Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of suspected Sauron Loader components staged in C:\ProgramData\keyroll\ (rnpkeys.exe or tdwp.dll) followed by an outbound network connection from the same host within a 2-minute window. This behavior correlates the staging of malicious binaries with the loader's automated outbound registration attempt.
Detects the execution of suspected Sauron Loader components staged in C:\ProgramData\keyroll\ (rnpkeys.exe or tdwp.dll) followed by an outbound network connection from the same host within a 2-minute window. This behavior correlates the staging of malicious binaries with the loader's automated outbound registration attempt.
Detects HTTP(S) requests to known SideCopy/ReverseRAT payload-delivery URLs identified in Operation SideCopy spear-phishing campaigns targeting Indian academia.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses, and for the presence or execution of files with known malicious file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256). It consolidates detections from network traffic, file events, and process execution logs over a 30-day lookback period.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses, and for the presence or execution of files with known malicious file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256). It consolidates detections from network traffic, file events, and process execution logs over a 30-day lookback period.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses, and for the presence or execution of files with known malicious file hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256). It consolidates detections from network traffic, file events, and process execution logs over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects outbound HTTP GET requests where the user agent is set to 'WebClient' and the URI ends in '.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of PowerShell download cradles, which are often used by adversaries to fetch and execute remote malicious scripts directly into memory.
Detects the creation or modification of script files (bat, ps1, vbs, cmd) within the Windows Startup folder initiated by processes commonly associated with AI agents or developer frameworks (e.g., dotnet, python, w3wp). This activity indicates an AI agent environment being exploited to establish persistence, potentially facilitating delayed remote code execution upon user logon.
Detects instances where a browser or agentic-browser process initiates a file download and subsequently executes that same file within a five-minute window, without the intervention of a user-driven process like explorer.exe. This pattern is indicative of automated 'agentic' browser activity, potentially signifying hijacked web instructions or malicious automated tool execution flows.
Detects HTTP GET requests originating from internal hosts to external destinations where the User-Agent string contains 'AutoIt'. This behavior is indicative of the DarkGate malware downloading additional payloads or components using AutoIt scripting capabilities.
Detects usage of the Windows certutil.exe utility with flags commonly used by adversaries to download files from remote URLs or decode base64 encoded files. These techniques are often utilized for ingress tool transfer or deobfuscating malicious payloads.
Detects the use of the BITSAdmin command-line utility to perform file downloads or add files to a transfer job. Adversaries may abuse the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) for downloading malicious files while evading detection or maintaining persistence.
This rule monitors for suspicious activities involving digital certificates. It detects PowerShell processes attempting to import a certificate into the Root store, which could indicate persistence or credential interception, and it detects the use of curl to download files named 'cert.pem' with insecure SSL settings (no certificate verification).
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with the Psychedelic Stealer malware command and control (C2) agent. The rule matches specific URI paths used for pinging, configuration retrieval, and tasking, while verifying the presence of the required 'X-API-Key' header, indicating established C2 communication.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with the Psychedelic Stealer malware command and control (C2) agent. The rule matches specific URI paths used for pinging, configuration retrieval, and tasking, while verifying the presence of the required 'X-API-Key' header, indicating established C2 communication.
Detects the staging of a potential RatHat malware component by observing a native Go binary being moved into /data/local/tmp via ADB shell (uid 2000), followed by an associated service binding to local port 7912 within a 5-minute window. This sequence is characteristic of the deployment process for this specific Android threat.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically focusing on its use of WebSocket-based FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) tunnels for command and control, session initialization, configuration retrieval, and local loopback proxy communication.
Detects the presence of known RatHat Go-based command agents (liblocal-service.so) or frpc reverse-proxy clients (libmedia_codec.so) when staged within temporary directories such as /data/local/tmp on Android devices, often following manual ADB shell interaction.
Detects instances where common script interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, etc.) are launched by developer-centric processes (node.exe, npm.exe, Code.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments often used for reconnaissance, payload downloading, or obfuscated command execution.
Detects VBScript files that exhibit characteristics of a downloader or dropper, including common Windows API usage (WScript.Shell, Shell.Application, MSXML2.XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream), staging in the C:\Users\Public\ directory, and performing sandbox evasion via WMI InstallDate checks.
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