Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
265 detections
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Detects modifications to Windows LSA and LanmanServer registry keys (RestrictAnonymous, NullSessionPipes) in conjunction with ERAAgent.exe process execution, as well as ERAAgent creating named pipes accessible by anonymous logon, which may indicate configuration tampering to facilitate unauthorized access or credential collection.
Detects modifications to Windows LSA and LanmanServer registry keys (RestrictAnonymous, NullSessionPipes) in conjunction with ERAAgent.exe process execution, as well as ERAAgent creating named pipes accessible by anonymous logon, which may indicate configuration tampering to facilitate unauthorized access or credential collection.
Detects an attempt to create a new user account via ADSI (Active Directory Service Interfaces)
using either the WinNT or LDAP provider. This is an uncommon method to create user accounts
and may indicate an attempt to evade detection by avoiding more commonly monitored commands
such as "net user", "New-LocalUser" or "New-ADUser".
using either the WinNT or LDAP provider. This is an uncommon method to create user accounts
and may indicate an attempt to evade detection by avoiding more commonly monitored commands
such as "net user", "New-LocalUser" or "New-ADUser".
This rule detects the creation of a new WordPress administrator account within a short window (15 minutes) of an anomalous authentication or registration event on the same account or session. It is designed to identify post-exploitation activity, specifically persistence mechanisms following the exploitation of web application vulnerabilities like arbitrary file uploads or authentication bypasses in WordPress plugins.
Detects potential exploitation of the ScreenConnect SetupWizard.aspx to bypass authentication and create unauthorized administrative users. The rule monitors for the creation or modification of User.xml or Users.xml files in the ScreenConnect application directories, correlating these file events with suspicious process activity (such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe) or web requests to the SetupWizard.aspx endpoint.
FortiGate Local User Account Created
Cortex XDR
Detects the creation of a new locally defined user account on a FortiGate device by monitoring configuration change logs. Unauthorized local accounts can be used to establish persistent, unauthorized access to network infrastructure.
Detects the creation of a local user account followed by the modification of the Winlogon SpecialAccounts\UserList registry key to hide the account from the Windows logon UI. This behavior is indicative of persistent access maintenance by adversaries, such as the Andariel threat group.
This rule detects scenarios where a new user account is created (Event ID 4720) and is subsequently logged into (Event ID 4624) within a 30-minute window. This behavior can indicate an adversary creating a backdoor or service account for persistence or lateral movement, followed by immediate usage of that account.
Detects potential persistence mechanisms involving 'IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE' or 'WinWrapIDE.exe'. The rule monitors for the creation of a scheduled task, registry run key additions, or event ID 4698 (scheduled task creation) associated with these artifacts. It further correlates these activities with suspicious account creation events (Event IDs 4720, 4732) on the same device within a one-hour window.
This rule detects scenarios where a new user account is created (Event ID 4720) and is subsequently logged into (Event ID 4624) within a 30-minute window. This behavior can indicate an adversary creating a backdoor or service account for persistence or lateral movement, followed by immediate usage of that account.
Detects potential persistence mechanisms involving 'IBM SPSS WinWrap Basic IDE' or 'WinWrapIDE.exe'. The rule monitors for the creation of a scheduled task, registry run key additions, or event ID 4698 (scheduled task creation) associated with these artifacts. It further correlates these activities with suspicious account creation events (Event IDs 4720, 4732) on the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects a successful FortiCloud SSO administrative login to a Fortinet appliance followed by the creation of a local administrator account from the same source IP and user within 15 minutes.
The query uses Fortinet CEF events available in CommonSecurityLog and correlates the appliance, administrative user, and source IP to reduce unrelated administrative activity. This behavior is associated with post-exploitation activity observed for CVE-2026-24858.
Bu sorgudaki temel saldırı zinciri, Microsoft Azure-Sentinel deposundaki
"CVE Exploitation Indicators on Network Appliance (3P)" hunting sorgusunda
bulunan FortiCloud SSO oturumu ile admin hesabı oluşturma korelasyonundan
esinlenilerek hazırlanmıştır.
The query uses Fortinet CEF events available in CommonSecurityLog and correlates the appliance, administrative user, and source IP to reduce unrelated administrative activity. This behavior is associated with post-exploitation activity observed for CVE-2026-24858.
Bu sorgudaki temel saldırı zinciri, Microsoft Azure-Sentinel deposundaki
"CVE Exploitation Indicators on Network Appliance (3P)" hunting sorgusunda
bulunan FortiCloud SSO oturumu ile admin hesabı oluşturma korelasyonundan
esinlenilerek hazırlanmıştır.
This rule detects the creation of a local user account named _BootUEFI_ and its addition to the Remote Desktop Users group, followed by RemoteInteractive logons using that account. This behavior is indicative of an RDP backdoor mechanism associated with the HeptaX campaign.
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects requests to WordPress plugin-install/upload or privileged user REST endpoints occurring shortly after anomalous WordPress REST API batch activity, consistent with post-exploitation follow-through in the wp2shell chain.
Detects creation of a new local user account and its addition to the local Administrators group, consistent with the plugin32.dll RDP backdoor module which hardcodes a username/password and adds the new account to the administrators group for persistent RDP access.
Detects the creation of a local user account using net.exe or net1.exe followed immediately (within 10 minutes) by that same account being added to a local administrators group on the same device.
Detects the creation of an administrative account named 'adminin' on FortiGate devices. This specific account name has been linked to the 'FortiBleed' credential theft campaign, which often serves as a precursor to ransomware deployment by threat actors like the INC Ransom group.
This rule detects the creation of unauthorized technician accounts in the SimpleHelp RMM platform that follow an OIDC authentication bypass pattern (CVE-2026-48558). It correlates server logs indicating 'New Anon' registration activity with Windows Security Event ID 4720 (User account created), specifically filtering for accounts that do not belong to trusted corporate domains.
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