Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
733 detections
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This rule detects the presence of specific file hashes known to be associated with backdoored software builds, specifically related to recent supply chain compromises affecting South Korean software vendors (e.g., HAProxy builds). It monitors device file events, process initiation, and identity logon events to identify systems that have deployed, executed, or been accessed by these malicious binaries.
Detects the abuse of Visual Studio Code (and compatible IDEs like Cursor) workspace trust to trigger malicious tasks upon opening a folder. This pattern is associated with the 'Void Dokkaebi' (Famous Chollima) threat group's propagation of the 'DEV#POPPER' RAT. The rule identifies instances where the code editor spawns common scripting or network utilities (like PowerShell, curl, or Node.js) with command-line arguments indicative of file downloads or execution, as defined in a local '.vscode/tasks.json' file.
Detects execution of a PowerShell script named 'rust-setup.ps1' or network connectivity to a specific external IP address (23.254.165.112:443) identified as a stage-2 payload delivery or command-and-control communication in a supply chain attack scenario.
Identifies devices with software versions affected by CVE-2026-45321 or devices running TanStack related packages identified via vulnerability management and software inventory data.
Detects process activity referencing the typosquatted proc-macro1 crate or build-script-build.exe spawning a child process — the build-time execution chain used to trigger the malicious proc-macro1 payload on Windows build hosts.
Detects the exact base64-encoded URL fragments used by the malicious proc-macro1 build.rs to obscure the C2 download URL (23.254.165.112:9089) prior to fetching a remote payload.
Detects known malicious stage-2 payload binaries dropped by the compromised proc-macro1/arrayref Rust supply-chain attack via hash, size, and file-type match.
The following analytic detects the creation of a Python path configuration (`.pth`) file in conjunction with a package installation process.
Path configuration files placed under `site-packages` or `dist-packages` are executed with every subsequent invocation of Python, allowing adversaries to achieve persistence on the victim endpoint regardless of build method or distribution type.
This technique was used by the threat actor group TeamPCP during the supply chain compromise of the `litellm` package.
If confirmed malicious, this could result in arbitrary code execution every time Python is invoked on the compromised host.
Path configuration files placed under `site-packages` or `dist-packages` are executed with every subsequent invocation of Python, allowing adversaries to achieve persistence on the victim endpoint regardless of build method or distribution type.
This technique was used by the threat actor group TeamPCP during the supply chain compromise of the `litellm` package.
If confirmed malicious, this could result in arbitrary code execution every time Python is invoked on the compromised host.
This rule detects the installation of malicious VS Code extensions by monitoring file system writes within common VS Code and VS Code Server extension directories. It specifically alerts on a predefined list of extension namespaces associated with a known malicious coordinated campaign that impersonated legitimate publishers.
Detects the execution of the temp_auto_push.bat tool, associated with the threat actor Void Dokkaebi, used to perform malicious commit amendments and code injection in source code repositories. The tool achieves this by manipulating the system clock to timestomp commit metadata, amending commits using 'git commit --amend --no-verify' to bypass security controls, and force-pushing the compromised history.
The following analytic detects the creation of a Python site hook file (`sitecustomize.py` or `usercustomize.py`) within a `site-packages`/`dist-packages` directory in conjunction with a package installation process.
Python's `site` module loads these hooks from directories on `sys.path` before Python is executed.
If an adversary manipulates or plants one of these files, they can hijack the Python environment and execute their payload with every Python invocation, achieving persistence on the victim endpoint.
The VIPERTUNNEL backdoor was reported to abuse site hooks in order to import and trigger DLL execution.
If confirmed malicious, this could result in arbitrary code execution every time Python is invoked on the compromised host.
Python's `site` module loads these hooks from directories on `sys.path` before Python is executed.
If an adversary manipulates or plants one of these files, they can hijack the Python environment and execute their payload with every Python invocation, achieving persistence on the victim endpoint.
