Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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RMM: ScreenConnect
Theme: DocuSign
URL: hxxps://vy.ijnggpi[.]com/ftx/
MSI Download URL: hxxps://web-g63lkz.screenconnect[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi
SHA256: a30a9779079dc897a15fed27f27f614fab77a20e953368808ba99ac6c6a3375b
Theme: DocuSign
URL: hxxps://vy.ijnggpi[.]com/ftx/
MSI Download URL: hxxps://web-g63lkz.screenconnect[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi
SHA256: a30a9779079dc897a15fed27f27f614fab77a20e953368808ba99ac6c6a3375b
Detects the use of 'curl' with '-X PUT' and '--data-binary' options, which can indicate data exfiltration or staging activities. This combination is often used to upload raw data to a specified endpoint.
Detects a multi-stage attack sequence where a web-facing application (e.g., Python, Node.js) downloads a file to a temporary directory (/tmp or /var/tmp) using curl or wget, creates the file, and subsequently applies executable permissions (chmod +x) to it. This pattern is characteristic of CVE-2026-33017 exploitation targeting Langflow to deploy cryptomining binaries.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity originating from Langflow-related web service processes (langflow, uvicorn, gunicorn, python). It detects the spawning of unexpected OS-level child processes (like shell interpreters), creation of suspicious files in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm), and outbound network connections to known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with recent Langflow exploitation attempts (CVE-2026-33017).
This rule detects network activity associated with the easy-day-js Mastra npm supply chain attack. Specifically, it identifies data exfiltration over TLS to a secondary C2 server (23.254.164.123:443) and the download of a stage-2 payload from a primary C2 server (23.254.164.92:8000) via HTTP, looking for the URI '/update/49890878'.
Detects suspicious usage of the Bun runtime, specifically when it is spawned by common Node.js development processes (like npm or node-gyp) or downloaded from non-official sources using command-line tools or browsers. This behavior is associated with the Miasma malware campaign, which abuses the Bun runtime for malicious operations.
This rule detects when a command-line shell (bash, sh, cmd, powershell) is spawned by a parent process (curl, git, php, ssh) that has recently established an outbound network connection on port 22 (SSH). It also flags instances where the child shell process subsequently opens a network listener, often indicating a potential reverse shell or unauthorized remote access attempt.
This rule detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to initiate file transfer jobs. These tools can be abused by adversaries to download malicious payloads or exfiltrate data, often bypassing standard firewall restrictions. The rule specifically filters out legitimate Microsoft-signed processes to reduce noise.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows binaries (Certutil and BITSAdmin) to communicate with external, non-Microsoft IP addresses, which is indicative of potential tool downloading or data exfiltration. The rule explicitly filters out known Microsoft update domains to reduce noise.
This rule detects scenarios where a common web browser (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, IE, Opera, or Brave) connects to an external destination not on a known allow-list, followed shortly (within 30 seconds) by the execution of a script-based binary (wscript.exe or mshta.exe) on the same host. This is a common pattern for initial access where a user downloads a malicious script from an unknown source via a browser and subsequently executes it.
Detects Payouts King ransomware operator TTPs involving Microsoft Teams social engineering followed by Windows Quick Assist (msra.exe) abuse. The rule monitors for three primary indicators: Teams spawning Quick Assist, Quick Assist being launched with remote session-initiation flags, and Quick Assist spawning suspicious child processes (cmd, powershell, etc.) or network utilities (curl, certutil, bitsadmin) characteristic of post-exploitation payload delivery.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows binaries (Certutil and BITSAdmin) to communicate with external, non-Microsoft IP addresses, which is indicative of potential tool downloading or data exfiltration. The rule explicitly filters out known Microsoft update domains to reduce noise.
This rule detects scenarios where a common web browser (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, IE, Opera, or Brave) connects to an external destination not on a known allow-list, followed shortly (within 30 seconds) by the execution of a script-based binary (wscript.exe or mshta.exe) on the same host. This is a common pattern for initial access where a user downloads a malicious script from an unknown source via a browser and subsequently executes it.
Detects node.exe executing 'test.js' as a child process of NPM lifecycle scripts (postinstall/preinstall). This behavior is characteristic of malicious NPM packages like 'ts-bn-lint' and 'log-taker' used in the Polymarket Trap campaign to execute an embedded infostealer payload.
Detects the creation of files associated with the SPECTRALVIPER malware, used by OceanLotus for DLL sideloading. This rule specifically monitors for known launcher executables (e.g., Genuine.exe, Updater.exe) and associated configuration/payload files (e.g., GlobalSettings.conf, appcompat.log) being dropped into directories commonly used for persistence or lateral movement, such as Autodesk and Windows appcompat folders.
This rule detects various activities related to the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), specifically focusing on: 1) Executing network tools like curl or wget via wsl.exe, 2) The creation of executable or script files in suspicious directories (User\Public, ProgramData, Windows\Temp) by DllHost.exe, and 3) The execution of wsl.exe or wslhost.exe. These behaviors are often associated with adversaries using WSL to bypass security controls, stage payloads, or facilitate command-and-control communication.
Detects instances where DllHost.exe creates or writes files in sensitive directories (Users, ProgramData, Windows\Temp) without any associated network connection events (Sysmon EID 3). This pattern is consistent with potential WSL2 proxied file operations where the network connection originates within a virtual machine and is invisible to standard Windows host telemetry, potentially masking malicious activity.
Detects the Red Lamassu batch script dropper (1.bat) leveraging PowerShell with hidden window styles to download malicious JFMBackdoor components (flt.bin, FLTLIB.dll, scr.mui, fltMC.exe) into temporary directories from known actor-controlled infrastructure (23.27.201.160).
Detects instances where DllHost.exe (COM Surrogate) creates executable or script files in high-risk, user-writable directories. This activity is indicative of potential exploitation of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL2) filesystem proxy, where a Linux process running within WSL2 writes files to the Windows host filesystem (/mnt/c/), resulting in the file creation event being attributed to the DllHost.exe COM surrogate on the Windows side.
Detects anomalous network communication patterns and file system changes indicative of SoftEther VPN usage, particularly when linked to processes masquerading as VMware or communicating with known malicious C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for network connections on common SoftEther ports, connections to specific command-and-control IP addresses, and the creation of SoftEther configuration files like 'hamcore.se2' or 'vpn_bridge.config'.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to initiate background data transfer jobs pointing to non-Microsoft or non-Windows Update domains. This technique is commonly used by adversaries for C2 communication or to download malicious payloads.
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