Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
345 detections
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WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz
'Finds attempts to list users or groups using the built-in Windows 'net' tool '
Use this query to locate commands related to discovering highly privileged users in an environment, sometimes a precursor to ransomware
Surfaces suspicious spoolsv.exe behavior likely related to CVE-2021-1675
The query checks for suspicious Tomcat process launches associated with likely exploitation of Confluence - CVE-2022-26134
Read more here:.
https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26134
Tags: #exploit #CVE-2022-26134
Read more here:.
https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26134
Tags: #exploit #CVE-2022-26134
Dragon Fly
KQL
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_dragonfly.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Operation Soft Cell.
Operation Soft Cell is a series of campaigns targeting users' call logs at telecommunications providers throughout the world. These attacks date from as early as 2012.
Operation Soft Cell operators sometimes use legitimate web server processes to launch commands, especially for network discovery and user/owner discovery. The following query detects activity of this kind.
Reference - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers
Operation Soft Cell is a series of campaigns targeting users' call logs at telecommunications providers throughout the world. These attacks date from as early as 2012.
Operation Soft Cell operators sometimes use legitimate web server processes to launch commands, especially for network discovery and user/owner discovery. The following query detects activity of this kind.
Reference - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers
The following queries pivot from an IP address assigned to a machine to the relevant machine or logged-on users.
To read more about it, check out this post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/What-s-New/Advanced-hunting-now-includes-network-adapters-information/m-p/224402#M74.
Query #1: get machines that have used a given local IP address at a given time - as configured on their network adapters.
To read more about it, check out this post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/What-s-New/Advanced-hunting-now-includes-network-adapters-information/m-p/224402#M74.
Query #1: get machines that have used a given local IP address at a given time - as configured on their network adapters.
doppelpaymer
KQL
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Doppelpaymer: More human-operated ransomware. There is also a related blog.
DoppelPaymer is ransomware that is spread manually by human operators. These operators have exhibited extensive knowledge of system administration and common network security misconfigurations. For example, they may use net.exe to run reconnaissance and find service accounts to target. They often use stolen credentials from over-privileged service accounts to turn off security software, run malicious commands, and spread malware throughout an organization.
The following query detects the net.exe reconnaissance method described above.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with DoppelPaymer.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/11/20/customer-guidance-for-the-dopplepaymer-ransomware/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoppelPaymer!MTB&threatId=-2147205372
DoppelPaymer is ransomware that is spread manually by human operators. These operators have exhibited extensive knowledge of system administration and common network security misconfigurations. For example, they may use net.exe to run reconnaissance and find service accounts to target. They often use stolen credentials from over-privileged service accounts to turn off security software, run malicious commands, and spread malware throughout an organization.
The following query detects the net.exe reconnaissance method described above.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with DoppelPaymer.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/11/20/customer-guidance-for-the-dopplepaymer-ransomware/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoppelPaymer!MTB&threatId=-2147205372
Endpoint Inventory
Detects remote RPC calls used by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership. This rule specifically targets the MS-WKST protocol (Workstation Service Remote Protocol) interface UUID and operation number associated with SharpHound's reconnaissance activities.
Detects uncommon network connections to the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) on port 9389 from processes not typically associated with ADWS management. This can indicate an adversary performing discovery of Active Directory information.
This rule detects the use of 'sc.exe' to query and enumerate services, specifically looking for the 'termservice'. Attackers often use 'sc.exe' to gather information about running services on a system, which can help them identify potential attack vectors or sensitive services. The detection focuses on the execution of 'sc.exe' with the 'query' command and the specific service 'termservice'.
Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
Detects uncommon network connections to the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) from processes not typically associated with ADWS management.
Detects the execution of the AdFind.exe utility, which is commonly used for reconnaissance in Active Directory environments. The rule identifies AdFind.exe by its image name, original filename, and specific IMPHASH values.
The analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.
This analytic detects an unusual number of Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests for non-existing users from a single source endpoint. It leverages Windows Event ID 4768 and identifies anomalies using the 3-sigma statistical rule. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary performing a user enumeration attack against Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could validate a list of usernames, potentially leading to further attacks such as brute force or credential stuffing, compromising the security of the environment.
This analytic identifies when Office 365 users search for suspicious keywords or have an excessive number of queries to a SharePoint site within a limited timeframe. This behavior may indicate that a malicious actor has gained control of a user account and is conducting discovery or enumeration activities.
The analytic detects the Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. It leverages EventCode 4798, which is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gather information on user accounts, a common precursor to further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to map out user accounts, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments `user` or `users` to query local user accounts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local users, which is a common step in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.
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