Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (encoded commands, hidden window style, or specific payload strings like 'MiniJunk') originating from common file staging directories (e.g., Downloads, Temp, AppData). This pattern is often indicative of malicious post-lure payload execution.
Detects artifacts, execution of harness tooling, and post-exploitation behavior associated with CVE-2026-55200 in libssh2. The rule monitors for the presence of known exploit filenames (libpwn), suspicious Python script execution, unexpected shell spawning from SSH-enabled clients, and outbound network connections to non-standard ports typical of exploit scaffolding.
Detects the execution of known malicious or hijacked npm and Go packages associated with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' supply chain campaign. The rule monitors for node.exe or go.exe spawning unexpected child processes like shells or download utilities (e.g., curl, powershell) and the presence of specific malicious package names in command lines.
This rule detects network connections to or from known suspicious IP addresses and requests to known suspicious domains. These indicators are often associated with command and control (C2) activity, malware distribution, or other malicious infrastructure.
Detects a Python loader process spawned by VS Code or Node.js environments that exhibits suspicious network activity indicative of fetching the InvisibleFerret infostealer, correlated with the installation of Python dependencies via 'pip' within a 10-minute window. This behavior is associated with the Lazarus Group 'Contagious Interview' campaign.
Detects the execution of known Windows download utilities (curl, wget, certutil, bitsadmin, powershell) spawned directly from cmd.exe (batch script context). The rule focuses on commands referencing temporary directories or common download/transfer parameters, which are often indicative of staged malicious activity, such as fetching secondary payloads or tools.
Detects HTTP GET requests to a specific file path (docs.zip) on the Ukrainian government website (drs.gov.ua), identified as an activity associated with the Turla threat group's STOCKSTAY malware component.
Detects instances where a Python interpreter (python.exe or python3.exe) initiates an interactive command-line shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash.exe, or sh.exe). The detection logic further narrows this behavior by looking for common reverse shell indicators such as socket connections or command execution arguments within the process command line.
Detects the loader using the native Windows curl.exe to retrieve a ZIP archive containing the RMM components, bypassing PowerShell execution policies. This rule specifically looks for curl.exe executing with the '-o' flag to output to a .zip file from an HTTP/HTTPS URL, and then correlates this with a file creation event for a .zip file on the same device.
Detects suspicious child process creation originating from Adobe ColdFusion or IIS worker processes (w3wp.exe). This rule monitors for the execution of command-line shells, scripting engines, or download utilities often used in exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2023-26360, CVE-2023-29298, or CVE-2023-29300.
Detects the creation of files named 'WC3' or 'wt1' within the 'C:\ProgramData' directory. These filenames are associated with the UAC-0226 threat actor's delivery chain, specifically involving an encoded PowerShell loader (WC3) and an arithmetic-encoded GIFTEDCROOK payload (wt1). These files are typically dropped via path traversal exploitation (CVE-2025-8088) using WinRAR NTFS alternate data streams.
Detects potential remote code execution (RCE) attempts targeting Langflow that manifest as the spawning of child shell processes or the execution of curl/wget commands to download and execute malicious scripts (specifically 'isp.sh') from the IP address 83.142.209.214. It also monitors for Python-based execution patterns using 'os.system' to drop or execute these payloads.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity potentially associated with the 'Ptero' malware family. The rule correlates several behaviors: direct invocation of PowerShell with known Ptero-related script names, execution spawned by common phishing delivery parents (such as Office applications or web scripting engines), PowerShell downloading files from Cloudflare Workers domains, and the correlation of PowerShell network download activity with subsequent registry-based persistence modifications.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities on macOS: downloading a file from a potentially malicious source using curl, mounting a disk image using hdiutil, and subsequently opening files from the mounted volume. This pattern is commonly associated with the delivery and execution of malicious payloads, such as trojanized software or malware installers.
Detects node.exe spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe during npm package installation process, indicating potential malicious use of preinstall or postinstall scripts. This pattern has been observed in supply chain attacks involving infostealers like Miasma and MYRA.
Detects instances where DllHost.exe creates or writes executable, script, or library files into common user-writable directories (e.g., C:\Users\*, C:\ProgramData\*, C:\Temp\*). This behavior is often associated with file staging or the delivery of malicious payloads. The rule also checks if the DllHost.exe process was spawned by WSL (Windows Subsystem for Linux) related processes, which can be indicative of cross-environment execution or evasion techniques.
Detects the execution of a potentially malicious fltMC.exe from the user's TEMP directory, a technique utilized by the Red Lamassu actor to sideload the JFMBackdoor. This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes or the execution of fltMC.exe from suspicious locations where the legitimate System32 binary should not reside.
Detects the execution of short-named executable binaries from common staging directories (Users\Public, Windows\Temp, ProgramData) where the parent process is DllHost.exe, explorer.exe, or cmd.exe. This pattern is indicative of WSL2 being used to stage and execute payloads, where DllHost.exe is leveraged to proxy file operations from the WSL2 environment to the Windows host, potentially bypassing certain security controls.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to suspicious URIs and subsequent inbound responses containing executable binary (PE) signatures, characteristic of Emotet malware command-and-control (C2) activity.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts exhibiting characteristics of PowerShell-based download cradles, such as specific User-Agent strings or URL patterns associated with IEX DownloadString or Invoke-WebRequest.
Detects when 'Cursor.exe' (a legitimate application) spawns common command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, curl.exe, wget.exe, certutil.exe, bitsadmin.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of downloading files from the internet (e.g., containing 'http://', 'https://', 'ftp://', '-o', '-OutFile', 'iwr', 'DownloadString', 'DownloadFile'). This could indicate malicious activity where 'Cursor.exe' is being abused to facilitate ingress tool transfer or execute malicious payloads.
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