Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
811 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
339
195
76
50
47
Contributors
208
105
95
70
69
Categories
492
482
95
95
87
Platforms
626
161
82
25
5
Products / Services
203
160
110
86
67
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
811
CVEs
6
6
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
20
2
2
1
IDS Protocols
20
3
Detects command-line activity aimed at discovering password manager processes or database files. This technique is often used by attackers during the reconnaissance phase to find stored credentials.
Detects suspicious way to dump the kernel on Windows systems using dtrace.exe, which is available on Windows systems since Windows 10 19H1
Detects listing of the inodes of the "/" directory to determine if the we are running inside of a container.
Detects suspicious behavior where a Node.js-based application launches cmd.exe to query MachineGuid from the registry, indicating potential fingerprinting or persistence activity by EvilAi malware. The rule specifically looks for processes initiated from a suspicious folder path, where node.exe is the parent process, and cmd.exe is used to query 'HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography' for 'MachineGuid'.
This rule detects the presence of 'activeMQConnectionURL' and 'tcp://' within HTTP response bodies, which is indicative of a Commvault server exposing its hostname or connection details. This information could be leveraged by attackers for reconnaissance or to identify vulnerable Commvault instances.
Detects specific process behavior observed with Devil Bait malware samples. This rule identifies the execution of 'cmd.exe' as a child process of 'wscript.exe', attempting to redirect output to an XML or TXT file within the APPDATA\Microsoft directory. Additionally, it looks for reconnaissance commands such as 'ipconfig /all', 'dir', 'systeminfo', and 'tasklist' executed via 'cmd.exe'. This combination of behaviors is indicative of Devil Bait malware performing initial system reconnaissance and data collection.
Yara rule that detects EggStremeFuel backdoor.
Detects behaviors associated with AMOS and Odyssey Stealer, including using osascript to perform anti-analysis checks via system_profiler and terminating OneDrive services to impair defenses.
Detects potential suspicious behavior using secedit.exe, specifically when it is used to export or configure security policies. This could indicate an adversary attempting to discover system configurations or modify them for persistence, defense evasion, or privilege escalation.
These YARA rules are designed to identify executables compiled with specific programming languages: Rust, Golang, and Nim. They achieve this by looking for unique strings, section names, and other artifacts left by the respective compilers and runtime environments within PE (Windows) and ELF (Linux) files. The rules are primarily for file identification and profiling, rather than detecting malicious behavior directly. They help in understanding the technology stack of an executable, which can be useful in malware analysis, threat intelligence, and software inventory.
Detects user data export activity.
Detects user permission data export attempt.
This rule detects the use of 'wmic.exe' to perform system disk and volume reconnaissance. Specifically, it looks for command-line arguments related to querying volume names, logical disks, and general volume information. This activity has been observed in campaigns by threat actors such as Volt Typhoon.
The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows built-in tool FSUTIL with the "FSINFO" or "Volume" parameters, in order to discover file system and disk information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. Monitoring this activity is significant because FSUTIL can be abused by adversaries to gather detailed information about the file system, aiding in further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to map the file system, identify valuable data, and plan subsequent actions such as privilege escalation or persistence.
Detects suspicious command-line activity spawned by the GoAnywhere MFT Tomcat service. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation techniques observed following the exploitation of CVE-2025-10035, as detailed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence. The detection looks for specific discovery and execution commands launched via cmd.exe or powershell.exe from the GoAnywhere parent process.
This rule detects various activities associated with the InterLock Ransomware (UNC5774). It identifies anti-VM checks performed via PowerShell, specifically looking for commands that query for QEMU, memory less than 4GB or 1.5GB, or specific desktop naming conventions. It also detects local group and Service Principal Name (SPN) enumeration using PowerShell cmdlets like 'Get-LocalGroupMember', 'Get-LocalGroup', or ADSI queries for 'samAccountName' and 'servicePrincipalName'. Persistence mechanisms are covered by monitoring registry Run/RunOnce keys for entries that launch 'node' or 'php' executables. Furthermore, the rule looks for suspicious staging of 'node.exe' or 'php.exe' within the AppData\Roaming directory when initiated by PowerShell processes. The rule leverages 'DeviceProcessEvents', 'DeviceRegistryEvents', and 'DeviceEvents' (specifically PowerShellCommand action type) to capture these activities.
MAL Bat Dropper
YARA
Detects a specific multi-stage batch file dropper identified by its hash. This malware uses PowerShell, VBScript, and multiple layers of obfuscation (Base64, XOR, Gzip) to deliver its payload.
Detects a Windows command shell executing a batch file that subsequently spawns processes for system discovery (often for AV checking) and then either executes a potential payload or performs network reconnaissance. This behavior is consistent with the initial stages of the BlockBlasters malware campaign.
Detects a series of WMI queries used by Maranhão Stealer for system reconnaissance.
Detects HijackLoader attempting to perform anti-virtual machine (VM) checks by querying for VirtualBox-specific registry keys from a PowerShell process that also initiates a network connection. This combination of behaviors is indicative of sandbox evasion.
Detects the initial PowerShell download cradle associated with ClickFix/CORNFLAKE.V3 campaigns. This activity is often the result of a user being tricked into pasting and running a command from a malicious website.
Page 31 of 39