Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,521 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,049
575
259
163
130
Contributors
536
485
323
178
133
Categories
1,256
974
852
701
406
Platforms
1,929
373
346
244
20
Products / Services
759
507
254
248
210
MITRE Techniques
18,127
15,648
12,596
8,407
6,231
2,521
CVEs
7
5
4
4
4
IDS Classtypes
201
41
5
4
1
IDS Protocols
175
38
21
9
7
Detects network activity associated with the SilverFox malware, specifically targeting the discovery of relay endpoints via specific URI patterns containing cache-busting timestamps, DNS lookups for identified relay domains (noah-ssh.com.cn) and Cloudflare Workers subdomains, and suspicious HTTP response characteristics such as specific cache headers paired with wildcard CORS headers.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for outbound network connections to a list of known malicious IP addresses associated with various C2 frameworks and malware families, as identified by threat intelligence feeds (e.g., ThreatFox). Identifying these connections helps detect potential C2 communication and ingress tool transfer.
This rule monitors network connections, file events, and process execution command lines for references to a list of known malicious URLs, including indicators associated with ClearFake, IClickFix, AMOS, Remus, and Mozi botnet payloads.
This rule detects shell processes (sh or bash) being spawned from suspicious, commonly writable directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) within a short window of file system activity (creation, modification, or deletion) and associated MQTT protocol network communication. This pattern is indicative of potential malware staging or command-and-control activity on Linux systems.
Detects the Kimsuky APT-C-55 'Stella_Gary' attack chain, where PowerShell is used to download a JavaScript verification script from an external C2 (InfinityFree), followed by the execution of that script via cscript.exe in temporary directories. This behavior is used to bypass anti-bot mechanisms and retrieve secondary payloads from hardcoded C2 infrastructure.
Detects HTTP traffic from internal hosts to the 'gapidriver.com' domain, specifically identifying the GapiUpdate stager behavior. The rule looks for authenticated GET requests to '/api/get.php' using a specific Bearer token and User-Agent, as well as status reporting to '/api/rest.php'.
Detects HTTP requests to known Sality (SALTY SPIDER) payload-hosting
domains distributed as "URL packs" to infected bots. Sality's P2P network tasks bots
with URL packs pointing to compromised or operator-maintained web servers hosting
malware payloads (such as the EggJagger clipjacker) disguised as innocuous image or
document files (.gif, .png, .pdf) on free hosting providers.
domains distributed as "URL packs" to infected bots. Sality's P2P network tasks bots
with URL packs pointing to compromised or operator-maintained web servers hosting
malware payloads (such as the EggJagger clipjacker) disguised as innocuous image or
document files (.gif, .png, .pdf) on free hosting providers.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication related to the GhostContainer malware. It inspects HTTP POST requests directed at Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) paths containing a suspicious 'x-owa-urlpostdata' header. The presence of this specific header, followed by a base64-encoded string of significant length, indicates an attempt to deliver C2 commands or exfiltrate data through OWA infrastructure.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication related to the GhostContainer malware. It inspects HTTP POST requests directed at Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) paths containing a suspicious 'x-owa-urlpostdata' header. The presence of this specific header, followed by a base64-encoded string of significant length, indicates an attempt to deliver C2 commands or exfiltrate data through OWA infrastructure.
This rule monitors for interactions with known malicious files (by SHA256 hash), connections to confirmed C2 infrastructure (specific IP address and domains), or requests to known malicious URLs. It aggregates indicators across file, process, network, and web browsing telemetry to identify potential threats or compromised systems communicating with known attacker infrastructure.
This rule monitors for interactions with known malicious files (by SHA256 hash), connections to confirmed C2 infrastructure (specific IP address and domains), or requests to known malicious URLs. It aggregates indicators across file, process, network, and web browsing telemetry to identify potential threats or compromised systems communicating with known attacker infrastructure.
This rule monitors for interactions with known malicious files (by SHA256 hash), connections to confirmed C2 infrastructure (specific IP address and domains), or requests to known malicious URLs. It aggregates indicators across file, process, network, and web browsing telemetry to identify potential threats or compromised systems communicating with known attacker infrastructure.
Detects the execution of curl.exe by various script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe) or Windows Explorer. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to download malicious payloads or intermediate loaders as part of an attack chain, such as deploying CastleLoader/CastleRAT.
Detects instances of ImageMagick binaries (convert, identify, magick) spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., shells, network tools, scripting interpreters) when processing image files with HEIF/HEIC extensions. This is a common pattern for exploiting image processing vulnerabilities (e.g., ImageTragick) to achieve remote code execution.
Detects instances of ImageMagick binaries (convert, identify, magick) spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., shells, network tools, scripting interpreters) when processing image files with HEIF/HEIC extensions. This is a common pattern for exploiting image processing vulnerabilities (e.g., ImageTragick) to achieve remote code execution.
Detects instances of ImageMagick binaries (convert, identify, magick) spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., shells, network tools, scripting interpreters) when processing image files with HEIF/HEIC extensions. This is a common pattern for exploiting image processing vulnerabilities (e.g., ImageTragick) to achieve remote code execution.
Detects instances of ImageMagick binaries (convert, identify, magick) spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., shells, network tools, scripting interpreters) when processing image files with HEIF/HEIC extensions. This is a common pattern for exploiting image processing vulnerabilities (e.g., ImageTragick) to achieve remote code execution.
Detects the execution of processes related to the 'Toy Ghouls' bird-agent tool delivery, utilizing Evil-WinRM or WinRM-fs to execute commands remotely via the WinRM service (wsmprovhost.exe).
Page 36 of 121