Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network traffic (DNS queries, HTTP requests, and TLS SNI) directed towards the domain 'htlwub00klocate.blogspot.com', which is associated with adversary staging activity.
Detects a multi-stage PowerShell execution pattern often associated with 'ClickFix' or similar social engineering lures, where a base64-encoded or obfuscated command is used to invoke malicious network downloads (IEX, WebClient, DownloadString). The rule further correlates these execution patterns with potential persistence mechanisms, specifically monitoring modifications to Windows startup locations or Run keys.
Detects a suspicious multi-stage PowerShell execution pattern where an initial process utilizing obfuscated arguments (e.g., -EncodedCommand) launches a secondary PowerShell process that performs network operations indicative of downloading and executing a remote payload.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
This rule detects network activity associated with the PlugX RAT, specifically monitoring for DNS lookups of 'images.hcgtest.net', direct IP connections to '104.21.77.221', and HTTP requests to '/download/ar96rhqjgw2' using a user-agent containing 'curl'. This pattern indicates a compromised host attempting to download a PlugX archive.
Detects network connections to known remote tunneling and relay services (e.g., ngrok, Cloudflare Tunnel) initiated by commonly abused LOLBins or processes running from user-writable directories. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary establishing persistent remote access or egress channels for command-and-control communication.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects the execution of known command-line utilities (cmd, powershell, mshta, wscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize external network request tools (curl, finger) to initiate network connections. This pattern is commonly observed in stage-1 downloader behavior where a user-initiated action from explorer triggers an attempt to pull down external payloads.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting the domain 'mnl.ac' and its associated infrastructure (IPs 149.255.35.135 and 45.74.7.27). The rules monitor for DNS queries, HTTP requests to fetch configuration files (configuration.ps1), and general outbound TCP connections that characterize the staging phase of the ClickFix PowerShell execution chain.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects network traffic patterns associated with the Kimsuky threat group utilizing raw.githubusercontent.com as a dead-drop resolver. The rule specifically identifies the retrieval of configuration files (.ini) and victim-specific data files (.dat) containing MachineGuid identifiers, which are characteristic of Kimsuky's command and control (C2) operations.
Detects the execution of command-line tools (powershell, cmd, bash, curl, etc.) originating from common package managers and build tools (npm, node, pip, python, yarn). The rule flags these processes if they contain command-line arguments indicative of suspicious activity such as base64-encoded commands, remote script execution (IEX, curl/wget to shell), or indicators of persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks, registry Run keys).
Detects network traffic initiated by the WeaselBiscuit loader targeting api.npoint.io, a known free JSON storage service often abused by adversaries as a dead drop resolver for Command and Control (C2) configurations or secondary payloads.
Detects network communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence of known malicious file hashes on the system. The rule correlates network connection events, file creation events, and process creation events against predefined lists of C2 infrastructure and malware indicators.
Detects the use of PowerShell's 'WriteAllBytes' method to write a file to the user's Local AppData Temp directory, immediately followed by the creation of a known or suspicious executable file in that same location. This pattern is commonly indicative of a stage in a fileless-style malware attack or automated payload delivery.
Detects the activity of the PIVOTPIPE .NET loader, which involves writing specific artifacts (core.pak, agent.json, pk.der, or sleepmask.o) to a temporary directory with the 'nb_' prefix or the creation of debug files containing strings associated with in-memory reflective loading of a remote access tool (RAT).
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