Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
301 detections
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KQL Query
Detects outbound network traffic to Icedrive domains from non-browser and non-Icedrive client processes, which could indicate C2 communication by the BeardShell implant used by Sednit (APT28).
Detects outbound network traffic to Filen domains from non-browser and non-Filen client processes, which could indicate C2 communication by Sednit's modified Covenant implant.
Detects network traffic to known command and control (C2) domains used by the Iranian APT group Seedworm to distribute the Fakeset backdoor. These domains are hosted on the Backblaze cloud storage service.
Detects outbound network traffic or DNS queries to the Yandex Cloud Functions domain (functions.yandexcloud.net). This domain was used as a C2 relay by the 'ambar-src' malicious npm package, indicating potential command and control activity.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to WebView2 processes interacting with AI webchat domains, potentially indicating covert command and control (C2) proxying or other malicious use. It looks for WebView2 traffic to specific AI domains (Grok, Copilot) originating from unusual parent processes, WebView2 access to Grok with URL parameter-driven prompt execution, and suspicious child process execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) where WebView2 is the parent process.
Detects processes that access Google Sheets API endpoints and parameters described in GRIDTIDE reporting,
where the initiating process is not a common web browser. This may indicate abuse of Sheets as a C2 channel.
where the initiating process is not a common web browser. This may indicate abuse of Sheets as a C2 channel.
This detection identifies network connections from non-browser processes to known Large Language Model (LLM) API endpoints. While some connections may be legitimate developer or application traffic, unexpected processes connecting to these services could indicate unauthorized data exfiltration, corporate espionage, or misuse of AI services.
This rule query identifies likely post‑exploitation activity associated with React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) in which Part 1 identifies web servers spawning unusual child processes (such as command shells or system utilities) combined with suspicious command-line patterns, which may indicate post-exploitation behavior following a compromise. and part 2 detects web servers making outbound network connections to known malicious IPs or hostnames, or to domains associated with tunneling services (e.g., trycloudflare.com), suggesting potential command-and-control activity or data exfiltration.
Detects the Kimsuky TTP of using legitimate cloud services like GitHub and Google Drive to download and subsequently execute malicious payloads, often using interpreters like mshta.exe or rundll32.exe.
Detects network traffic to Solana RPC endpoints containing the wallet address associated with the GlassWorm malware. GlassWorm uses the Solana blockchain as a resilient C2 mechanism by querying for transactions from an attacker-controlled wallet.
This rule detects network traffic to specific JSON storage services (jsonkeeper.com, jsonsilo.com, npoint.io) that have been observed to be abused by the DPRK-linked 'Contagious Interview' threat actors for malware delivery. The detection is based on TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) patterns.
This rule detects various activities associated with the InterLock Ransomware (UNC5774). It identifies anti-VM checks performed via PowerShell, specifically looking for commands that query for QEMU, memory less than 4GB or 1.5GB, or specific desktop naming conventions. It also detects local group and Service Principal Name (SPN) enumeration using PowerShell cmdlets like 'Get-LocalGroupMember', 'Get-LocalGroup', or ADSI queries for 'samAccountName' and 'servicePrincipalName'. Persistence mechanisms are covered by monitoring registry Run/RunOnce keys for entries that launch 'node' or 'php' executables. Furthermore, the rule looks for suspicious staging of 'node.exe' or 'php.exe' within the AppData\Roaming directory when initiated by PowerShell processes. The rule leverages 'DeviceProcessEvents', 'DeviceRegistryEvents', and 'DeviceEvents' (specifically PowerShellCommand action type) to capture these activities.
This rule detects phishing attempts by identifying emails containing URLs and endpoint network connections to domains known to be associated with phishing campaigns. It leverages an external Indicator of Compromise (IOC) list of phishing domains. The rule scans email events for inbound messages with URLs matching these domains and also monitors endpoint network events for successful connections or HTTP inspections to these malicious domains. The results from both email and endpoint sources are then combined to provide a correlated view of potential phishing activity.
This rule detects various artifacts and behaviors associated with the DeedRAT malware, also known as MicRun or SBAMRES. It identifies the execution of 'MicRun.exe', suspicious file paths like 'C:\ProgramData\MicroDefaults', and registry persistence via 'Run' keys with specific data patterns. The rule also looks for the creation of malicious services using 'sc create MicRun', known malicious SHA256 hashes for both processes and files, and suspicious filenames such as 'SBAMRES.DLL' and 'MicRun.exe'. Additionally, it detects network communication to a known DeedRAT C2 domain, 'luckybear669.kozow.com'.
This rule hunts for various artifacts and behaviors associated with the APT28 campaign "Phantom Net Voxel", which leverages COM hijacking, steganography, and cloud services for C2. This version is specifically tailored for Azure Sentinel using only DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents. It detects known malicious file hashes, regsvr32 execution of a specific DLL, Office applications dropping malicious DLLs or steganographic PNGs, C2 communications to known cloud storage domains, creation of SlimAgent log files, and explorer.exe accessing steganographic PNG files indicating successful COM hijacking.
Detects network traffic consistent with XWorm malware using the Telegram API for Command and Control (C2) or data exfiltration. This rule specifically looks for HTTP requests to 'api.telegram.org' with URL patterns indicative of sending messages or files via the Telegram Bot API (e.g., /bot<token>/sendMessage, /bot<token>/sendDocument, /bot<token>/sendPhoto).
Detects indicators associated with a supply chain attack compromising popular NPM packages like 'chalk' and 'debug'. The rule identifies network connections to known malicious domains and command-line activity related to the installation of compromised packages.
Detects possible Lumma infections based on non-browser network connections to TLDs or steamcommunity API as often seen in Lumma infections
Detects DNS queries for domains known to be used by the DarkCloud campaign for payload delivery and C2 communication. This rule specifically targets domains used for initial payload download, final payload delivery, and public IP address determination.
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" domains. Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware. While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
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