Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
644 detections
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Detects NightLedger Command 75, which enumerates logical drives as a pre-exfiltration reconnaissance step; identifying available storage volumes before staging and uploading data via Command 70 (POST to C2). The query hunts for drive enumeration commands (WMIC, fsutil, PowerShell variants) spawned specifically from the DLL-loader process class associated with NightLedger's execution chain. Drive enumeration from rundll32, regsvr32, AppVShNotify.exe, or dllhost has no legitimate use case and is high-confidence in this parent-process context.
Detects anomalous, high-volume file access (creation, modification, or renaming) targeting sensitive extensions (e.g., .key, .pem, .pfx) within document directories by unsigned processes. It also detects similar high-volume file access behavior that occurs immediately following the mounting of a removable USB device, consistent with CornFlake RAT data exfiltration patterns.
This query detects PowerShell-based AES encryption activity followed by mass file rename/encryption indicators and ransom note creation within a correlated pre-defined timestamp.
Detects unauthorized file system access to sensitive Gitea configuration files (app.ini) or internal directories (custom/conf, data/tmp) by the gitea/git service account. This pattern is indicative of post-exploitation credential or secret harvesting following remote code execution vulnerabilities, such as the diffpatch git hook RCE (CVE-2026-60004).
Detects reconnaissance of system security posture by unsigned or unknown processes. The rule monitors for a combination of AV/EDR product enumeration (SecurityCenter2, Windows Defender exclusion queries), RDP history collection, Office MRU collection, and general system information gathering. It correlates two or more of these activities originating from the same process within a 15-minute window, while excluding known legitimate security and management software.
Detects the creation of a file named 'logAzure.txt' that contains sensitive Microsoft Graph or cloud configuration credentials, such as TenantId, ClientId, ClientSecret, or UserEmail. This activity is indicative of credential staging or exfiltration by malicious actors.
Detects the creation of a file named 'logAzure.txt' that contains sensitive Microsoft Graph or cloud configuration credentials, such as TenantId, ClientId, ClientSecret, or UserEmail. This activity is indicative of credential staging or exfiltration by malicious actors.
Detects discovery and SUID/SGID enumeration commands (whoami, hostname, id, uname, cat /etc/passwd, find -perm) executed by a shell spawned from a WordPress plugins directory by a web server process.
Detects the use of command-line tools employing recursive search patterns (e.g., -Recurse) targeting document file extensions (PDF, DOCX, XLSX). This activity is often associated with the staging phase of an exfiltration attempt, where an adversary identifies sensitive files across a directory structure before collection.
Detects high-confidence BoryptGrab-lineage infostealer activity involving fake GitHub delivery indicators, known C2 infrastructure, suspicious gup.exe execution, libcurl.dll side-loading from user-writable paths, and known malicious file hashes.
Detects the use of command-line tools employing recursive search patterns (e.g., -Recurse) targeting document file extensions (PDF, DOCX, XLSX). This activity is often associated with the staging phase of an exfiltration attempt, where an adversary identifies sensitive files across a directory structure before collection.
Detects the creation of a file named 'logAzure.txt' that contains sensitive Microsoft Graph or cloud configuration credentials, such as TenantId, ClientId, ClientSecret, or UserEmail. This activity is indicative of credential staging or exfiltration by malicious actors.
Detects the use of command-line tools employing recursive search patterns (e.g., -Recurse) targeting document file extensions (PDF, DOCX, XLSX). This activity is often associated with the staging phase of an exfiltration attempt, where an adversary identifies sensitive files across a directory structure before collection.
Detects discovery and SUID/SGID enumeration commands (whoami, hostname, id, uname, cat /etc/passwd, find -perm) executed by a shell spawned from a WordPress plugins directory by a web server process.
Detects file creation events with the .candy extension, consistent with the GigaWiper/Crucio-derived BigBang extortion module (BigBangExtortMain, bigBangSingleFileExtortion, bigBangHybridEncryption) which AES-CBC encrypts files using randomly generated, unsaved key/IV pairs across enumerated Windows logical drives before deleting the original file with os.Remove.
This rule detects execution of specific functions or command-line arguments derived from the GigaWiper / FlockWiper malware family. These functions are associated with destructive activities such as file discovery, sorting, reading, and secure encryption or deletion of files, indicative of a wiper-style attack.
This rule detects execution of specific functions or command-line arguments derived from the GigaWiper / FlockWiper malware family. These functions are associated with destructive activities such as file discovery, sorting, reading, and secure encryption or deletion of files, indicative of a wiper-style attack.
This rule detects potential reconnaissance activity on macOS by monitoring for the execution of 'system_profiler' to gather system application data or the use of 'grep' to search for process information (ps). Such activity is often associated with initial discovery phases where an adversary gathers information about the target system.
Detects file creation events with the .candy extension, consistent with the GigaWiper/Crucio-derived BigBang extortion module (BigBangExtortMain, bigBangSingleFileExtortion, bigBangHybridEncryption) which AES-CBC encrypts files using randomly generated, unsaved key/IV pairs across enumerated Windows logical drives before deleting the original file with os.Remove.
Detects the creation of specific sensitive file names (AGENTS.md, MEMORY.md, IDENTITY.md, USER.md, SOUL.md) within 30 minutes of a process execution containing email-related keywords (email, mail, inbox). This pattern is often indicative of an adversary staging sensitive information for exfiltration after gaining access to or interacting with an email client or communication tool.
Detects discovery and SUID/SGID enumeration commands (whoami, hostname, id, uname, cat /etc/passwd, find -perm) executed by a shell spawned from a WordPress plugins directory by a web server process.
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