Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,521 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,049
575
259
163
130
Contributors
536
485
323
178
133
Categories
1,256
974
852
701
406
Platforms
1,929
373
346
244
20
Products / Services
759
507
254
248
210
MITRE Techniques
18,127
15,648
12,596
8,407
6,231
2,521
CVEs
7
5
4
4
4
IDS Classtypes
201
41
5
4
1
IDS Protocols
175
38
21
9
7
Detects node.exe spawning curl or wget pointing directly to the hardcoded C2 IPs (94.154.172.43, 91.195.240.123) indicating stage 2 download.
Detects PowerShell execution initiated by Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, specifically 'IDriveRemotePC.exe' or 'RemotePC.exe', when the PowerShell command line contains keywords indicative of downloading and executing remote content (e.g., 'DownloadString', 'IEX', 'Invoke-Expression', 'http', 'https', 'ftp'). This behavior is often associated with initial access or staging phases of an attack, such as ransomware deployment.
Detects the use of PowerShell with 'Invoke-WebRequest' to download trojanized installers (MicrosoftEdgeSetup.exe, ChromeSetup.exe, MSTeamsSetup.exe) from malicious domains like 'apple-online.shop' or 'trycloudflare.com', as observed in Interlock activity leveraging JunkFiction.
Detects PowerShell, mshta, or curl writing an executable, DLL, or script beneath a hidden-looking AppData directory. This behavior is often associated with malware staging or persistence.
EchoCreep Downloads a Tool
Cortex XDR
Detects the curl utility being launched by processes associated with EchoCreep or similar backdoor activity (searchapp, service, update, cmd) to download files, indicated by the use of output flags (-o, --output, -L, --remote-name). This activity is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or downloading additional tools after initial compromise.
Detects SEO-poisoned fake VPN installers (GlobalProtect, Cisco AnyConnect) dropping and silently executing legitimate RMM tools (NetSupport, ScreenConnect) as a persistence backdoor.
Detects lateral movement or persistence where WMI directly spawns an RMM tool like ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, or other common remote management tools. This activity is often indicative of an attacker establishing remote access or maintaining persistence on a compromised system.
Detects anomalous execution of the Bun runtime on CI/CD infrastructure, often associated with the 'Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud' campaign. The rule monitors for unauthorized Bun process creation spawned by Node.js package management tools (likely via binding.gyp lifecycle hooks), execution using specific campaign-related command-line arguments, or network activity initiated by Bun on non-standard paths, which may indicate build-time compromise and subsequent C2 communication.
Correlates the execution of the injected Vidar payload with the dropping of legitimate sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, or freebl3.dll, which are required to parse and steal browser databases. This rule specifically looks for these DLLs being created on a device where the initiating process was 'AutoIt3.exe', indicating a potential Vidar stealer infection.
This rule detects network activity involving connections to known malicious IP addresses or DNS domains ('govtop.one') and subsequent attempts to download specific suspicious file payloads, such as archives or image files often associated with malicious activity. This activity is indicative of potential command and control communication or initial malware ingress.
Detects endpoint activity associated with the Operation DragonReturn phishing campaign, including DNS resolution of known malicious domains, download of specific malicious ZIP archives, execution of extracted dropper files, and network communication with identified command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects browser network events fetching secondary stage loaders via PHP handlers masking as schema descriptors.
Detects network connections where the user-agent string contains 'NSIS_InetLoad' and 'Mozilla', often indicative of a staged downloader. The rule also checks if the principal process is an executable and attempts to capture the user-agent from the URL or process command line.
Detects instances of PowerShell being launched by common scripting host binaries (mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as encoded commands, hidden windows, and remote code download patterns (e.g., iex, Invoke-RestMethod). The rule further checks for indicators related to the Lightlife C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects PowerShell processes attempting to retrieve or execute remote .rtf resources via web requests. It specifically looks for `powershell.exe` or `pwsh.exe` in the process path combined with command-line arguments indicating `Invoke-WebRequest`, `iwr`, `DownloadString`, `Invoke-Expression`, or `iex` targeting a URL ending in `.rtf`.
Detects outbound network connections to 'stitch-design.ai' or 'stitch-google.com', which are identified as malicious domains utilized by a compromised AI agent skill. This skill attempts to bypass security vetting by dynamically fetching its instructions from these attacker-controlled external domains post-installation.
Detects malicious multi-stage download behavior where a web browser spawns PowerShell to initiate an outbound network connection, characteristic of the 'ErrTraffic' Beer cluster often associated with ClickFix infection lures delivering malware such as DanaBot, Stealc, HijackLoader, SmokeLoader, or Vidar.
Detects a multi-stage npm supply chain compromise, often associated with Operation Friday Harvest or PostCSS typosquatting campaigns. The rule monitors for a sequence of 4 out of 5 behavioral stages on a single host within a 30-minute window: malicious postinstall script execution (npm/node spawning shells), staging of malicious payloads in temp directories, network connections to known command-and-control (C2) or payload-hosting infrastructure (e.g., GitHub, Telegram), execution of dropped binaries, and unauthorized access to sensitive credential files.
Detects a multi-stage execution pattern involving cmd.exe spawning PowerShell to download files from storjshare.io using System.Net.WebClient, followed by a secondary PowerShell execution using 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs' to trigger a UAC bypass, characteristic of the REF8372 campaign and OXLOADER distribution.
Detects a suspicious pattern consistent with the REF8372 OXLOADER malware delivery, where a batch file (BAT) is executed from the Downloads or Temp directories using cmd.exe, which then spawns PowerShell to download external content from link.storjshare.io.
Detects the OXLOADER malware dropping a renamed copy of dui70.dll with a malicious RWX .xtext section into the user's Temp folder, followed by the loader process reading mpr.dll, which is a known behavior related to its sandbox check and API resolution execution chain.
Page 76 of 121