Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound TLS traffic where the Server Name Indication (SNI) matches known command-and-control (C2) domains associated with the Sauron Loader malware. This indicates a compromised host attempting to communicate with malicious infrastructure.
Detects a Bash stager script associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) 'ClickFix' campaign. The script performs system architecture verification to download a specific Mach-O payload, makes the downloaded file executable using chmod, and subsequently executes the payload.
Detects the download and presence of the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) payload, a 64-bit Mach-O executable, identified by specific file hashes or internal file structure characteristics (Mach-O magic bytes) within a specific file size range.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of the Sauron Loader malware, utilizing a specific, randomized URI path structure and a known malicious User-Agent string to establish C2 communication.
Detects the download and presence of the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) payload, a 64-bit Mach-O executable, identified by specific file hashes or internal file structure characteristics (Mach-O magic bytes) within a specific file size range.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of the Sauron Loader malware, utilizing a specific, randomized URI path structure and a known malicious User-Agent string to establish C2 communication.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize a combination of 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) and obfuscated strings typical of download cradles. The rule looks for escaped double quotes inside the command line and specific regex patterns that match common obfuscation techniques used to hide malicious URLs or script components.
Detects the execution of potentially malicious utilities (curl, finger, cmd, powershell) that are launched by the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe). This pattern is often indicative of malicious activity where an adversary uses legitimate OS processes to spawn command shells or network tools for further exploitation or file retrieval.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious repository interactions by monitoring 'git' commands executed by common AI-assisted coding tools or command-line developer utilities. It flags occurrences where a checkout operation occurs without accompanying standard git history or status checks, which may indicate automated exfiltration or lateral movement attempt within a developer environment.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
Detects the creation of files within the 'AppData\Local\SystemFolder32' directory. This path is non-standard and is frequently used by malware or unauthorized scripts to conceal malicious payloads or persistence mechanisms while masquerading as legitimate system components.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to download a specific payload associated with the RustyShade malware from a Backblaze B2 cloud storage bucket. It monitors command lines containing 'wget' or 'Invoke-WebRequest' targeting 'f005.backblazeb2.com' and files named 'DriverInstaller.zip'.
This rule detects PowerShell processes executing with hidden window styles while performing web-based download operations from GitHub domains. It further identifies potential nested PowerShell execution, which is often used in obfuscated download-and-execute attack chains.
Detects network communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence of known malicious file hashes on the system. The rule correlates network connection events, file creation events, and process creation events against predefined lists of C2 infrastructure and malware indicators.
Detects instances where a Semantic Kernel agent host process (or related .NET processes) spawns suspicious child processes such as command shells, network tools, or system enumeration utilities. This activity is indicative of potential command injection or remote code execution via AI agent frameworks, where an LLM-driven agent might be coerced into executing arbitrary commands on the underlying host.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
Detects a specific pattern associated with the VioletRAT stage-2 loader, where cmd.exe executes a randomly-named batch file from a temporary directory, which subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell process designed to download or reflectively load a .NET assembly.
Detects a specific pattern associated with the VioletRAT stage-2 loader, where cmd.exe executes a randomly-named batch file from a temporary directory, which subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell process designed to download or reflectively load a .NET assembly.
Detects a specific pattern associated with the VioletRAT stage-2 loader, where cmd.exe executes a randomly-named batch file from a temporary directory, which subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell process designed to download or reflectively load a .NET assembly.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by correlating device events against a known set of malicious file hashes, domains, and URLs. It identifies files with known malicious hashes, network connections to known malicious domains, and command-line processes attempting to download files from known malicious URLs using common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
Detects the use of download utilities (curl or wget) from terminal shells with command-line arguments containing 'force=1' and architecture-specific identifiers (e.g., arm64, x86_64). This pattern matches the execution chain commonly associated with ClickFix-based AMOS malware distribution, where users are tricked into pasting commands to download and execute architecture-specific payloads.
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