Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects sign-in activity using refresh tokens from device details (deviceId, browser, OS) that have not been previously observed for the user. This pattern is indicative of session token theft, often associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits where attackers replay stolen session or refresh tokens to bypass multi-factor authentication.
This rule identifies potential account compromise through the detection of non-interactive Azure AD sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations within a short, travel-implausible timeframe. Such activity is highly indicative of the theft and export of a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) from a legitimate endpoint, which is subsequently replayed by an adversary from external infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to cloud resources.
Detects usage of AWS CloudShell followed by S3 data-plane activity (GetObject/PutObject) from users without a documented baseline or exhibiting geographic anomalies. This pattern is indicative of potential misuse of a pre-authenticated execution context to perform unauthorized data staging or access, often evading host-based EDR monitoring.
Detects high-privilege IAM role assignments in Google Cloud Platform and Microsoft Azure environments. The rule specifically monitors for assignments of overly permissive roles (e.g., Owner, Global Administrator, or wildcard actions) that could allow for full environment compromise or persistence.
Detects when a Service Principal is assigned to a highly privileged administrative role in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID). This activity can be an indicator of an adversary establishing persistence or escalating privileges by leveraging non-human identities.
Detects the assignment of highly privileged Azure AD/Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Application Administrator) to a service principal. Assigning such roles to service principals is a common persistence technique, as these identities can be used to bypass conditional access policies and MFA through non-interactive authentication methods like client credentials.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator) to a user account, where the initiator's sign-in session is identified as anomalous. Anomalous indicators include non-interactive sign-in, unknown/untrusted device state, elevated risk score, or activity occurring outside of configured business hours.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator) to a user account, where the initiator's sign-in session is identified as anomalous. Anomalous indicators include non-interactive sign-in, unknown/untrusted device state, elevated risk score, or activity occurring outside of configured business hours.
Detects instances where a user account that has been flagged as risky (e.g., unfamiliar features, impossible travel, or malicious IP activity) performs a modification or registration of multi-factor authentication (MFA) security information within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls after a credential compromise.
This rule correlates endpoint-based alerts related to credential theft or infostealer malware with subsequent successful cloud identity authentication events. It identifies situations where a user, who has recently triggered a credential theft alert on an endpoint, logs into a cloud environment from a country or IP address that has not been historically associated with that user within a 24-hour window.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events where a refresh token is used to authenticate without satisfying a multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirement. This pattern is indicative of potential token theft and replay attacks, where an adversary uses a stolen refresh token to maintain persistence or access resources without triggering the expected MFA prompt.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in events that are flagged with a medium or high risk level and identified as anomalous by Azure AD Identity Protection. The specific combination of successful authentication alongside risk details like unfamiliar features, anonymized IP addresses, or malicious IP addresses is highly indicative of potential cloud account takeover, potentially following session token theft or infostealer activity.
Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a risky or anomalous login to Azure AD, such as from an anonymous network or an non-compliant device, followed shortly after by the registration of a new MFA method or security information. This behavior is indicative of an attacker who has compromised credentials and is attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls by enrolling their own MFA device.
Detects an anomalous volume of file downloads from cloud storage platforms (SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Box) occurring within two hours of a high or medium risk sign-in event, including impossible travel or token replay scenarios. This pattern is indicative of potential data exfiltration by an actor using compromised credentials.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege roles to cloud user accounts in Entra ID, AWS, or GCP when that assignment is preceded by anomalous sign-in behavior (high-risk or failed authentication) within 24 hours, or when the account appears to be dormant (no activity in 90+ days) prior to the privilege assignment.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior, including impossible travel (geo-velocity) and non-interactive authentication without MFA, specifically targeting patterns indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token theft.
Detects instances where an IAM user creates a new access key or requests a session token, followed by subsequent API activity from a different source IP address or region within a one-hour window. This behavior is often associated with the creation of persistence mechanisms or credential theft.
Detects modifications to AWS IAM policies (user or role policies) that grant AdministratorAccess, PowerUserAccess, or wildcard permissions (*). This is a common indicator of privilege escalation or persistence, where an attacker grants themselves or another identity broad administrative access within the AWS account.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user exhibits signs of account compromise—either through impossible travel patterns or the use of OAuth tokens on a new device—followed within one hour by the modification of mailbox settings, such as creating new inbox rules or modifying mailbox permissions, which is a common indicator of persistence and email exfiltration.
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