API token.
Detects successful OAuth device code sign-in attempts where the geographic location of the authentication does not match the user's historical baseline location. This is indicative of OAuth device code phishing, where a user is tricked into approving an authentication prompt for an attacker-controlled device.
Detects the use of open-source secret-scanning tools (e.g., TruffleHog) by identifying their specific User-Agent strings in AWS CloudTrail logs during GetCallerIdentity calls, followed by suspicious enumeration activity (ListBuckets, ListSecrets, ListAccessKeys) from the same source IP. This behavior is indicative of threat actors validating stolen credentials for unauthorized access to cloud resources.
Detects anomalous bursts of sts:GetCallerIdentity API calls, which are often used by adversaries to validate harvested or stolen AWS access keys. The rule monitors for a high frequency of such calls or a large number of distinct access keys being validated from IP addresses that are not part of the organization's approved corporate or cloud egress ranges.
Detects Azure AD sign-in events indicative of 'EvilTokens' phishing-as-a-service tradecraft. The rule monitors for initial token-grant events (device-code authentication or OAuth application consent) and subsequent successful sign-ins using existing SessionIds. This rule is designed as a foundational detection component for identifying session token replay, which allows adversaries to bypass MFA and password requirements by hijacking valid session tokens.
Detects a multi-stage exfiltration sequence consisting of: (1) bulk file archival/compression using common utilities, (2) suspicious OAuth grant or service principal authorization, and (3) abnormal network egress volume to common ports. This pattern suggests an adversary is preparing data, establishing or leveraging an identity/application for cloud access, and subsequently exfiltrating data.
Detects activity from known Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaign IP addresses across Azure control-plane, sign-in, and App Service logs. The rule monitors for malicious indicators in Azure Activity logs, Azure Sign-in logs, and Service Principal sign-ins, as well as specific sensitive URI paths (e.g., shells, admin login paths) within App Service HTTP logs.
Detects a service principal or user account performing a burst of 'ListKeys' operations across multiple Azure Storage accounts. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to dump access keys for multiple storage accounts after initial compromise or privilege escalation to gain further access to sensitive cloud data.
Detects attempts to delete Azure resource locks protecting Site Recovery or Backup services, followed by credential retrieval (ListKeys) within a one-hour window. This sequence pattern is a strong indicator of an adversary attempting to disable backup protection before potentially destroying data or exfiltrating keys.
Detects a sequence of events characteristic of exploitation against RouterOS (CVE-2026-67276/CVE-2026-86060), involving a failed SSH login attempt with the username '-2', followed by the creation of a new user account within the same SSH session, and a successful login with that newly created account.
Detects the addition of service principal credentials by a user who is not explicitly listed as an owner of the application. This activity is monitored to identify potential persistence or privilege escalation attempts where an unauthorized account adds its own authentication method to an existing cloud application or service principal.
This rule detects when a non-privileged user adds a new owner to an Azure AD Application or Service Principal, followed by a suspicious modification (such as adding credentials or permissions) to that same application within 30 minutes. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to gain persistent, elevated access to an application's service principal to manipulate its configuration or permissions.
This rule detects when a non-privileged user adds a new owner to an Azure AD Application or Service Principal, followed by a suspicious modification (such as adding credentials or permissions) to that same application within 30 minutes. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to gain persistent, elevated access to an application's service principal to manipulate its configuration or permissions.
Detects potential refresh token replay attacks, such as those facilitated by Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) proxy phishing, by identifying consecutive non-interactive sign-in events for the same user from geographically distant locations within a short time frame that precludes physical travel.
Detects successful cloud console login events across AWS, Azure, and GCP where multi-factor authentication (MFA) was not utilized, combined with impossible travel indicators (login from different countries within an 8-hour window for the same principal).
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