Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,088 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
619
191
113
86
47
Contributors
302
211
112
88
54
Categories
481
416
353
192
164
Platforms
726
348
216
136
57
Products / Services
518
292
197
124
88
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
1,088
CVEs
5
5
5
5
4
IDS Classtypes
3
2
1
1
IDS Protocols
3
Detects when a Managed Identity successfully authenticates via the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) and subsequently performs administrative or enumeration actions within a short timeframe. This pattern can indicate an attacker has compromised a resource (e.g., a Virtual Machine) and is using its Managed Identity to move laterally or access other resources within the Azure environment. The rule correlates successful IMDS-based sign-ins with subsequent activities such as running commands on virtual machines, or listing/getting secrets and keys from Key Vaults, or other general administrative/alert-generating activities.
Detects TruffleHog credential validation via sts:GetCallerIdentity - initial access indicator for AWS WorkMail phishing campaigns
Detects when a user authorizes the 'ToogleBox Recall' Google Workspace add-on. This tool has been observed being used by threat actors like UNC6661 (associated with ShinyHunters) to automate the deletion of MFA enrollment notifications, hiding unauthorized device registrations.
This rule detects chat or call activity by external users in Microsoft Teams whose source tenant is not present in a pre-defined whitelist. This could indicate unauthorized external communication or potential data exfiltration attempts.
This detection identifies when a user or service principal executes a command inside an AKS pod ('kubectl exec') and then, using the same identity, accesses data in a sensitive Azure Blob Storage container within a short time frame. This pattern can indicate an attacker, having gained initial access to the Kubernetes API, is using a pod as a pivot point to discover and exfiltrate sensitive data.
Detects when a user flagged as 'high risk' by Azure AD Identity Protection lists storage account keys. This could indicate a compromised account is being used to access sensitive data or escalate privileges.
This rule detects successful SSO logins on FortiGate devices using usernames and source IP addresses associated with a known malicious campaign exploiting a SAML SSO bypass. The rule specifically looks for successful SSO logins (logid == "0100032001", method == "sso", status == "success") from a predefined list of malicious usernames or source IP addresses.
Multiple threat actors are compromising Microsoft 365 accounts in phishing attacks that leverage the OAuth device code authorization mechanism.
Attackers trick victims into entering a device code on Microsoft’s legitimate device login page, unknowingly authorizing an attacker-controlled application and granting them access to the target account without stealing credentials or bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Attackers trick victims into entering a device code on Microsoft’s legitimate device login page, unknowingly authorizing an attacker-controlled application and granting them access to the target account without stealing credentials or bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA).
This alert finds sessions where a device-code flow produced multiple sign-in events (interactive + non-interactive), with mismatched user-agents or differing country/geolocation, for the same Session ID - a strong indicator of device-code phishing abuse.
Looks for:
Brute-forcing device code tokens
Token replay attempts
Malicious use of device code authentication across different devices or locations
Anomalous sign-in behaviour suggesting account compromise
Looks for:
Brute-forcing device code tokens
Token replay attempts
Malicious use of device code authentication across different devices or locations
Anomalous sign-in behaviour suggesting account compromise
Detects when an AWS IAM role is assumed by an identity that has not used that specific role within a historical 7-day window. This behavior can indicate lateral movement, privilege escalation, compromised credentials, or a deviation from normal workload patterns. The rule excludes AWS internal service identities to focus on human and workload actors.
This detection identifies cases where a successful device registration event in Azure AD occurs shortly after a successful Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) authentication to Microsoft Intune Enrollment via the Microsoft Authentication Broker.
Microsoft allows specific application and resource combinations access without a previously registered device.
An access token issued for the Microsoft Authentication Broker application and the Intune Enrollment resource can be used to authenticate and initiate the device join process.
An attacker can leverage the token to bypass CA, register device, and establish persistence. Once registered, attacker gets a Primary Refresh Token (PRT), valid for 90 days.
The following query joins ROPC successful sign-ins, to successful device registrations. Registrations that occur soon after a ROPC event (2 days in this instance) could be an indicator of abuse.
Microsoft allows specific application and resource combinations access without a previously registered device.
An access token issued for the Microsoft Authentication Broker application and the Intune Enrollment resource can be used to authenticate and initiate the device join process.
An attacker can leverage the token to bypass CA, register device, and establish persistence. Once registered, attacker gets a Primary Refresh Token (PRT), valid for 90 days.
The following query joins ROPC successful sign-ins, to successful device registrations. Registrations that occur soon after a ROPC event (2 days in this instance) could be an indicator of abuse.
Detects suspicious access to multiple Azure Storage Accounts using a Shared Access Signature (SAS) token from a single external IP address. This pattern can indicate the use of a compromised, potentially overly permissive, SAS token for reconnaissance or lateral movement.
Detects when a user creates a new secret within GitHub for an organization, environment, codespace, or repository. This activity is critical to monitor as secrets often contain sensitive credentials (e.g., API keys, tokens) that, if compromised or misused, can lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistence within the GitHub environment. The rule specifically looks for audit log actions indicating the creation of these secrets.
Detects when changes are made to the SSH certificate configuration of a GitHub organization, specifically the creation of an SSH certificate authority or the disabling of the requirement for members to use SSH certificates.
This rule detects changes to self-hosted GitHub Actions runner configurations. These changes include actions such as removing a self-hosted runner from an organization or repository, creating or removing runner groups, and adding, removing, or updating runners within a runner group. Such modifications can indicate administrative actions related to CI/CD infrastructure, which should be validated for legitimacy.
This rule detects failed user login attempts within Bitbucket. It specifically looks for audit events categorized as 'Authentication' with the action 'User login failed'. This type of event can indicate various activities, including legitimate users mistyping passwords, or malicious actors attempting to brute-force credentials or perform credential stuffing attacks against Bitbucket accounts.
This rule detects when Okta identifies new or unusual activity within the Admin Console. It specifically looks for 'policy.evaluate_sign_on' events targeting the 'Okta Admin Console' where Okta's internal heuristics (debugcontext.debugdata.behaviors or debugcontext.debugdata.logonlysecuritydata) flag the activity as 'POSITIVE' for unusual behavior. This can indicate an adversary attempting to gain or maintain access to administrative functions, or an administrator performing actions that are outside their typical patterns.
This detection identifies single-factor ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) logins from new countries not seen in the last 14 days for a given user+app combination. ROPC authentication does not support MFA, making it a frequent vector for attackers to bypass MFA misconfigurations and gain initial access or escalate privileges in Azure AD.
Detects user sign-ins occurring outside of predefined normal business hours and from locations not explicitly whitelisted. This rule aims to identify potentially unauthorized access attempts or compromised accounts being used at unusual times or from unexpected geographies.
Detects the registration of a new device or MFA authentication method in Microsoft Entra ID from an IP address geolocated to Morocco. This is a persistence tactic used by the Jingle Thief group (also tracked as Atlas Lion and STORM-0539).
Detects successful authentication attempts originating from clients using legacy authentication methods, identifiable via specific user agent strings. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), potentially as part of a password spray attack. Legacy authentication protocols often do not support modern MFA mechanisms, making them a target for attackers who have obtained valid credentials through other means or are performing brute-force attacks like password spraying.
Page 41 of 52