Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
178 detections
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Detects network communication patterns associated with the RUSTYSHADE malware family, which leverages the GitHub REST API for command-and-control (C2) operations. The rule monitors for specific SNI indicators, GitHub API URL patterns for command retrieval, task/result file interactions, exfiltration of files (screenshots/webcam photos), and custom encrypted request body markers.
Detects network activity associated with the EtherHiding technique, where adversaries leverage the Polygon blockchain to resolve command-and-control (C2) infrastructure and communicate with malicious smart contracts. This rule identifies specific JSON-RPC requests ('eth_call') using SloppyRAT contract selectors and DNS queries for blockchain-related RPC endpoints.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the HEAVYGRAM malware beaconing to Telegram's API. It identifies HTTP requests to api.telegram.org containing specific URI strings and parameters, which suggests the bot is performing check-in activities or sending status updates via a Telegram bot channel.
Detects network traffic indicating a HEAVYGRAM malware instance communicating with the Telegram Bot API. This is identified by monitoring encrypted TLS traffic to api.telegram.org, which is a common technique used by malware to establish a command-and-control channel using legitimate web services.
Detects network traffic indicating a HEAVYGRAM malware instance communicating with the Telegram Bot API. This is identified by monitoring encrypted TLS traffic to api.telegram.org, which is a common technique used by malware to establish a command-and-control channel using legitimate web services.
Detects network traffic indicating a HEAVYGRAM malware instance communicating with the Telegram Bot API. This is identified by monitoring encrypted TLS traffic to api.telegram.org, which is a common technique used by malware to establish a command-and-control channel using legitimate web services.
Detects outbound network traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) indicative of long-polling command and control (C2) communication. This behavior is associated with the HEAVYGRAM malware and its use of Telegram as a C2 channel.
Detects outbound network traffic to the Telegram Bot API where the request body contains keywords associated with cryptocurrency wallet software (e.g., MetaMask, Phantom, Tron). This behavior is indicative of a malicious script, possibly embedded in a Google Docs sidebar or similar web-based application, exfiltrating host/browser information or wallet-related data to an attacker-controlled Telegram bot.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to the Telegram Bot API where the request body contains specific action keywords (e.g., VIEW or MOBILE). This pattern is often indicative of C2 communication using legitimate Telegram infrastructure to control compromised systems.
Detects sensitive data exfiltration attempts (PII, credit card, OTP) via HTTP POST requests to suspicious lookalike domains, followed by a WebSocket connection to known IronToll C2 infrastructure.
Detects sensitive data exfiltration attempts (PII, credit card, OTP) via HTTP POST requests to suspicious lookalike domains, followed by a WebSocket connection to known IronToll C2 infrastructure.
Detects sensitive data exfiltration attempts (PII, credit card, OTP) via HTTP POST requests to suspicious lookalike domains, followed by a WebSocket connection to known IronToll C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects network communication associated with the REVSTEALER 'EtherHiding' technique. It monitors for POST requests to Polygon network RPC endpoints containing specific contract interaction signatures ('eth_call' with '0x4965e13f' and a specific contract address), as well as TLS connections to known malicious domains and fallback RPC providers used to resolve C2 instructions from blockchain data.
This rule detects network communication associated with the REVSTEALER 'EtherHiding' technique. It monitors for POST requests to Polygon network RPC endpoints containing specific contract interaction signatures ('eth_call' with '0x4965e13f' and a specific contract address), as well as TLS connections to known malicious domains and fallback RPC providers used to resolve C2 instructions from blockchain data.
Detects network activity related to the Beamglea/ClickFix framework using api.keyval.org as a dead-drop resolver. The rule monitors for DNS resolutions, TLS SNI requests, and HTTP GET/PUT requests to the identified C2 infrastructure, which is used for retrieving and storing obfuscated redirect values.
Detects network traffic associated with the GemStone malicious browser extension, including initial registration to a command-and-control (C2) server on Cloudflare Workers, periodic heartbeat beacons, command polling, and external public IP address lookups for victim identification.
Detects network activity related to the Toy Ghouls 'matrix-bird-agent' backdoor. The rule identifies communication with the domain 'meet.element.tw' via TLS SNI and HTTP host headers, as well as specific Matrix API event types (m.bird.status, m.bird.metrics, m.bird.cmd_response) and references to 'panel-bot' within the HTTP request body, indicating potential command-and-control behavior.
Microsoft Graph API Calendar C2 Activity
Cortex XDR
Detects anomalous Microsoft Graph API activity targeting calendar events and attachments, indicative of the HOLLOWGRAPH C2 protocol. The rule identifies application identity accounts using non-browser user agents to perform suspicious operations (e.g., creating events with future-dated timestamps, specific subject tag formats like 'Boss{..}ID{..}' or 'Event ID:', and file attachments named 'File{n}.txt'). This pattern suggests the use of a compromised M365 mailbox as a two-way dead-drop for C2 and data exfiltration.
Detects developer tooling processes such as Node.js, npm, and yarn—or processes spawned by code editors like VS Code and Cursor—establishing network connections to specific blockchain API endpoints (Tron, Binance Smart Chain, Aptos). This behavior is associated with the DEV#POPPER RAT, which utilizes these blockchain transaction channels to stage encrypted payloads and retrieve configuration keys.
Detects outbound network traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) via TLS SNI or HTTP requests, which is a common communication channel for Command and Control (C2) or management for Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platforms.
Detects periodic beaconing and configuration polling by the TWINLOOT implant using Azure Blob Storage as a dead-drop mechanism. The rules identify specific TLS SNI patterns and HTTP requests for 'cfg.json' files hosted on Azure Blob storage using non-browser user-agents.
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