Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
145 detections
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Detects successful Device Code authentication followed immediately by a new device registration, a tactic used to extend access via PRT generation. This behavior is indicative of an attacker using a stolen device code to register a new device, thereby gaining persistent access to the user's account.
This rule detects anomalous access to cloud services, specifically Salesforce, Drift, Salesloft, HubSpot, and Marketo, that may indicate OAuth token abuse. It identifies scenarios where a high volume of actions (8 or more) occur within a short timeframe (3 hours or less) from a single IP address but with multiple unique user agents (2 or more). The detection is further refined by looking for actions related to 'Add delegated permission grant' or 'Create service principal', which are indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges after gaining access through a compromised OAuth token.
Detects deployment of the VMAccess extension via Azure Management plane, which can be abused by attackers to create local backdoor administrators on Azure Virtual Machines.
This query detects the creation of local user accounts on Linux systems using the 'useradd' or 'adduser' commands. Monitoring for local account creation is crucial as adversaries may create accounts for persistence, privilege escalation, or to facilitate lateral movement.
This rule detects suspicious administrative activities in Azure AD, Microsoft Graph, SharePoint, Exchange, or Teams when performed by accounts that are not explicitly identified as 'admin' or 'service' accounts. It looks for a combination of at least 5 operations and 2 unique operation types within a 2-hour window, targeting group, application, or service principal related resources. This could indicate an attacker using compromised non-privileged accounts to perform administrative actions or escalate privileges.
Identifies HTTP POST requests indicative of rogue administrator account creation patterns ('dev_xxxxxx' or 'developer_api1') used in the OptinMonster, TrustPulse, and PushEngage supply chain attack. This rule specifically looks for POST requests to WordPress user creation endpoints containing attacker-controlled account names in the URI query.
Detects automated bulk account registration for establishing fake identities
This rule detects anomalous access to cloud services, specifically Salesforce, Drift, Salesloft, HubSpot, and Marketo, that may indicate OAuth token abuse. It identifies scenarios where a high volume of actions (8 or more) occur within a short timeframe (3 hours or less) from a single IP address but with multiple unique user agents (2 or more). The detection is further refined by looking for actions related to 'Add delegated permission grant' or 'Create service principal', which are indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges after gaining access through a compromised OAuth token.
Detects creation of accounts with names mimicking legitimate service accounts
Detects automated bulk account registration for establishing fake identities
Detects when a single user account performs 5 or more account creations (EventID 4720) or account enables (EventID 4722) within a one-hour period. This activity could indicate malicious behavior, such as an attacker establishing persistence or expanding access, or it could be a sign of automated account provisioning.
This rule detects the creation or modification of the '.vscode/extensions.json' file. This file is critical for managing extensions within Visual Studio Code environments. Attackers can exploit modifications to this file, as demonstrated in recent zero-day attacks, to introduce malicious extensions, potentially leading to code execution or other forms of compromise within a developer's environment. The detection focuses on file system events (creation and modification) targeting this specific configuration file.
This rule detects attempts to create new user accounts via SMB (Server Message Block) by looking for the 'NetUserAdd' function call within SMB traffic. This could indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges by creating new accounts on a target system.
Detects administrative user management (Create/Alter/Drop) and schema deletion within SAP HANA DB.
Detects SAP user administration activities including the creation, deletion, or unlocking of user accounts, as captured by SAP Security Audit logs (messages AU7, AU8, AU9, AUA).
Detects a suspicious pattern in SAP environments where an existing user creates a new account (AU7 - User created) and subsequently logs into that newly created account (AU1 - User logged on or AU5 - User logged on via RFC) from the same terminal/IP address within a 30-minute window, potentially indicating account takeover or unauthorized persistence.
Detects when a new AWS IAM Principal (User, Role, or Group) is created and then has a policy attached to it by the same actor within a 10-minute time frame. This sequence is a suspicious TTP often used by attackers to provision a new, privileged "shadow" account or role for persistence and lateral movement, bypassing existing accounts or role assumption paths.
Detects a suspicious sequence where a new credential (PAT, SSH key, or OAuth authorization) is created and then used to establish durable persistence via webhooks or deploy keys. This behavior typically occurs after an account compromise as an attacker attempts to "lock in" access that survives credential rotation and provides real-time exfiltration of repository data.
Detects the addition of an SSH public key to a GitHub account using programmatic access (Personal Access Tokens, OAuth, or GitHub Apps). Unlike keys added via the Web UI, programmatic creation often bypasses manual verification steps and provides long-lived access that survives password resets and MFA changes. This is a common technique for attackers to establish persistent command line access to repositories.
Detects the creation of a new Personal Access Token (PAT) in GitHub. Attackers frequently create PATs after gaining initial access to an account to maintain persistence that survives a password reset. Tokens with broad scopes (repo, admin:org) allow for full repository exfiltration and administrative manipulation of the organization.
This rule detects when a guest user from a common public email domain (e.g., gmail.com, outlook.com) is invited to an Azure Active Directory (AAD) tenant and subsequently added to an AAD security group. This could indicate an attempt to grant unauthorized access to an external account or a misconfiguration allowing guest users to be added to sensitive groups.
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