Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects non-browser processes initiating network connections to common file-sharing or cloud services (e.g., GitHub Gist, Telegram, Dropbox) followed by subsequent network activity from the same process within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential command and control (C2) communication, payload retrieval, or data staging/exfiltration using legitimate web services.
Detects network activity related to the SectopRAT malware downloading a secondary module named 'WbElevation.dll' from a known command and control (C2) server. This module is typically associated with browser credential theft functionality.
Detects network activity related to the SectopRAT malware downloading a secondary module named 'WbElevation.dll' from a known command and control (C2) server. This module is typically associated with browser credential theft functionality.
Detects a sequence of Tox P2P protocol packets consisting of a Cookie Request, Cookie Response, and Crypto Handshake within a single network flow. This pattern is indicative of the Tox P2P protocol, which is sometimes abused by malware (e.g., AvisLoader) for command-and-control (C2) communications to evade traditional network inspection.
Detects a sequence of Tox P2P protocol packets consisting of a Cookie Request, Cookie Response, and Crypto Handshake within a single network flow. This pattern is indicative of the Tox P2P protocol, which is sometimes abused by malware (e.g., AvisLoader) for command-and-control (C2) communications to evade traditional network inspection.
Detects the execution of VelvetCake modular scripts by PowerShell, which involves downloading and executing scripts from %TEMP% via Invoke-Expression, and monitoring the C:\Users\Public directory for file staging and subsequent exfiltration. This rule captures the tactical loop of script execution, output file creation, and exfiltration preparation often observed in Operation Conflict Compass activity.
Detects unexpected child process execution spawned by the ScreenConnect ClientService. This activity is indicative of the exploitation of CVE-2026-84869, which allows for unauthorized file transfer and arbitrary code execution within the context of the remote support agent without requiring user interaction or confirmation.
Detects unauthorized or potentially malicious file transfer activity within ScreenConnect sessions. The rule flags file transfers occurring on vulnerable versions of ScreenConnect (prior to 26.6.5), transfers that bypass user confirmation prompts, or instances where files are transferred and subsequently executed.
Detects network activity associated with shellcode staging, specifically requests to the domain 'deadhub.org' or its specific IP address using hardcoded paths that mimic static UI assets. This activity is indicative of a loader fetching malicious fragments for in-memory execution.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific GitHub repository path (raw.githubusercontent.com/omskiwdcvoiuyfd0998/) identified as staging infrastructure associated with Konni/VelvetCake malware operations. This activity is indicative of a compromised host attempting to download malicious payloads or stage tools from actor-controlled infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific GitHub repository path (raw.githubusercontent.com/omskiwdcvoiuyfd0998/) identified as staging infrastructure associated with Konni/VelvetCake malware operations. This activity is indicative of a compromised host attempting to download malicious payloads or stage tools from actor-controlled infrastructure.
Detects the execution of Python processes where command line arguments indicate the use of the DLLMemLoader agent or related indicators like 'hostfxr' or specific hex strings. This activity is often associated with the loading of malicious DLLs or secondary stages in an attack chain.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
Detects execution of python scripts or shell commands involving curl from temporary directories like /tmp, /Temp, or /Downloads. This pattern is commonly associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads, often involving downloading scripts via curl or executing files that mimic legitimate standalone python builds or system scripts.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is used to download or execute remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools or remote access software binaries (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Atera). This pattern is often indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistent remote access to a compromised system after initial intrusion.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands using encoded arguments combined with network download cmdlets. This pattern is indicative of a multi-stage loader chain often used in 'ClickFix' style social engineering lures to download and execute secondary malicious payloads.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
Detects network communication to known SpiceRAT Command and Control (C2) IP addresses and DNS queries for known SpiceRAT-related domains. The rule identifies potential compromise by flagging outbound traffic or DNS resolutions associated with SpiceRAT infrastructure.
This rule detects PowerShell processes attempting to download specific ZIP files (e.g., DriverInstaller.zip, Automata-20.zip, ww.zip) from Backblaze B2 cloud storage buckets. This pattern is commonly associated with the delivery of malicious payloads or staged tools.
Detects common web application and application server processes (such as java, node, nginx, or apache) spawning suspicious shell or utility processes. This behavior is often indicative of exploitation of a web vulnerability (e.g., Remote Code Execution) where an adversary attempts to gain a reverse shell or execute post-exploitation commands.
Detects network communication to domains and specific file paths associated with the MacSync macOS stealer, which is used for malware dropper delivery and command-and-control (C2) operations. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for indicators such as specific malicious URLs, iCloud path abuse, and C2 infrastructure interaction.
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