Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation of executable or PowerShell script files in common temporary or user-writeable directories by DllHost.exe within 120 seconds of the execution of wsl.exe. This behavior is indicative of potential payload staging where Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) might be leveraged to obscure or facilitate the delivery and execution of malicious artifacts.
Detects malicious shell script execution on Linux edge/IoT devices associated with the JDY botnet exploitation of CVE-2026-35616. The rule identifies processes checking for MIPS-based architectures, using download utilities (wget, curl) for payload retrieval, and subsequent file deletion activity indicative of post-exploitation cleanup.
Detects outbound network connections originating from the 'vmmem' process, which is the Windows host process managing the WSL2 virtual machine. Since WSL2 operates with its own network stack, connections from this process to non-local (non-RFC-1918) IP addresses can bypass traditional Windows host-based network telemetry, potentially indicating command-and-control (C2) activity or payload staging occurring within the WSL2 container environment.
This rule detects network connections to or from known suspicious IP addresses and requests to known suspicious domains. These indicators are often associated with command and control (C2) activity, malware distribution, or other malicious infrastructure.
Detects a suspected exploitation of CVE-2026-35616 on edge/SOHO devices, followed within 5 minutes by the download of an architecture-specific MIPS dropper via curl or wget, a behavior consistent with known threat activity such as the Volt Typhoon/JDY Botnet.
Detects bulk file downloads of executable or script content from web proxies using automated or headless client agents (e.g., curl, wget) where no browser-like Referer is present. The rule aggregates these downloads within a 10-minute window and correlates them with endpoint Sysmon file creation events in non-standard directories, indicating potential tool staging or malware delivery.
This rule monitors for potentially malicious use of the Windows Certutil utility, specifically targeting the -urlcache (often used to download remote files) and -decode (used to decode hidden or obfuscated payloads) command-line arguments. It filters out common trusted processes like Microsoft's msiexec.exe to reduce noise.
Detects suspicious browser-downloaded executables using image, screenshot, document, invoice, scan, or receipt-themed filenames that execute from user-writable locations and are followed by suspicious payload creation, Run-key persistence, or outbound network activity. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders, fake image/document lures, and user-executed initial access payloads.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to GitHub Actions workflows, including the creation or modification of workflow configuration files, the placement of suspicious JavaScript files in the repository's .github directory, the execution of the 'Bun' runtime within an Actions runner environment, and cloud-based events indicating workflow modification containing 'Run Copilot' strings. These patterns are often associated with CI/CD pipeline compromise, malicious automation, or unauthorized code execution within build environments.
This rule monitors for potentially malicious use of the Windows Certutil utility, specifically targeting the -urlcache (often used to download remote files) and -decode (used to decode hidden or obfuscated payloads) command-line arguments. It filters out common trusted processes like Microsoft's msiexec.exe to reduce noise.
Detects potential command and control (C2) activity from node.exe to known malicious domains associated with the Polymarket Trap / wshu.net campaign. Additionally, it monitors for suspicious child process spawning by node.exe, including usage of downloader utilities (curl, wget, PowerShell) or execution of downloaded scripts/archives (npm, .tgz files) indicative of malicious post-exploitation activity.
Detects network activity and process execution patterns associated with the Amadey loader and Operation FlutterBridge. The rule monitors for unauthorized file downloads from self-hosted GitLab repositories using raw paths, delivery of malicious archives like 'protected.zip', and the execution of common downloaders (PowerShell, cmd, curl, wget) triggered by known Amadey process artifacts (Yfgfwb.exe).
Detects the use of the BITSAdmin utility to transfer files or set notification command lines. BITSAdmin is a legitimate Windows utility often abused by adversaries to download malicious files or achieve persistence/execution via BITS jobs.
Detects the execution of the Windows binary 'certutil.exe' using flags commonly abused by adversaries to download files from remote URLs or decode base64-encoded files. It excludes instances where certutil is executed by Microsoft-signed processes from the System32 directory to reduce false positives.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with command-line arguments containing keywords indicative of in-memory download and execution, such as '-enc' or '-EncodedCommand' used in conjunction with 'IEX' (Invoke-Expression) or 'DownloadString'. This pattern is a common TTP for initial access and second-stage payload delivery, and was observed in the exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell).
Detects instances where the Windows script hosts wscript.exe or cscript.exe establish outbound network connections to common web ports (HTTP/HTTPS) on external IP addresses. This behavior is frequently associated with script-based malware, droppers, or C2 beacons.
Detects the execution of command-line interfaces (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe) when spawned by common browser processes or Windows Explorer. This is a common pattern for drive-by downloads or malicious scripts executed via the browser, characterized by command lines containing download indicators (e.g., Invoke-Expression, curl, certutil, encoded commands).
Detects the TONResolver RAT infection chain, where PowerShell is used to download the Node.js runtime to a non-standard directory under AppData\Local\Nodejs, followed by the execution of a JavaScript payload. This behavior is associated with campaigns utilizing Cloudflare-proxied (.cfd) domains to distribute malicious components.
Detects execution of PowerShell processes spawned by script hosts (wscript.exe, mshta.exe) with common bypass/encoded flags. The rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns involving known malicious infrastructure domains or specific suspected payload filenames, indicative of the Millenium RAT dropper activity.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands indicative of Gamaredon (Shuckworm) threat group activity. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes utilizing command-line arguments typical of their 2025 downloader toolset (such as PteroPaste, PteroDee, and PteroCache), specifically combining encoded commands, in-memory execution (IEX/Invoke-Expression), and remote file fetching (DownloadString).
Detects the obfuscated 'setup.cjs' dropper associated with the easy-day-js npm supply chain attack. The rule identifies unique obfuscated variable names, XOR-encoded marker bytes, and specific campaign-related strings, including postinstall commands, package names, second-stage payload filenames, self-deletion patterns, and TLS bypass indicators.
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