Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
178 detections
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Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to Telegram shortened URLs (t.me). The detection looks for TLS SNI strings or HTTP requests targeting t.me domains, specifically focusing on non-browser user-agent strings which are indicative of Vidar-style malware using Telegram as a dead-drop resolver for C2 operations.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the Telegram Bot API (/sendPhoto) containing patterns indicative of data exfiltration. The rule identifies suspicious message content, such as URLs leading to VK.com or reconnaissance data like Shodan host links and IP location query templates, suggesting the use of Telegram as a Command and Control (C2) channel for exfiltrating sensitive information.
This rule detects network activity associated with the SilverFox malware, specifically targeting communication patterns between the compromised host and identified relay infrastructure. The detection focuses on unique URL query patterns for relay discovery and dispatcher requests, as well as the identification of staging/download links within server responses.
Detects network requests targeting specific public Polygon RPC endpoints that query a known smart contract associated with EtherHiding-style C2 activity. This rule monitors for RPC methods (eth_call, eth_getStorageAt) commonly used to retrieve embedded C2 instructions stored within blockchain state data, a technique known as leveraging smart contracts for command-and-control communication.
This rule detects network communication patterns indicative of the Kimsuky threat group using compromised WordPress sites hosted on wasmer.app for command and control (C2). It specifically looks for established HTTP requests to the .wasmer.app domain, targeting a specific WordPress uploads path and a unique token format in the URI string.
Detects network traffic associated with Hannibal Stealer, including communication with known hardcoded C2 infrastructure, suspicious URI patterns for data exfiltration, and the use of the Telegram Bot API for potential C2 or exfiltration.
Detects outbound network communication attempts by the SilverFox malware to known Cloudflare Workers relay infrastructure, specifically targeting hostnames associated with 'noah-relay' instances. The rule monitors DNS lookups, TLS SNI headers, and HTTP Host headers to identify potential Command and Control (C2) traffic.
Detects network traffic indicative of an adversary using the Ethereum blockchain as a dead-drop C2 channel. The rules identify specific JSON-RPC methods (eth_getTransactionByHash, eth_call) typically associated with querying blockchain data for C2 instructions, as well as non-browser processes initiating these requests to external endpoints.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API containing hardcoded bot tokens and chat IDs associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package campaign. This indicates active data exfiltration or command-and-control communication.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known public Ethereum RPC gateways (Alchemy and Infura) containing embedded, hardcoded API keys or references to specific contract addresses associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign. This pattern indicates a compromised host leveraging legitimate Web3 infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects network traffic directed to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) characterized by TLS SNI indicators or specific HTTP URI structures (e.g., /bot). This behavior is indicative of malware or automated tools using the Telegram platform as a command-and-control (C2) channel for beaconing, command delivery, or data exfiltration.
Detects TLS connections to known CHOSEN BRICK cloud object-storage exfiltration endpoints (VultrObjects, StorjShare, Backblaze B2) and repeated Telegram Bot API document-upload calls consistent with data exfiltration. An earlier revision attempted to chain a Telegram-session flowbit to a later cloud-storage upload, but Suricata flowbits are scoped to a single flow and cannot correlate across the two separate connections involved here, so that cross-flow pair was removed as not functionally valid; each remaining rule fires independently on direct traffic to a known exfil channel.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific URI path ('/wp-content/uploads/init/') on the domain 'wasmer.app', which is associated with Kimsuky (APT43) C2 beaconing activity. The presence of a token parameter in the URI and the structure of the request indicates an established connection for command and control purposes.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the HEAVYGRAM malware beaconing to Telegram's API. It identifies HTTP requests to api.telegram.org containing specific URI strings and parameters, which suggests the bot is performing check-in activities or sending status updates via a Telegram bot channel.
Detects network beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the HEAVYGRAM backdoor, which utilizes the Telegram Bot API for remote interaction. This rule monitors for encrypted SNI traffic directed at api.telegram.org, as well as specific HTTP polling and command execution patterns (e.g., /getUpdates, /bot<token>/) indicating automated interaction with a Telegram bot controlled by an adversary.
Detection of suspicious network traffic directed toward Slack APIs, characterized by the use of hardcoded Slack bot tokens and specific communication patterns associated with the 'indexed-btree' npm malware family, indicating potential C2 communication or data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known public Ethereum RPC gateways (Alchemy and Infura) containing embedded, hardcoded API keys or references to specific contract addresses associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign. This pattern indicates a compromised host leveraging legitimate Web3 infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known public Ethereum RPC gateways (Alchemy and Infura) containing embedded, hardcoded API keys or references to specific contract addresses associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign. This pattern indicates a compromised host leveraging legitimate Web3 infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the PSNATCH malware exfiltrating data to GitHub. It specifically identifies HTTP requests to 'api.github.com' using the custom 'SmartUploader' User-Agent string, which is characteristic of this malware's exfiltration behavior.
This rule detects network traffic patterns indicative of the Transparent Tribe threat group using the GitHub API for command-and-control (C2) operations. It specifically identifies HTTP requests to GitHub's content API that attempt to access or exchange files named 'command.txt', 'results.txt', 'heartbeat.txt', or 'screenshot.png', which are known indicators of this actor's C2 communication strategy.
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