Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

7 detections

Detects scenarios where an attacker execute the Impacket DCOMexec tool in order to abuse DCOM services.
SIGMA Detection Rules@SIGMADetectionRules
SIGMA Detection Rules
1 year ago
0012
Detects scenarios where an attacker execute the Impacket DCOMexec tool in order to abuse DCOM services.
SIGMA Detection Rules@SIGMADetectionRules
SIGMA Detection Rules
1 year ago
008
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_oceanlotus_registry.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0018
'This query uses Sysmon Image Load (Event ID 7) and Process Create (Event ID 1) data to look for COM Event System being used to load a newly seen DLL.'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0016
'This query identifies modifications to COM registry keys to point to executable files in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0014
'This query looks for changes to COM registry keys to point to files in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\.
This can be used to enable COM hijacking for persistence.
Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0014
'This query identifies modifications to COM registry keys to point to executable files in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0013