Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic detects the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to a user. This activity is significant because the Global Administrator role grants extensive access to data, resources, and settings, similar to a Domain Administrator in traditional AD environments. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, and potentially gain control over Azure resources, posing a severe security risk.
The following analytic detects the assignment of the Privileged Authentication Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory audit logs to identify when this specific role is assigned. This activity is significant because users in this role can set or reset authentication methods for any user, including those in privileged roles like Global Administrators. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could change credentials and assume the identity and permissions of high-privilege users, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and critical configurations.
This analytic identifies instances where the Mail.Read Graph API permissions are granted to an application registration within an Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to changes in application permissions within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. This activity is significant because the Mail.Read permission allows applications to access and read all emails within a user's mailbox, which often contain sensitive or confidential information. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data exfiltration, spear-phishing attacks, or further compromise based on the information gathered from the emails.
The following analytic detects potential privilege escalation threats in Azure Active Directory (AD). This detection is important because it identifies instances where privileged roles that hold elevated permissions are assigned to service principals. This prevents unauthorized access or malicious activities, which occur when these non-human entities access Azure resources to exploit them. False positives might occur since administrators can legitimately assign privileged roles to service principals. This detection leverages the O365 Universal Audit Log data source.
This rule detects when a user is added to an administrative role within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). It specifically looks for events where the event type is 'USER_CHANGE_PERMISSIONS', the product event type is 'Add member to role', and the product name is 'Azure AD Directory Audit'. The rule is configured to trigger when a user is assigned to a role with the TemplateId '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10', which corresponds to the Global Administrator role in Azure AD. This activity is sensitive and warrants validation due to the high privileges associated with administrative roles.
This rule detects when a user is added to a role in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) outside of a Privileged Identity Management (PIM) process. While adding users to roles is a normal administrative action, performing it outside of PIM can indicate a potential security risk, as PIM provides just-in-time access and approval workflows for privileged roles. This rule specifically looks for "Add member to role outside of PIM (permanent)" events, which are often triggered via PowerShell API calls.
Detects when a new user is created in Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) and subsequently assigned administrative or other specified roles within a 90-minute window. This rule aims to identify potential privilege escalation or suspicious account setup activities.
This rule detects a sequence of events where a new user account is created in Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) and then, shortly after, that same user is assigned an administrative-level role. This behavior can indicate an attacker establishing persistence or escalating privileges by creating a new account and immediately granting it high-level access.
Adding users to administrative roles is needed but due to sensitivity of these roles, validation should occur when this occurs
Detect users who are newly created and then immediately assigned administrator level roles
Adding users to roles is expected but if it occurs outside of PIM, validation should occur
Detects when a user is created in Entra ID and assigned roles within a defined time window.
This rule detects when highly privileged administrative roles, specifically 'Owner' or 'Editor', are assigned to a service account within Google Cloud Platform. This activity is significant because service accounts with such elevated permissions can be leveraged by attackers for persistence, privilege escalation, and to perform a wide range of actions within the GCP environment, potentially leading to compromise of cloud resources.
This rule identifies when a custom administrator role is created within Google Workspace. Monitoring such events is crucial for security teams to detect and prevent unauthorized access to data that could result from malicious or accidental configuration of administrator privileges.
This rule identifies when a Google Workspace user account is moved between Organizational Units (OUs). This activity can be a legitimate administrative action, but it can also be used by an attacker to move a compromised account to an OU with different policies, potentially granting them more privileges or evading existing security controls. For example, an attacker might move an account to an OU with less stringent multi-factor authentication requirements or different access policies to sensitive data.
Detects AWS IAM activities originating from an EC2 instance that could be used to retain access or escalate privileges. This includes actions like creating users, attaching policies, creating/updating login profiles, creating access keys, creating groups, and creating roles.
Identifies when an administrator role is assigned to a user account in Google Workspace. Security teams can monitor for the malicious or accidental assignment of administrator privileges to prevent unauthorized access to data. The rule specifically looks for `USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_PERMISSIONS` events with `ASSIGN_ROLE` as the product event type and `DELEGATED_ADMIN_SETTINGS` in the security result category details. It also calculates a higher risk score if the assigned role is `_SEED_ADMIN_ROLE`.
Detect when admin privileged roles such as Owner or Editor are added to a Service Account.
Identifies when an administrator role is assigned to a user account in Google Workspace. Security teams can monitor for the malicious or accidental assignment of administrator privileges to prevent unauthorized access to data.
Identifies when a custom administrator role is created in Google Workspace. Security teams can monitor for malicious or accidental configuration of administrator privileges to prevent unauthorized access to data.
Identifies when a Google Workspace user account is moved between Organizational Units.
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