Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
302 detections
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Detects the creation of new AWS access keys or login profiles for a target identity immediately following the deletion or modification of a credential for the same identity, where the actors performing the two actions are different. This pattern indicates an adversary creating persistent access after a security incident responder or automated system has revoked a previously compromised credential.
Detects the creation of new AWS access keys or login profiles for a target identity immediately following the deletion or modification of a credential for the same identity, where the actors performing the two actions are different. This pattern indicates an adversary creating persistent access after a security incident responder or automated system has revoked a previously compromised credential.
Detects high-frequency creation and revocation of service principal credentials, indicating potential malicious credential cycling, or unusual bursts of service account JWT/refresh token rotation across multiple IP addresses, which may indicate an attempt to evade detection or maintain persistence.
Detects instances where a database role initially possessing only REPLICATION privileges is elevated to a SUPERUSER role, which represents a significant escalation of privilege within a PostgreSQL environment.
Detects instances where a database role initially possessing only REPLICATION privileges is elevated to a SUPERUSER role, which represents a significant escalation of privilege within a PostgreSQL environment.
Detects instances where a database role initially possessing only REPLICATION privileges is elevated to a SUPERUSER role, which represents a significant escalation of privilege within a PostgreSQL environment.
This rule detects administrative SQL statements (ALTER ROLE, CREATE ROLE, or GRANT) that assign the REPLICATION attribute to a database role. The REPLICATION attribute in PostgreSQL allows a user to initiate streaming replication and perform logical decoding. This is a security-sensitive privilege, as users with this attribute can potentially bypass standard access controls or, if the environment is misconfigured or vulnerable (e.g., CVE-2026-6471), potentially leverage malicious replication plugins to achieve arbitrary code execution.
This rule detects administrative SQL statements (ALTER ROLE, CREATE ROLE, or GRANT) that assign the REPLICATION attribute to a database role. The REPLICATION attribute in PostgreSQL allows a user to initiate streaming replication and perform logical decoding. This is a security-sensitive privilege, as users with this attribute can potentially bypass standard access controls or, if the environment is misconfigured or vulnerable (e.g., CVE-2026-6471), potentially leverage malicious replication plugins to achieve arbitrary code execution.
Detects a new client secret added to an Entra ID application shortly followed by Mail.ReadWrite Graph API calls, indicating the application was hijacked to impersonate its identity and read a target user's mailbox — the technique CISA's red team used after obtaining an access token.
Detects instances where a database role initially possessing only REPLICATION privileges is elevated to a SUPERUSER role, which represents a significant escalation of privilege within a PostgreSQL environment.
Detects when a new credential is added to an existing application. Any additional credentials added outside of expected processes could be a malicious actor using those credentials.
This rule detects potentially malicious service principal activity by correlating the granting of sensitive app roles with subsequent spikes in sign-in volume. It monitors AuditLogs for 'Add app role assignment to service principal' events involving high-privilege roles, then joins this data with AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs to identify if the service principal experiences a sudden, significant increase in hourly sign-ins compared to its historical baseline within 24 hours of the permission change.
This rule monitors Windows Security Event Logs for Event IDs 4728 and 4729, which indicate that a security-enabled global group has had a member added or removed, respectively. By aggregating these changes by group name and event action, it provides a summary of administrative activity regarding Active Directory group membership changes over a 365-day period.
AD Group Changes and Membership Activity
Cortex XDR
This rule monitors Active Directory security event logs for modifications to local, global, and universal groups. It specifically tracks events related to the creation, deletion, and membership changes of AD groups, providing visibility into potential privilege escalation or unauthorized administrative activity within the domain.
Five or more service account keys created by the same principal, indicating mass credential generation.
This rule detects the addition or update of credentials (certificates and secrets) to Azure AD applications or service principals using AuditLogs. Adversaries often perform this activity to establish persistent access to a cloud environment by 'backdooring' a trusted application or service principal with their own secret, allowing them to authenticate as that identity later.
Detects developer accounts whose daily count of API key creation or model provisioning operations exceeds their own 15-day historical per-user baseline plus several standard deviations, excluding service principals/apps, which may indicate compromised credentials being abused to provision or harvest AI API keys for resale (token jacking).
This rule detects the addition or update of credentials (certificates and secrets) to Azure AD applications or service principals using AuditLogs. Adversaries often perform this activity to establish persistent access to a cloud environment by 'backdooring' a trusted application or service principal with their own secret, allowing them to authenticate as that identity later.
Five or more service account keys created by the same principal inside a 1 hour time bucket, indicating potential mass credential generation.
This rule detects when a user (excluding service accounts) explicitly sets IAM permissions on a Google Cloud Storage bucket, potentially indicating unauthorized privilege escalation or modification of access controls to facilitate data exfiltration or persistence.
Detects the creation of an app-specific password named 'ZimbraWeb' using the CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest SOAP command in Zimbra logs. This technique is used to maintain persistent access to mailboxes while bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA).
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