Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
132 detections
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The following analytic detects the creation of a Service Principal in an Azure AD environment. It leverages Azure Active Directory events ingested through EventHub, specifically monitoring the "Add service principal" operation. This activity is significant because Service Principals can be used by adversaries to establish persistence and bypass multi-factor authentication and conditional access policies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain single-factor access to the Azure AD environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access to resources and prolonged undetected activity.
The following analytic identifies instances where a single service principal creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute timeframe. It leverages O365 logs from the Unified Audit Log, focusing on the 'Add service principal' operation in the Office 365 Azure Active Directory environment. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised or malicious service principal attempting to expand control or access within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic identifies instances where a single user creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute timeframe in Azure AD. It detects this activity by monitoring the 'Add service principal' operation and aggregating data in 10-minute intervals. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary rapidly creating multiple service principals to stage an attack or expand their foothold within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or access sensitive information within the Azure environment.
The following analytic identifies instances where a single user creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute window in the Office 365 environment. It leverages O365 logs from the Unified Audit Log, focusing on the 'Add service principal' operation in Azure Active Directory. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised user account or unauthorized actions, potentially leading to broader network infiltration or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain persistent access, escalate privileges, or exfiltrate sensitive information.
The following analytic detects the invitation of an external guest user within Azure AD. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify events where an external user is invited, using fields such as operationName and initiatedBy. Monitoring these invitations is crucial as they can lead to unauthorized access if abused. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain access to internal resources, potentially leading to data breaches or further exploitation of the environment.
The following analytic detects the addition of new service principal accounts in O365 tenants. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, specifically monitoring for operations related to adding or creating service principals. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit service principals to gain unauthorized access and perform malicious actions within an organization's environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to interact with APIs, access resources, and execute operations on behalf of the organization, potentially leading to data breaches or further compromise.
The analytic identifies the creation of a login profile for one AWS user by another, followed by a console login from the same source IP. It uses AWS CloudTrail logs to correlate the `CreateLoginProfile` and `ConsoleLogin` events based on the source IP and user identity. This activity is significant as it may indicate privilege escalation, where an attacker creates a new login profile to gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate privileges and maintain persistent access to the AWS environment.
The analytic detects an AWS CloudTrail event where a user with permissions updates the login profile of another user. It leverages CloudTrail logs to identify instances where the user making the change is different from the user whose profile is being updated. This activity is significant because it can indicate privilege escalation attempts, where an attacker uses a compromised account to gain higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate their privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over sensitive resources within the AWS environment.
The analytic detects the addition of an application role assignment grant to a user in Office 365. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, specifically monitoring the "Add app role assignment grant to user" operation. This activity is significant as it can indicate unauthorized privilege escalation or the assignment of sensitive roles to users. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain elevated permissions, potentially leading to unauthorized access to critical resources and data within the Office 365 environment.
The analytic detects an AWS CloudTrail event where a user with permissions updates the login profile of another user. It leverages CloudTrail logs to identify instances where the user making the change is different from the user whose profile is being updated. This activity is significant because it can indicate privilege escalation attempts, where an attacker uses a compromised account to gain higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate their privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over sensitive resources within the AWS environment.
The following analytic identifies the creation of AWS IAM access keys by a user for another user, which can indicate privilege escalation. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where the user creating the access key is different from the user for whom the key is created. This activity is significant because unauthorized access key creation can allow attackers to establish persistence or exfiltrate data via AWS APIs. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS services, data exfiltration, and long-term persistence in the environment.
Detects when an invitation to join a GitHub enterprise or organization is sent to a non-company email address. This rule can be customized to alert you when a GitHub invitation is sent to an unexpected domain i.e. not one of your company's domains used for email.
Application creation can be legitimate but aren't frequently created. Validating application creation may be appropriate to ensure rogue apps aren't being created.
Identify a successful group creation. Triggered through the use of GraphRunner's Invoke-SecurityGroupCloner function.
This rule identifies when a new application from the Google Workspace Marketplace is added to a Google Workspace organization. Installing certain third-party applications can introduce security risks such as data exfiltration, data leakage, or an expanded attack surface for the organization.
This rule detects when free Google email addresses (gmail.com, googlemail.com, or googlegroups.com) are added to an IAM policy in Google Cloud Platform. This activity is suspicious as it could indicate an attempt by an attacker to establish persistence or escalate privileges by granting access to an external, potentially untraceable, account.
This rule detects a specific privilege escalation scenario in AWS where a user creates a new access key for another user and then immediately uses that newly created access key from the same IP address to perform further actions. This behavior indicates an attempt to escalate privileges by leveraging a newly generated credential.
Detects when a user creates or updates a login profile for another user in AWS IAM and then the newly created/modified user logs in from the same IP address. This behavior can indicate privilege escalation where an attacker gains access to an existing user's credentials, creates a new login profile or modifies an existing one for another user, and then uses that new profile to log in, potentially escalating their privileges or maintaining persistence.
Detect when free Google Email addressess are added to IAM Policy such as gmail.com, googlemail.com or googlegroups.com.
Detects when an excessive number of permissions are assigned to an Entra ID application within a time window, potentially indicating a greedy permission grab, as a percentage from old permissions to new permissions
Detect when a user creates a new access key for another user and escalates privileges using this newly created access key from the same IP.
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