Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
178 detections
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This rule monitors outbound TLS traffic to detect communication with public Slack or Telegram webhook APIs, which are commonly abused by malware or malicious Node.js/npm packages for data exfiltration or command-and-control (C2) operations.
Detects network traffic directed towards Telegram shortened URLs (t.me) which is a common command-and-control (C2) communication channel used by Vidar and other malware families to exfiltrate data or retrieve instructions.
Detects RevStealer malware attempting to use blockchain infrastructure for C2 communication or failover. The rules identify specific 'eth_call' JSON-RPC method calls to Polygon smart contracts containing hardcoded indicators, as well as TLS connections to known public RPC providers used as fallback C2 infrastructure.
Detects network traffic from internal hosts interacting with Ethereum Sepolia testnet contracts via common blockchain infrastructure providers (Alchemy, Infura) or JSON-RPC calls. These patterns are characteristic of 'indexed-btree' malware utilizing decentralized blockchain technology for command-and-control polling.
Detection of known Cloudflare Workers subdomains used as dead-drop resolvers for C2 communication by the QUICSILVER QUICAgent malware. The rule monitors for specific DNS queries to resolve these domains and subsequent HTTP GET requests used to retrieve C2 instructions.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects network traffic associated with the NPM Btree malware campaign, specifically identifying command-and-control (C2) polling activities directed toward blockchain RPC endpoints like Alchemy and Infura. The rules monitor for specific API keys, C2 smart contract addresses via 'eth_call' JSON-RPC requests, and overall traffic patterns to known malicious infrastructure.
Detects network traffic indicating the use of Slack APIs as a command and control (C2) channel or for exfiltration. The rules monitor for specific TLS SNI strings, hardcoded Slack bot tokens, and specific channel IDs associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign, which utilizes Slack as a C2 platform.
Detects network activity associated with a malicious npm package campaign leveraging Sepolia Ethereum testnet RPC endpoints (Alchemy and Infura) for command-and-control (C2) communication. The detection looks for JSON-RPC 'eth_call' requests and specific contract address references characteristic of this campaign.
Detects network activity associated with the NPM Btree malware campaign, specifically TLS/HTTP communication with Ethereum Sepolia RPC endpoints (Alchemy and Infura) and requests containing a hardcoded malicious contract address.
Detection of suspicious network traffic directed toward Slack APIs, characterized by the use of hardcoded Slack bot tokens and specific communication patterns associated with the 'indexed-btree' npm malware family, indicating potential C2 communication or data exfiltration.
Detects outbound network traffic, including DNS lookups, TLS connections, and HTTP requests, directed towards IPRoyal or LightningProxies. These services are commonly used as residential or datacenter proxies and may be leveraged by adversaries for command-and-control (C2) communication, including traffic tunneling for services like Telegram.
Detects network traffic associated with NarwhalRAT malware utilizing the pCloud API as a command-and-control (C2) channel or dead-drop resolver. The rule monitors both HTTP requests containing specific folder identifiers and authentication parameters, as well as TLS SNI indicating connections to api.pcloud.com.
Detects network traffic to GitHub API endpoints that matches patterns indicative of RUSTYSHADE malware communicating with a private repository for command and control. The rule specifically looks for access to repository content paths related to commands, results, heartbeats, screenshots, or information files, coupled with the inclusion of an Authorization token in the HTTP header.
Detects outbound network traffic (TLS and HTTP) destined for the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org). This pattern is often used by malicious actors for Command and Control (C2) communication, bot notifications, or data exfiltration, leveraging the legitimate Telegram infrastructure to hide malicious activity.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects network indicators associated with the ClearFake campaign, including connections to known dead-drop resolvers (bsc-testnet-rpc.publicnode.com), use of Cloudflare Workers as C2 infrastructure, and the delivery of malicious fake browser-update/CAPTCHA JavaScript payloads.
Detects network activity initiated by Node.js processes towards specific Infura and Alchemy RPC endpoints for the Sepolia testnet, including specific JSON-RPC queries containing potential malicious contract addresses. This pattern is indicative of C2 communication using legitimate Web3 infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known public Ethereum RPC gateways (Alchemy and Infura) containing embedded, hardcoded API keys or references to specific contract addresses associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign. This pattern indicates a compromised host leveraging legitimate Web3 infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests indicative of the RevStealer malware interacting with a Polygon blockchain smart contract via a public RPC endpoint. The rule specifically looks for 'eth_call' JSON-RPC methods targeting a known malicious contract address and a specific function selector ('0xd8b0d6ad') often used in RevStealer's command-and-control failover operations.
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