Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
265 detections
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Sysmon registry detection of a local hidden user account.
'Summarizes uses of uncommon & undocumented commandline switches to create persistence
User accounts may be created to achieve persistence on a machine.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136
Query for users being created using "net user" command
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -
e.g. in this example we look for some undocumented variations (e.g. /ad instead of /add)'
User accounts may be created to achieve persistence on a machine.
Read more here: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136
Query for users being created using "net user" command
"net user" commands are noisy, so needs to be joined with another signal -
e.g. in this example we look for some undocumented variations (e.g. /ad instead of /add)'
Search for the creation of a new user using a known DEV-0270 username/password schema.
Identifies the creation of local users via the net.exe command. This rule specifically looks for process creation events where 'net.exe' or 'net1.exe' is executed with the 'user' and 'add' arguments in the command line.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicating the creation of a user account, a successful login by that user, and the subsequent deletion of the same user account within a 4-hour timeframe. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary creating temporary accounts for malicious activities, using them, and then removing them to cover their tracks or evade detection. The rule specifically targets Windows login events (event code 4624).
This rule detects the creation of a domain group named "ESX Admins" using either `net.exe` or PowerShell cmdlets like `New-ADGroup`. This activity is highly suspicious and indicates a potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2024-37085. This vulnerability allows an attacker to elevate privileges to full administrative access on a domain-joined ESXi hypervisor, as VMware ESXi hypervisors grant full administrative access by default to members of a domain group named "ESX Admins".
Identifies the creation of local users via the net.exe command
Detects creation of new Kubernetes service account, which could indicate an attacker's attempt to persist within a cluster.
Detects the creation, login, and deletion of a user account over a predefined timeframe
The analytic detects the creation of new accounts elevated to local administrators. It uses Windows event logs, specifically EventCode 4720 (user account creation) and EventCode 4732 (user added to Administrators group). This activity is significant as it indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation, which is critical for SOC monitoring. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain administrative access, leading to unauthorized data access, system modifications, and disruption of services. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate risks and prevent further unauthorized actions.
This analytic detects attempts to create an "ESX Admins" group using PowerShell commands. This activity may indicate an attempt to exploit the VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass vulnerability (CVE-2024-37085). Attackers can use this method to gain unauthorized access to ESXi hosts by recreating the 'ESX Admins' group after its deletion from Active Directory.
The following analytic detects the creation of new user accounts on Linux systems using commands like "useradd" or "adduser." It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often create new user accounts to establish persistence on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, escalate privileges, and further compromise the system, posing a severe security risk.
This analytic detects attempts to create an "ESX Admins" group using the Windows net.exe or net1.exe commands. This activity may indicate an attempt to exploit the VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass vulnerability (CVE-2024-37085). Attackers can use this method to gain unauthorized access to ESXi hosts by recreating the "ESX Admins" group after its deletion from Active Directory.
This analytic detects modifications to privileged groups in Active Directory, including creation, deletion, and changes to various types of groups such as local, global, universal, and LDAP query groups. It specifically monitors for changes to high-privilege groups like "Administrators", "Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", and "ESX Admins", among others. This detection is particularly relevant in the context of potential exploitation of vulnerabilities like the VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass (CVE-2024-37085), where attackers may attempt to manipulate privileged groups to gain unauthorized access to systems.
The analytic detects the creation of new user accounts on Linux systems using commands like "useradd" or "adduser." It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries often create new user accounts to establish persistence on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain access, escalate privileges, and further compromise the system, posing a severe security risk.
Detects the creation of a local user account named "DarkGate" with the username "SafeMode" using the `net.exe` or `net1.exe` command-line utility. This specific pattern is associated with DarkGate malware activity.
Detects the creation of hidden user accounts on macOS. This can occur either by assigning a UserID less than 500 or by explicitly setting the 'IsHidden' option to true during account creation using the 'dscl' command-line utility.
Detects the creation of a new user account on Linux systems. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. The rule specifically looks for 'SYSCALL' events where the executable ends with '/useradd' or 'ADD_USER' record types from auditd logs.
Detects the creation of local user accounts on Windows servers. In environments utilizing Active Directory, local user creation on member servers is generally an anomalous event and could indicate an adversary establishing persistence or creating backdoor accounts. This rule is specifically designed for Windows server logs and should not be applied to Domain Controller logs, as local user creation on DCs is not applicable.
Detects the creation of a local hidden user account on Windows systems. Hidden accounts are often indicated by a dollar sign ($) at the end of the username and can be used by adversaries for persistence.
Detects the creation of suspicious local accounts that mimic the 'ANONYMOUS LOGON' account, potentially using additional spaces or other obfuscation techniques. This rule specifically targets Event ID 4720 (A security-enabled local group was created) and looks for 'ANONYMOUS' and 'LOGON' within the SamAccountName field, aiming to cover scenarios where such accounts are created to bypass detection or for malicious persistence.
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