Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query from file: Identity Blast Radius
Looks for a logon domain in the Microsoft Entra ID logs, encoded with the same DGA encoding used in the Nobelium campaign.
See Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks for more on the Nobelium campaign (formerly known as Solorigate).
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Hunting%20Queries/DnsEvents/Solorigate-Encoded-Domain-URL.yaml
See Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks for more on the Nobelium campaign (formerly known as Solorigate).
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Hunting%20Queries/DnsEvents/Solorigate-Encoded-Domain-URL.yaml
C2-NamedPipe
KQL
Detects the creation of a named pipe used by known APT malware.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wpo/4de75e21-36fd-440a-859b-75accc74487c
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wpo/4de75e21-36fd-440a-859b-75accc74487c
Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for network connections using any protocols associated with recent RevengeRAT, AsyncRAT, and other malware campaigns targeting the aviation industry.
This activity is often followed by connections to copy-and-paste sites such as pastebin.com, stikked.ch, academia.edu, and archive.org. Many of these connections will occur on non-standard ports.
The following query looks for network connections using any protocols associated with recent RevengeRAT, AsyncRAT, and other malware campaigns targeting the aviation industry.
This activity is often followed by connections to copy-and-paste sites such as pastebin.com, stikked.ch, academia.edu, and archive.org. Many of these connections will occur on non-standard ports.
'This composite hunting query will highlight any HTTP traffic in CommonSecurityLog web proxies (such as ZScaler) that match known patterns used by red teaming tools potentially stolen from FireEye. Most FireEye red teaming tools are designed to mimic
legitimate API activity, false positives are common. This query includes a basic check to determine how common a hostname is in you environment, and allows you to modify this threshold to remove legitimate traffic from the query results.
This query contains only a subset of potential FireEye red team tool communications, and therefore should not be relied upon alone :) .'
legitimate API activity, false positives are common. This query includes a basic check to determine how common a hostname is in you environment, and allows you to modify this threshold to remove legitimate traffic from the query results.
This query contains only a subset of potential FireEye red team tool communications, and therefore should not be relied upon alone :) .'
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
This query surfaces alerts related to Gootkit and enriches with command and control information, which has been observed delivering ransomware.
These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
This query finds network communication to specific URL.
Please note that in line #7 it filters RemoteUrl using has operator, which looks for a "whole term" and runs faster.
Example: RemoteUrl has "microsoft" matches "www.microsoft.com" but not "microsoftonline.com".
Please note that in line #7 it filters RemoteUrl using has operator, which looks for a "whole term" and runs faster.
Example: RemoteUrl has "microsoft" matches "www.microsoft.com" but not "microsoftonline.com".
Microsoft has observed attackers who have gained entry to an environment via the Log4J vulnerability utilizing uncommon PowerShell flags to communicate to command-and-control infrastructure.
Simple query to show the unique network connections that were audited or blocked by ExploitGuard.
For more questions on this query, feel free to ping @FlyingBlueMonki on twitter or mattegen@microsoft.com via email.
For more questions on this query, feel free to ping @FlyingBlueMonki on twitter or mattegen@microsoft.com via email.
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_equationgroup_c2.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.