Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a multi-stage loader execution chain, potentially named GHAPPIER, by identifying sequential stages of execution. These stages include initial marker file checks, shell-based command dispatching via curl/wget, renaming and execution of secondary payloads, Node.js-based runtime staging, and the eventual creation of implant artifacts in common paths such as VSCode extensions or hidden directories.
This rule detects network requests directed at raw.githubusercontent.com that attempt to retrieve 'init.dat' or files named with a specific GUID format, patterns which are characteristic of the Kimsuky threat group using GitHub as a dead drop resolver for C2 infrastructure discovery.
Detects the use of 'winget configure' to retrieve and apply a Desired State Configuration (DSC) file from a remote HTTPS URL. This behavior can be abused to execute malicious configuration scripts directly from the internet.
Detects the installation of known malicious npm or PyPI packages followed within 30 minutes by the execution of a package manager (node or python) performing network activity. This pattern matches the behavior of downloader stages in the 'Graphalgo' campaign, which uses coding-task lures to trick users into installing malicious packages.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows binaries (certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe) to download files from remote URLs to sensitive or common staging directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData). Attackers frequently abuse these built-in tools for 'living off the land' (LotL) to retrieve malicious payloads or secondary tools while bypassing traditional signature-based detection.
Detects the abuse of signed Windows system binaries (LOLBins: certutil, mshta, regsvr32, rundll32, bitsadmin, msiexec) through the identification of command-line arguments that suggest malicious activity, such as downloading remote content, decoding files, executing scriptlets, or loading DLLs from temporary storage directories.
Detects the abuse of the built-in Windows utility 'certutil.exe' to download remote files using URL cache functionality or to deobfuscate base64-encoded payloads. This is a common LOLBin (Living-off-the-Land Binary) technique used in phishing loaders, malware delivery, and post-exploitation toolkits.
This rule detects suspicious activity originating from the PaperCut 'pc-app.exe' process. It monitors for the creation or execution of a file named 'mscopilot.exe' within the non-standard directory 'C:\Microsoft.Office365\'. The rule matches based on a known malicious SHA1 hash or the specific file-write-then-execute behavior within a one-hour window, indicating potential AdaptixC2 loader activity.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that involve suspicious arguments (such as encoded commands, execution from volatile directories like Temp/AppData, or run-once triggers) shortly after a file has been downloaded into a temporary or user-writable directory. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence for downloaded malware.
Detects a specific pattern associated with AvisLoader or similar malware: a device establishes a network connection to known Cloudflare Tunnel infrastructure domains (trycloudflare.com or workers.dev), followed by the creation and execution of an executable file (.exe, .dll, or .scr) in user-writable directories such as Downloads, AppData, or Temp within a 15-minute window.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by correlating device events against a known set of malicious file hashes, domains, and URLs. It identifies files with known malicious hashes, network connections to known malicious domains, and command-line processes attempting to download files from known malicious URLs using common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by correlating device events against a known set of malicious file hashes, domains, and URLs. It identifies files with known malicious hashes, network connections to known malicious domains, and command-line processes attempting to download files from known malicious URLs using common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
This rule detects the Kothamine dropper chain by correlating network connections or command-line activity fetching payloads from a specific GitHub repository ('cphc811-ui/new-tails') with the subsequent creation of associated malicious files (e.g., tailscale-related binaries, injector DLLs) on the same host within a one-hour window.
This rule detects the Kothamine dropper chain by correlating network connections or command-line activity fetching payloads from a specific GitHub repository ('cphc811-ui/new-tails') with the subsequent creation of associated malicious files (e.g., tailscale-related binaries, injector DLLs) on the same host within a one-hour window.
Detects scenarios where common download utilities are used to fetch a file from the internet, followed by the immediate execution or loading of that same file within a 10-minute window, indicative of an Ingress Tool Transfer followed by execution.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows binaries (LOLBins) certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe for suspicious activities such as downloading files via URL or decoding encoded files. This rule explicitly excludes known legitimate administrative activity originating from Microsoft Configuration Manager (SCCM).
This rule detects the use of native Windows utilities certutil.exe and bitsadmin.exe for potentially malicious purposes. Specifically, it flags certutil.exe being used for decoding or cached URL operations, and bitsadmin.exe being used to initiate file transfers from remote URLs or network paths. These tools are commonly abused by attackers for file staging, ingress tool transfer, and deobfuscation of malicious payloads.
Detects suspicious PowerShell process execution initiated by Windows Explorer, specifically involving WebDAV-related commands or network share mounting indicators. This pattern is commonly associated with attackers attempting to download and execute remote payloads from WebDAV shares to bypass security controls.
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