Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where a user account that has been flagged as risky (e.g., unfamiliar features, impossible travel, or malicious IP activity) performs a modification or registration of multi-factor authentication (MFA) security information within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls after a credential compromise.
Detects the modification of critical Entra ID authentication method policies, such as the registration or configuration of external MFA/OIDC providers, by a user account shortly after an anomalous or high-risk login event. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistent backdoor access via rogue MFA provider registration, consistent with techniques used to subvert cloud authentication policies.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's registered phone number or recovery contact method is updated, followed shortly by an MFA factor reset or new factor enrollment. This pattern is a common indicator of a SIM-swap attack, where an attacker intercepts SMS-based MFA codes after hijacking the victim's phone number.
Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations performed by a single user within a 2-hour window. The chain consists of a password reset, MFA method modification, new device registration, and a subsequent privilege escalation event (such as role assignment or application consent). This pattern is consistent with helpdesk-vishing campaigns often used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to perform full account takeovers.
This rule detects scenarios where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by the registration of an unmanaged, non-compliant device to their account. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft (e.g., EvilTokens) where an adversary uses a stolen token to register their own device as a persistent, unmanaged entity, bypassing standard corporate device enrollment controls.
Detects a sequence of events where a user with a high-risk or compromised sign-in status registers a new device in Entra ID shortly after the event, followed by subsequent sign-ins from that device that bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) via Conditional Access policies.
Detects MFA or credential reset activities on high-value or privileged accounts that lack a corresponding out-of-band verification signal, such as manager approval or identity proofing, within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of social engineering attempts where attackers manipulate help-desk procedures to bypass identity protections.
Detects anomalous activity where a successful device-code authentication is immediately followed by rapid multi-device registration or Intune enrollment. This pattern is consistent with GhostCode-style attacks involving Primary Refresh Token (PRT) theft and rogue device registration to bypass conditional access policies.
This rule detects modifications to multi-factor authentication (MFA) settings performed by privileged users (e.g., Global Admins) from IP addresses not previously associated with their account. The rule tracks actions such as registering new security information, changing default MFA methods, or deleting authentication methods. High-risk indicators like an unknown IP address for a privileged account are flagged for further investigation.
This rule detects modifications to multi-factor authentication (MFA) settings performed by privileged users (e.g., Global Admins) from IP addresses not previously associated with their account. The rule tracks actions such as registering new security information, changing default MFA methods, or deleting authentication methods. High-risk indicators like an unknown IP address for a privileged account are flagged for further investigation.
This rule monitors Office 365 management logs for device registration or join events in Azure Active Directory where the resulting device state is flagged as both non-compliant and unmanaged, despite having a 'Workplace' or 'AzureAd' trust type. It further aggregates these events by user to identify potential suspicious patterns, such as bulk registrations or rapid activity within a 30-minute window, which may indicate account compromise or unauthorized device enrollment.
This rule detects a correlation between a successful non-interactive authentication event (e.g., token-based sign-in) and a subsequent device registration event performed by the same user identity within a short time window. This sequence is a known pattern for attackers seeking to register an adversary-controlled device against a compromised account to establish durable persistence and potentially bypass conditional access policies (PRT persistence).
This rule detects a correlation between a successful non-interactive authentication event (e.g., token-based sign-in) and a subsequent device registration event performed by the same user identity within a short time window. This sequence is a known pattern for attackers seeking to register an adversary-controlled device against a compromised account to establish durable persistence and potentially bypass conditional access policies (PRT persistence).
Detects instances where a user account that has been flagged as risky (e.g., unfamiliar features, impossible travel, or malicious IP activity) performs a modification or registration of multi-factor authentication (MFA) security information within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls after a credential compromise.
Sequence detection for the three-step chain — credential reset, MFA/authenticator reset, new device registration — completing within 40 minutes for one user, directly modeling the Scattered Spider/UNC3944 speed-to-domain-admin playbook from Mandiant M-Trends 2026.
Flags Temporary Access Pass issuance to accounts holding privileged directory roles, especially when issued by Tier-1 support rather than a PIM-approved workflow — TAP is the modern equivalent of the helpdesk MFA bypass abused in Scattered Spider-style intrusions.
Detects high-privilege account management actions in Entra ID (password resets or MFA modifications) performed by service or admin accounts, which are characteristic of social engineering (vishing) attacks targeting IT helpdesks to gain unauthorized access.
Detects device registration events in Entra ID where the device display name does not conform to standard enterprise organizational naming conventions. Adversaries may register unauthorized devices to an Entra ID tenant to bypass conditional access policies or gain persistence.
Detects a potential OAuth device code phishing abuse pattern where an authenticated device code sign-in is immediately followed by a new device registration or Primary Refresh Token (PRT) issuance for the same user, potentially originating from a different device or IP address.
Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations performed by a single user within a 2-hour window. The chain consists of a password reset, MFA method modification, new device registration, and a subsequent privilege escalation event (such as role assignment or application consent). This pattern is consistent with helpdesk-vishing campaigns often used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to perform full account takeovers.
Detects the registration of a new MFA device or authenticator by a user shortly after a password reset event, where the registration originates from an IP address classified as a hosting provider, datacenter, or VPN. This pattern is indicative of a help-desk or vishing-based account takeover attack where an adversary registers their own MFA device to gain persistent access.
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