Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
811 detections
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This rule detects HTTP POST requests to Vercel-hosted domains containing suspected phishing telemetry (such as device fingerprinting, keystrokes, and user agent collection) originated from a Google Sites frame. This is a common pattern for phishing kits masquerading as legitimate Ledger service pages to harvest credentials and hardware information.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to Vercel-hosted domains containing suspected phishing telemetry (such as device fingerprinting, keystrokes, and user agent collection) originated from a Google Sites frame. This is a common pattern for phishing kits masquerading as legitimate Ledger service pages to harvest credentials and hardware information.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to Vercel-hosted domains containing suspected phishing telemetry (such as device fingerprinting, keystrokes, and user agent collection) originated from a Google Sites frame. This is a common pattern for phishing kits masquerading as legitimate Ledger service pages to harvest credentials and hardware information.
Detects instances where a Node.js process spawns another Node.js process as a child. This behavior is often associated with malicious npm packages attempting to evade detection during runtime execution or executing secondary malicious payloads.
Detects reconnaissance behavior (System Information, Account, and Network Discovery) performed by processes associated with AI and LLM coding assistants. The rule monitors for a chain of suspicious activities, such as executing discovery commands or excessive network scanning within a 10-minute window, identifying potential misuse of developer-oriented agent tools for post-exploitation reconnaissance.
Detects reconnaissance behavior (System Information, Account, and Network Discovery) performed by processes associated with AI and LLM coding assistants. The rule monitors for a chain of suspicious activities, such as executing discovery commands or excessive network scanning within a 10-minute window, identifying potential misuse of developer-oriented agent tools for post-exploitation reconnaissance.
Detects network beaconing activity associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan. The rule monitors for specific C2 communication patterns, including the 'client;' string and the 'VVx-4.3' version marker, which are characteristic of this malware's host reconnaissance and command-and-control exfiltration phase.
This rule detects the two-stage network behavior of AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer). First, it identifies the initial C2 registration beaconing to an '/api/t' endpoint. Subsequently, it monitors for an immediate follow-up TLS connection to 'ipinfo.io', which is commonly used by the malware for geolocation and victim system reconnaissance.
Detects HTTP POST requests to a /collect endpoint containing visitorId and stage parameters, which is characteristic of ClickFix-style fake bot-protection overlays used to trick users into executing malicious scripts under the guise of security verification.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns from the legitimate 'rnpkeys.exe' process when side-loaded from the 'ProgramData\keyroll' directory. The rule specifically looks for a sequence of connections matching initial C2 registration (TLV 0x01) followed by consistent, periodic beaconing (TLV 0x02) at an interval indicating automated task polling, rather than single-connection legitimate activity.
This rule monitors the rnpkeys.exe process for suspicious environmental reconnaissance activity, specifically targeting locale/keyboard-layout registry queries or domain enumeration via command-line tools. These activities are identified as occurring in a strict temporal sequence (pre-registration check) shortly before an initial outbound network connection, consistent with the behavior of the Sauron loader malware.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
Detects the unknown or suspicious process 'doxc' (or 'doxc.exe') executing common Windows system administration utilities ('wmic.exe', 'fsutil.exe', 'cmd.exe') or command-line arguments typically used for reconnaissance and system information discovery, such as listing logical disks or volume information.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets and parameters to perform system, hardware, and external drive discovery. This includes querying volume information, disk/partition details, and checking for removable or specific bus-type media (USB, SD, MMC), which is commonly associated with reconnaissance activities by an adversary.
This rule identifies Linux devices with kernel versions that are vulnerable to CVE-2026-80844, CVE-2026-81000, CVE-2026-68121, and CVE-2026-74469. It parses the OSBuild field to extract kernel major, minor, and patch version numbers and compares them against known unpatched releases.
This rule monitors outbound network traffic for the inclusion of a Windows-style hostname pattern (e.g., 'DESKTOP-XXXXXX'), which is often used by stealer malware or RATs to identify victim machines during C2 communication. It explicitly excludes Microsoft licensing traffic to reduce false positives.
Detects host reconnaissance activity performed by PureLog Stealer, characterized by the execution of system administration tools (e.g., wmic, reg, systeminfo) spawned as child processes from .NET LOLBins (e.g., msbuild, installutil, regsvcs). This behavior indicates an adversary performing discovery of system configuration and environment details.
Detects a sequence of PowerShell commands consistent with the VelvetCake reconnaissance module, including enumeration of antivirus software via SecurityCenter2, system information, IP configurations, running processes, recent files, and drive mapping within a short timeframe.
Detects cleartext HTTP POST requests to specific URI endpoints (/api/v1/devices/register or /api/v1/devices/heartbeat) known to be used by the Corp_MDM Android spyware for C2 communication, registration, or heartbeat signals.
Detects cleartext HTTP POST requests to specific URI endpoints (/api/v1/devices/register or /api/v1/devices/heartbeat) known to be used by the Corp_MDM Android spyware for C2 communication, registration, or heartbeat signals.
Detects malicious PowerShell scripts that perform a sequence of reconnaissance activities, including security product enumeration via WMI (SecurityCenter2), system configuration discovery (ipconfig, systeminfo), process enumeration, recent file access, and drive mapping. This behavior is indicative of second-stage reconnaissance by threat actors to map the target environment.
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