Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,521 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,049
575
259
163
130
Contributors
536
485
323
178
133
Categories
1,256
974
852
701
406
Platforms
1,929
373
346
244
20
Products / Services
759
507
254
248
210
MITRE Techniques
18,127
15,648
12,596
8,407
6,232
2,521
CVEs
7
5
4
4
4
IDS Classtypes
201
41
5
4
1
IDS Protocols
175
38
21
9
7
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands that include signs of web-based downloads or unusually long payloads, which are often used to hide malicious scripts or execute stagers. The rule filters out trusted signers and common administrative management tools to reduce noise.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or the PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer cmdlet for downloading files from the internet or local network, often used by attackers to perform ingress tool transfer or to maintain persistence via BITS jobs.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS/HTTPS) communicating with the secondary hosting domain 'fileget.loseyourip.com' specifically attempting to retrieve potential payloads mimicking legitimate software (e.g., OBS Studio installer).
Detects execution of specific shell commands (shell, kill, upload, stop) often associated with remote access trojans or backdoors. This rule monitors process creation events where these specific command verbs are present in the command line of either the process itself or its initiator, commonly seen in scenarios where a backdoor receives commands via system execution primitives like execvp() or posix_spawnp().
Detects the execution or network communication involving python-build-standalone, a tool often used by developers to deploy portable Python environments. In an environment, the unauthorized use of this tool may indicate an adversary attempting to deploy their own Python interpreter to execute malicious scripts, effectively bypassing environment-specific restrictions or configurations.
Detects the transmission of a Metasploit Meterpreter stage over HTTP, identified by an application/octet-stream response containing the DOS MZ header signature.
This rule detects multi-stage attack patterns indicative of Linux privilege escalation or exploit staging. It tracks the creation of known exploit-related files in temporary directories, the compilation of exploit source code, downloading of scripts from GitHub to temporary directories, and the execution of binaries or commands (e.g., 'unshare', 'tc') often associated with kernel-level exploits. It flags hosts where multiple such indicators are detected sequentially within a single session.
Detects suspicious usage of the Bun runtime, specifically when it is spawned by common Node.js development processes (like npm or node-gyp) or downloaded from non-official sources using command-line tools or browsers. This behavior is associated with the Miasma malware campaign, which abuses the Bun runtime for malicious operations.
Detects a two-stage attack chain where a host downloads an image file from the network, followed by the execution of suspicious system binaries (e.g., mshta, powershell, rundll32). This pattern is characteristic of steganographic loaders like CloudEyE or DBatLoader used to extract and execute payloads like Remcos RAT.
Detects the execution of Node.js lifecycle scripts (preinstall, postinstall, install-check, etc.) that trigger secondary process execution, such as command shells, downloaders (curl, wget), or security utilities (certutil, bitsadmin). This behavior is often associated with malicious npm package supply chain attacks aimed at downloading secondary payloads during installation.
This rule detects command line execution containing keywords associated with offensive security tools (e.g., 'metasploit', 'exploit', 'shellcode', 'payload') in conjunction with external resource indicators such as HTTP/HTTPS or FTP URLs, suggesting the download and potential execution of malicious payloads.
Detects the Potemkin Loader using the native Windows curl.exe utility to download a ZIP archive from a remote source, followed by the creation of a local .zip file. This behavior is used to bypass security controls by avoiding PowerShell-based download mechanisms.
Detects the execution of the NetSupport RAT client process (client32.exe). This tool is often abused by threat actors for remote control, frequently deployed following social engineering lures such as ClickFix or BitB (Browser-in-the-Browser) attacks.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines associated with the TonRAT implant, which is distributed via .lnk shortcut files. The rule identifies obfuscated PowerShell execution spawned by shortcut files, the download of Node.js runtimes from external sources, and the staging of obfuscated JavaScript payloads in temporary directories.
Detects script content that invokes 'mshta.exe' from the 'SysWOW64' directory to access a remote resource ending with '.7z' via HTTP or HTTPS. This pattern is associated with the Animateclipper malware, which uses MSHTA for initial access or execution of malicious scripts.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell command-line activity characterized by the use of execution policy bypass flags, obfuscated strings referencing BigInteger or character manipulation, and the potential retrieval of malicious scripts from temporary directories.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to the deployment and execution of Node.js. It monitors for PowerShell commands downloading or extracting Node.js archives from official source paths, as well as instances where node.exe is spawned by office applications (Word, Excel, Outlook) or PowerShell, which is highly abnormal in standard production or end-user environments.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command-line activity commonly associated with malicious scripts, including execution bypass (e.g., -ep bypass), the use of .NET BigInteger for potential obfuscation, and downloading files via Invoke-WebRequest to the temp directory. The rule further increases fidelity by identifying if the parent process is a common execution vector such as explorer.exe, wscript.exe, or mshta.exe.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with Kimsuky JSE loaders, which leverage XML DOM manipulation (e.g., bin.base64) and ADODB.Stream components to decode and drop base64-encoded payloads into the ProgramData directory. It further monitors for subsequent decoding attempts using certutil and the presence of specific, suspicious file extensions (e.g., .a9oc, .lpXD, .lpxQ) often used by this threat actor.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious flags, obfuscation, or download cradles often used by the SystemBC/Coroxy malware to facilitate second-stage payload delivery and C2 activity.
This rule monitors process creation events for 'git' or 'npm' command-line activities that are highly indicative of potential software supply chain attacks. It triggers when known malicious package names or suspicious patterns are detected within command-line arguments, or when a workflow involves a git clone followed by subsequent npm installation, which is a common vector for deploying malicious dependencies.
Page 62 of 121