Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Identifies PowerShell executing scripts or expressions from the ProgramData directory, which may indicate malicious staging or backdoor execution. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell processes where the command line includes 'C:\ProgramData\' and also contains keywords like 'IEX', 'Invoke-Expression', or '.ps1', suggesting the execution of a script or expression.
Identifies the creation of PowerShell or batch files in unusual ProgramData subdirectories by command-line interpreters, which may indicate malware staging or persistence preparation.
Detects the creation of PowerShell or batch scripts within the C:\ProgramData directory, which is a common location abused by malware for payload staging and persistence. The rule specifically looks for file creation events where the initiating process is cmd.exe or powershell.exe and the file extension is either .ps1 or .bat.
Detects execution of Certutil.exe with arguments commonly used by adversaries for downloading files (urlcache) or decoding malicious payloads (decode/decodehex). These techniques are frequently used to bypass security controls and facilitate the delivery of secondary payloads or tools.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Package Manager (winget) Desired State Configuration (DSC) engine, where winget configure processes spawn configuration remoting or package manager server binaries. This behavior often indicates the execution of embedded PowerShell scripts or remote configuration files via YAML-based DSC configurations, which can be leveraged for malicious code execution.
Detects instances where the FireAnt MetaKit investment client (Metakit.exe) spawns 'setup.exe' as a child process. This pattern is indicative of a supply-chain attack involving the compromise of the FireAnt MetaKit update server, where the application is used to trigger the execution of a malicious downloader or installer.
Detects the SPECTRALVIPER downloader component characteristic of OceanLotus activity. The rule monitors for a specific HTTP POST request to a check-in URL, followed by the execution of IntelAudioService.exe with command-line arguments indicating a side-loading attack chain from the appmodel StateRepository.
Detects the JDY botnet's infection chain on Linux systems, characterized by script-based processor architecture reconnaissance followed by the retrieval, execution, and subsequent deletion of architecture-specific (MIPS) binaries. This rule monitors shell-based command sequences involving system information gathering, network-based file downloads, and immediate removal of the downloaded file.
Detects malicious dropper behavior involving batch files spawning hidden PowerShell processes to download components (flt.bin, FLTLIB.dll, scr.mui, fltMC.exe) to temporary directories. The rule further tracks the execution of the dropped fltMC.exe and the creation of the associated DLL/binary files, which is indicative of JFMBackdoor DLL side-loading.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via Command Prompt (cmd.exe) using hidden window arguments to download files from external sources or temporary directories, often associated with stages of malware delivery or post-exploitation activity.
Detects the ClickFix infection chain where a web browser process spawns PowerShell to execute obfuscated ScriptBlock content. This activity is correlated with network connections to identified ErrTraffic C2 infrastructure (/api/index.php?a=ctx) used for distributing various malware payloads including Vidar, Stealc, and others.
Detects anomalous HTTP GET requests targeting the ClawHub API for 'skills' that match known patterns of malicious file downloads, specifically identifying poc.py scripts or skill.md files which are indicative of the ClawHavoc campaign activity.
Detects instances where node.exe or npm.exe processes spawn PowerShell to execute download-related cmdlets (e.g., Invoke-WebRequest, IEX) or encoded commands, followed by the execution of a process from user-writable directories (TEMP or AppData) within a one-minute window, a pattern associated with PostCSS typosquatting supply chain attacks.
Detects HTTP GET requests for specific malicious archives (calculator.rar, EditorToolsPdf.zip) originating from suspected compromised Ukrainian domains (basecon.com.ua, online.zp.ua). This behavior is associated with the STOCKSTAY malware used by the threat actor Turla.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows utility 'Fondue.exe' (Features on Demand) loads the control panel library 'APPWIZ.cpl' from non-standard locations such as C:\Users\Public or AppData directories. It also identifies the staging phase where 'APPWIZ.cpl' is written to 'C:\Users\Public', which is indicative of a DLL side-loading attack sequence, often associated with the Elephant malware dropper.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts exhibiting characteristics of PowerShell-based download cradles, such as specific User-Agent strings or URL patterns associated with IEX DownloadString or Invoke-WebRequest.
Detects the initial file drop of the TiFlux RMM binaries (often disguised or renamed) executing from untrusted locations like Downloads or Temp.
Detects potential fileless execution of Meow RAT by monitoring process command lines for 'curl' fetching an AppleScript payload and piping it to 'osascript'. It also looks for specific Meow RAT indicators like C2 domains, payload names, and build hashes.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to initiate background data transfer jobs pointing to non-Microsoft or non-Windows Update domains. This technique is commonly used by adversaries for C2 communication or to download malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands that include signs of web-based downloads or unusually long payloads, which are often used to hide malicious scripts or execute stagers. The rule filters out trusted signers and common administrative management tools to reduce noise.
This rule detects the loading of a machine learning model (e.g., Pickle, PyTorch, or Hugging Face model files) via Python, immediately followed by the creation of a Windows Executable (PE) or Shared Object (.so) file on disk by the same initiating process. This behavior is indicative of an embedded stage-2 loader within a malicious model file, often seen in backdoored Large Language Models (LLMs). The time correlation between the model loading and the file drop is set to 45 seconds to identify immediate post-load execution.
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