The VIPERTUNNEL backdoor was reported to abuse site hooks in order to import and trigger DLL execution.
If confirmed malicious, this could result in arbitrary code execution every time Python is invoked on the compromised host.
Detects a build process (cargo/rustc/build-script-build) that drops an executable to /tmp/rust-setup and launches it detached so it persists after the build completes — the payload-delivery mechanism used by the compromised proc-macro1 Rust crate.
The following analytic detects modification of the PYTHONPATH environment variable in conjunction with a package installation process.
Python looks up the `sys.path` variable, which is generated by combining user and site folders with `.pth` files and the value of the PYTHONPATH environment variable, to determine which directories to use for importing modules.
If an adversary is able to control the value of PYTHONPATH, they can point it to an attacker-controlled directory and hijack imported packages, achieving user-level persistence across future Python invocations and new shell sessions.
If confirmed malicious, this could result in arbitrary code execution every time Python is invoked by the affected user.
Python looks up the `sys.path` variable, which is generated by combining user and site folders with `.pth` files and the value of the PYTHONPATH environment variable, to determine which directories to use for importing modules.
If an adversary is able to control the value of PYTHONPATH, they can point it to an attacker-controlled directory and hijack imported packages, achieving user-level persistence across future Python invocations and new shell sessions.
If confirmed malicious, this could result in arbitrary code execution every time Python is invoked by the affected user.
This rule detects the installation of a new VS Code extension occurring in close temporal proximity to network communication with the official VS Code marketplace or unpkg domains. This pattern is designed to surface potential supply chain compromises where malicious extensions may be deployed to developers' machines.
This rule detects the installation of a new VS Code extension occurring in close temporal proximity to network communication with the official VS Code marketplace or unpkg domains. This pattern is designed to surface potential supply chain compromises where malicious extensions may be deployed to developers' machines.
Detects Shai-Hulud / ChainDrop activity by correlating known malicious hashes, npm/Node/Bun execution, payload artifacts, IDE persistence, credential discovery, cloud metadata access, GitHub exfiltration, C2 domains, Ethereum RPC activity, staging files, persistence artifacts, and known IOC IP connections.
Detection for reported campaign delivering a trojanized, non-digitally signed TrueConf client installer to users connecting to a compromised TrueConf server.
Detects the execution of the Bun JavaScript runtime by npm or node.js during lifecycle tasks (preinstall, postinstall, etc.). This behavior is highly indicative of the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud supply chain worm, which uses npm lifecycle scripts to download and execute a second-stage payload using the Bun runtime.
Detects execution of a 'setup.mjs' preinstall lifecycle hook, the stage-1 loader used in the
4 August 2026 compromise of the keyv and cacheable npm namespaces. The trojanised package.json
adds "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" while leaving dist/ byte-identical to the last clean
release, so the only execution-time signal is the hook itself. The loader downloads a
standalone Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated second stage (Math_Symbol.js).
4 August 2026 compromise of the keyv and cacheable npm namespaces. The trojanised package.json
adds "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" while leaving dist/ byte-identical to the last clean
release, so the only execution-time signal is the hook itself. The loader downloads a
standalone Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated second stage (Math_Symbol.js).
This query identifies creation/loading of SysExcSvc.dll and SysReadSvc.dll along with suspicious LSASS memory dumping, reverse SSH tunnel creation.
These patterns are prevalent with "Phantom" including unusual OneDrive or Microsoft Graph access from LOLBins or unexpected processes.
These patterns are prevalent with "Phantom" including unusual OneDrive or Microsoft Graph access from LOLBins or unexpected processes.
Detects the execution of malicious 'node.exe' processes that invoke 'setup.mjs' or 'math_init.js' scripts from within .vscode or .claude configuration directories. This pattern is characteristic of the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, which leverages VS Code tasks or Claude Code session hooks to achieve persistent execution of dropper scripts without triggering standard npm installation flows.
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