Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
733 detections
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Detects instances where 'node.exe' is copying browser history SQLite databases (Chrome, Edge, Brave) to temporary directories, potentially indicating data exfiltration or staging. This behavior has been observed in supply chain attacks like the 'easy-day-js' incident involving the 'protocal.cjs' backdoor.
Detects Node.js processes launched with TLS certificate verification disabled via NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0. The Sapphire Sleet easy-day-js dropper uses this technique to establish C2 communication without certificate validation.
Supply chain worm targeting npm packages and GitHub Actions, linked to Shai-Hulud/Hades lineage
Detects potential supply-chain attacks where a malicious 'preinstall' hook in an npm package drops and executes a native binary (ELF or PE) from within the 'node_modules' directory. It monitors both the initial execution of the binary by npm/node and subsequent network activity from such binaries, specifically targeting suspicious subdirectories like 'tools/' or '.bin/'.
This rule detects potentially malicious npm activity, including the execution of preinstall hooks in non-standard locations, the use of publishing commands with external registry flags, and the execution of suspicious scripts located within node_modules directories, often indicative of a software supply chain compromise.
Detects potential supply chain attacks where a suspicious Python package is installed via 'pip' followed by execution of suspicious commands or network activity from 'python.exe' within a short timeframe. This rule correlates process creation events involving pip installations with subsequent suspicious command-line activity or external network connections from Python processes.
Detects anomalous activity consistent with the IronWorm threat actor using compromised CI credentials to perform npm package publishing. The rule identifies a sequence of two events from the same source IP within a 10-minute window: first, an OIDC identity token exchange request at the npm registry, followed by a package publish operation (PUT request). This behavior is characteristic of malicious actors hijacking CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code into trusted npm packages.
Detects malicious node.js processes spawned from npm lifecycle hooks (e.g., install, postinstall) that exhibit suspicious command-line arguments, environment variables, or connections to known malicious domains associated with supply chain compromise campaigns.
Detects node.exe (or node) processes accessing standard shell history files across Linux (.bash_history, .zsh_history, .sh_history, fish_history) and Windows (PSReadLine history). This behavior is characteristic of infostealer payloads, such as those observed in the Polymarket Trap npm supply chain campaign, attempting to collect sensitive command-line history.
Detects the Polymarket Trap technique where a Node.js process executes 'npm pack' during a post-install phase and subsequently overwrites core module files (e.g., index.js) within the node_modules directory. This behavior is used to evade static analysis and conceal malicious code within legitimate dependency files.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity on Linux systems by monitoring for two suspicious patterns: 1) The 'systemd-userdbd' process being spawned by Node.js or npm, which may indicate a supply-chain attack where a package masquerades as a system daemon, and 2) The execution of processes from anonymous file descriptors within '/proc/self/fd/', a common indicator of fileless execution techniques (e.g., fexecve).
Detects suspicious child process execution originating from Node.js environments. The rule monitors for common package installation scripts (e.g., postinstall) or suspicious command-line indicators associated with known malicious patterns, such as domain connections, library masquerading, and unauthorized script execution.
Detects instances where the FireAnt MetaKit investment client (Metakit.exe) spawns 'setup.exe' as a child process. This pattern is indicative of a supply-chain attack involving the compromise of the FireAnt MetaKit update server, where the application is used to trigger the execution of a malicious downloader or installer.
Detects the node.exe process deleting its own executing script file 'setup.cjs' located within an 'easy-day-js' node_modules directory. This behavior is indicative of the anti-forensics self-deletion mechanism used by the easy-day-js supply chain dropper to remove its footprint after executing a subsequent malicious payload.
Detects unauthorized file access to browser extension directories and credential stores (History, Login Data) by a suspicious Node.js process named 'protocal.cjs'. This activity is characteristic of the 'easy-day-js' supply chain compromise, where a malicious backdoor attempts to exfiltrate browser-stored credentials and history from Chrome, Edge, and Brave browsers.
Detects the use of curl.exe to upload files to the temp.sh service while simultaneously passing the resulting temp.sh URL within the User-Agent string to a C2 server. This specific exfiltration and beaconing TTP was observed in the Notepad++ supply chain attack.
Detects instances of npm package publication events initiated by known-compromised maintainer accounts (czirker, llxlr). These accounts have been identified as being used to distribute malicious packages, such as leo-aws versions, representing a software supply chain compromise.
Detects malicious npm package propagation indicative of the Miasma/Mini Shai-Hulud worm. The rule identifies suspicious patterns in AuditLogs, specifically burst npm publishes by known malicious actors or involving known malicious package names, as well as the use of weaponized GitHub Actions workflows or unauthorized snapshot branches.
Detects malicious npm package behavior where a package uses 'npm pack' and associated script files (e.g., sync-peer.cjs) to download and overwrite its own installed files. This technique is often used in software supply chain attacks to bypass static analysis of the original package tarball by fetching a second, malicious version at runtime.
Detects node.js executing known malicious npm lifecycle scripts (such as install-check.cjs, verify-peer.cjs, sync-peer.cjs, postinstall-run.js, and preinstall.js) often found in node_modules folders. These scripts are associated with the Polymarket Trap supply chain campaign, which leverages malicious npm hooks for initial access or malicious activity within a development environment.
Detects the execution of Node.js or npm processes that reference known malicious transitive npm dependencies or typosquatted packages identified in the Polymarket Trap supply chain campaign, such as 'log-taker' and various 'thirdweb' typosquats.
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