Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
175 detections
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Detects the loading of compression libraries (such as lzma.dll or 7z.dll) by ERAAgent.exe followed by suspicious process or thread activity (e.g., remote thread creation, memory allocation). This pattern is often associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads in memory.
Detects UNC3569/GRAYRABBIT shellcode combining call/pop self-location, PEB InLoadOrderModuleList walk, and the specific XOR-then-ROR8 export-name hashing loop observed in the GRAYRABBIT loader chain, requiring multiple distinctive elements together to reduce false positives on generic shellcode idioms
Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
Detects the loading of compression libraries (such as lzma.dll or 7z.dll) by ERAAgent.exe followed by suspicious process or thread activity (e.g., remote thread creation, memory allocation). This pattern is often associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads in memory.
Nightmare Eclipse released the ShieldBreak Exploit on Aug 11 2026. This exploit is a privilege escalation exploit to SYSTEM leveraging a vulnerability in Windows Defender. Part of this exploit relies on loading the MpClient.dll that Windows Defender uses to perform security scanning. This query looks for evidence of this DLL being loaded by a file not located in a standard Windows Defender-related location. Loading of this file from any other path is anomalous and should be investigated.
Detects the loading of compression libraries (such as lzma.dll or 7z.dll) by ERAAgent.exe followed by suspicious process or thread activity (e.g., remote thread creation, memory allocation). This pattern is often associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads in memory.
Detects C2Looper Rust-based backdoor by requiring at least 3 of 4 weak indicator categories: dynamic API resolution artifacts, v2 debug string, PE section layout, and Rust runtime strings; known hash is an optional fast-path only
Detects the loading of compression libraries (such as lzma.dll or 7z.dll) by ERAAgent.exe followed by suspicious process or thread activity (e.g., remote thread creation, memory allocation). This pattern is often associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads in memory.
Detects the TWINLOOT Python implant's arbitrary shell command handler, in which pythonw.exe running from a non-standard directory (ProgramData, AppData, or Temp) spawns cmd.exe with a /c argument and CREATE_NO_WINDOW creation flags, consistent with the implant's default command handler executing operator-tasked commands with a hidden console window.
Detects cmd.exe /c spawned by an unusual parent process combined with native-API execution patterns outside normal application behavior, excluding common benign parent-child chains, and requires co-occurrence with at least one other flagged detection before surfacing given its low specificity.
Detects NightLedger backdoor command dispatcher invoking known command IDs for process execution (3), DLL loading (43), process termination (56), and thread termination (69) as parsed from its C2 channel. When the dispatching process is AppVShNotify.exe, these actions are common to legitimate App-V activity, so the rule only fires for that image when there is additional evidence it is the compromised implant host - either recorded process lineage (ParentImage) or image-load context showing a module already loaded into the process (ImageLoaded). Events for AppVShNotify.exe lacking both signals are suppressed as likely benign generic process control.
Detects a non-browser process (unsigned, or not matching the legitimate Chrome/Edge install path and signature) invoking Windows CNG NCrypt APIs against the TPM-backed platform crypto provider, consistent with an attacker mimicking Chrome's passkey identity/UV key signing flow to forge authentication (Pass-ta-key). Excludes correctly signed Chrome and Edge processes running from their standard install locations.
Detects NightLedger backdoor command dispatcher invoking known command IDs for process execution (3), DLL loading (43), process termination (56), and thread termination (69) as parsed from its C2 channel. When the dispatching process is AppVShNotify.exe, these actions are common to legitimate App-V activity, so the rule only fires for that image when there is additional evidence it is the compromised implant host - either recorded process lineage (ParentImage) or image-load context showing a module already loaded into the process (ImageLoaded). Events for AppVShNotify.exe lacking both signals are suppressed as likely benign generic process control.
Detects CountLoader's taskType 5 command dispatch: a PowerShell script block that downloads content (Invoke-WebRequest/DownloadString) then pipes it to Invoke-Expression with a subsequent main() function call, consistent with fetched reconnaissance modules executed in memory.
Detects a non-browser process (unsigned, or not matching the legitimate Chrome/Edge install path and signature) invoking Windows CNG NCrypt APIs against the TPM-backed platform crypto provider, consistent with an attacker mimicking Chrome's passkey identity/UV key signing flow to forge authentication (Pass-ta-key). Excludes correctly signed Chrome and Edge processes running from their standard install locations.
This rule monitors for the execution or interaction with macOS native security components, specifically XProtect, XProtectRemediator, and YARA-based detection processes. It flags events related to these tools as potential security telemetry, scanning activities, or remediation actions.
Detects coordinated EDR-blinding techniques where a process performs in-memory patching of AMSI (AmsiScanBuffer) or ETW (EtwEventWrite) while simultaneously executing direct syscalls to bypass standard ntdll.dll hooked exports. This combination is highly indicative of malicious activity attempting to evade endpoint security instrumentation.
Detects a single unrecognized process combining two or more distinct PRO/ULTIMATE surveillance behaviors: webcam capture via Win32 Media Foundation, screenshot/screen-recorder file drops, and keystroke/clipboard dump file creation, within a short 15-minute window. Excludes known legitimate screen-recording, remote-support, and accessibility software.
Detects instances where the Microsoft Installer process (msiexec.exe) initiates a network connection to the local IPv4 loopback address (127.0.0.1). This behavior may indicate an MSI custom-action payload attempting to interact with a web browser through the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) to establish a covert command-and-control channel.
Detects the loading of a malicious DLL into the msiexec.exe process that exhibits characteristic Rust/Tokio async-runtime initialization behavior. This includes exported function names like 'RUN' and specific interactions with the 'TOKIO_WORKER_THREADS' environment variable or API calls to 'GetSystemInfo' and 'CreateThread' to size the worker thread pool. This behavior is associated with msaRAT, where the DLL is loaded via MSI custom actions to run within the context of the Windows Installer service.
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