Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the addition of users to specific high-value or sensitive groups in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), which could indicate potential unauthorized privilege escalation or persistence attempts by an attacker.
Detects users who modify their MFA settings (registration/update/delete) and subsequently perform privileged actions (such as adding role members or service principal credentials) within a short timeframe, while simultaneously observed active in communication applications like Teams, Zoom, or Webex. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary modifies authentication methods to gain persistent access, followed by privilege escalation.
Detects the addition of secrets or certificates to Azure service principals during non-business hours (before 7 AM or after 7 PM, or on weekends). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence in a cloud environment by adding their own credentials to an existing service principal.
Detects suspicious sequences of AWS CloudTrail API calls originating from non-console or non-service-account sources (CLI, curl, etc.). The rule flags scenarios where reconnaissance via 'GetCallerIdentity' is immediately followed by sensitive IAM modifications (CreateUser, CreateAccessKey) or privilege escalation attempts (AssumeRole), which may indicate the use of exfiltrated credentials.
Detects attempts to inject attacker-controlled credentials into Entra ID Agent Blueprints via the Microsoft Graph addPassword endpoint. This activity is identified by monitoring Microsoft Graph activity logs for 'addPassword' requests and correlating with Audit Logs for 'Add password' operations targeting resources containing 'blueprint' or 'Blueprint', or where modified properties include 'Blueprint Secret', 'passwordCredential', 'addPassword', or the actor has the 'Agent ID Administrator' role.
This rule detects the addition of new certificates or client secrets to Azure App Registrations or Service Principals by a user who is not recorded as an owner of that application in the last 90 days. This behavior is a common persistence and privilege escalation technique used by attackers to maintain access to cloud environments.
Detects attempts to modify or delete Conditional Access Policies in Microsoft Graph. Adversaries may attempt to alter or remove Conditional Access Policies to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access or persistence.
Detects unauthorized modifications to the vmanage-admin password on Cisco SD-WAN Manager. This rule is designed to identify suspicious credential changes that deviate from standard administrative practices, potentially indicating an actor modifying the default admin credentials for persistence or unauthorized access before attempting to revert the changes to evade detection.
Detects when a user or machine account is added to a highly privileged Active Directory group. This event is often a sign of privilege escalation or persistence establishment by an adversary.
Detects when a user or machine account is added to a highly privileged Active Directory group. This event is often a sign of privilege escalation or persistence establishment by an adversary.
This rule detects suspicious activities related to OAuth application consent and service principal operations originating from IP addresses identified as proxy infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for actions such as adding service principal credentials, granting OAuth2Permission, consenting to applications, adding delegated permission grants, and adding service principals or applications, when these actions are performed from a proxy IP address. This combination of activities and source IP can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Azure AD environment.
This rule detects attempts to manipulate user or service principal names (SPN/UPN) in Active Directory by adding non-ASCII or zero-width characters. Such modifications can be used by adversaries for obfuscation, to bypass detection mechanisms, or to create stealthy persistence. The rule specifically looks for Event IDs 4738 (User Account Changed) and 5136 (Directory Service Object Modified) where the 'servicePrincipalName' or 'userPrincipalName' attributes contain characters outside the standard ASCII range or zero-width characters like U+200B, U+200C, U+200D.
Detects cross-tenant service principal authentications that leverage blueprint-derived identities. This rule specifically looks for client_credentials grant types using client_assertion (JWT bearer) or client_secret targeting sensitive scopes like 'api://AzureADTokenExchange/.default' or 'AgentIdentity.CreateAsManager' from a foreign tenant service principal. This activity could indicate an attempt to establish persistence or gain unauthorized access across Azure AD tenants.
Detects attempts to modify or delete Conditional Access Policies in Microsoft Graph. This could indicate an adversary attempting to weaken security controls to facilitate unauthorized access or persistence.
This rule detects successful additions or updates to service principal credentials or application certificates/secrets within Azure AD. This activity can indicate persistence establishment by an attacker who has compromised an account with sufficient permissions to manipulate application identities.
This rule detects suspicious activities related to OAuth application consent and service principal operations originating from proxy infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for actions such as adding service principal credentials, granting OAuth2Permission, consenting to applications, adding delegated permission grants, or adding new service principals/applications, where the initiating IP address is identified as belonging to a proxy service. This combination of activities and source IP can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Azure AD environment.
Detects Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) activity followed by the deletion of authentication methods within a 1-hour window. This sequence of events can indicate an attacker attempting to maintain access or bypass multi-factor authentication after gaining initial access to an account, potentially executed by threat groups like Storm-2949.
This rule detects the creation of Okta API tokens with broad administrative scopes (okta.users.manage, okta.factors.manage, or okta.apps.manage) by the same user multiple times within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate an attempt to establish persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects attempts to add credentials or secrets to a service principal to establish persistence independent of user accounts. This rule specifically looks for 'Add service principal credentials' or 'Update application - Certificates and secrets management' operations in Azure AuditLogs.
This rule detects when a user successfully grants five or more OAuth2 permissions within a five-minute window, specifically looking for sensitive scopes such as 'Mail.Read', 'Calendar.Read', 'User.Read.All', or 'Directory.Read.All'. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to gain broad access to an organization's data through a compromised application or user account.
Detects registration of potentially malicious OAuth applications in Azure AD
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