Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
536 detections
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This rule monitors Palo Alto Networks firewalls for files identified as malicious by the WildFire or ML-based threat detection engines. It filters out known allowed file hashes and aggregates events to provide a high-confidence alert. The rule categorizes threats based on the verdict ('malicious', 'malware', 'phishing', 'suspicious', 'c2') and distinguishes whether the threat was blocked or delivered to the network, providing context for incident response.
Detects regsvr32.exe silently registering an OCX file staged in a user-writable temp or local app data directory when spawned from a browser, shell, or Run-dialog parent process.
Detects instances where a git repository is cloned, followed by the execution of VS Code, and subsequently the triggering of an automated task (via tasks.json or .vscode directory) by that VS Code instance within a short timeframe. This sequence may indicate an attacker attempting to execute code or automation routines immediately after cloning a malicious or compromised repository.
This query hunts for suspicious cases where Warp Terminal or a Warp-related parent process spawns Unix-like shell interpreters such as sh, bash, zsh, fish, or dash, and executes commands using shell execution patterns like -c, /bin/sh, sh -c, or bash -c. It detects suspicious post-condition behavior consistent with exploitation attempts for CVE-2026-48703 and CVE-2026-48731
This rule detects the execution of Java JAR files from suspicious or unconventional directories (such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or Public folders). It filters out known build tools and CI/CD agents to focus on potentially malicious or unauthorized execution of JAR files that might indicate payload staging or execution in high-risk locations.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are coerced into pasting and executing malicious commands (PowerShell/mshta) via the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe), or instances where PowerShell processes spawned from the Run dialog perform network communication over suspicious ports commonly associated with this campaign.
Detects potential LLM prompt injection or jailbreak attempts within command line arguments or event log data, such as instructions to override system prompts or masquerade as a specific persona.
Detects the execution of specific suspicious filenames ('YEPlayer.exe', 'Pis2rayVPN.msi', 'YEMPlayer.msi') or command-line references to these files, combined with correlated network activity to specific suspicious domains associated with masqueraded 'microsoft.comi-site.website' URLs.
This rule detects network connections to a suspicious domain associated with the 'Maccy' application, as well as file and process activity involving files named 'Maccy' that interact with the same suspicious domain. This is indicative of potential unauthorized application execution or malicious activity masquerading as the Maccy utility.
Detects instances where the same file (identified by SHA256) with common lure names like 'resume', 'headshot', or 'faceswap' is being created or modified by multiple different users across the environment. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary distributing malicious files or a coordinated effort to access sensitive or tempting filenames, potentially related to social engineering or lateral movement.
Detects the creation or modification of a .vscode/tasks.json file, followed by the execution of a process (specifically node.exe) that targets a script file without a standard JavaScript extension (.js, .mjs, .cjs). This behavior is consistent with an adversary configuring a hidden VS Code task (e.g., using 'hide:true' and 'runOn:folderOpen') to silently execute arbitrary code or assets when a project folder is opened.
This rule detects suspicious process activity initiated from or under the context of the SimpleHelp remote access tool. It monitors for common post-exploitation patterns including the execution of Python-based scripts associated with authentication bypass and OIDC credential harvesting, the spawning of Node.js processes, and the execution of common command interpreters (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) typically used by adversaries to gain further control over a compromised system.
Detects the execution of known malware families (Atlas RAT, RomulusLoader, SilentRunLoader) or processes spawned from temporary directories (AppData/Local/Temp, AppData/Roaming/Temp, Windows/Temp) by common email clients, browsers, and file archivers. This behavior is indicative of a user-initiated execution of a malicious payload, typically associated with phishing or drive-by download attacks.
Detects PowerShell processes launched by web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer) or Windows Explorer, especially when using suspicious command-line arguments like encoded commands, Invoke-Expression, or web download functions. This behavior can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, often initiated through user interaction (e.g., clicking a malicious link or opening a crafted file).
Detects the execution of command-line processes (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta) where the command arguments contain indicators of copy-paste lures commonly associated with social engineering, such as fake CAPTCHA verification, human verification requests, or 'not a robot' prompts. This behavior is indicative of an attacker tricking a user into executing malicious code via their system's command interpreter.
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a hack tool or other attack tool.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
This rule detects scenarios where Microsoft Teams initiates a potential screen-sharing session (via outbound network connections on specific ports) followed shortly by the access of VPN configuration files on the same host. This sequence may indicate an attacker using screen-sharing to view credentials or configuration details and subsequently attempting to utilize a VPN client.
Detects when a web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera) initiates a process that is not another instance of itself. This could indicate a drive-by download, execution of malicious code, or other suspicious activity originating from a browser.
Detects a PDF, SVG, HTML, or presentation attachment containing a QR code or extracted URL that leads into an enterprise authentication workflow. This rule is designed to identify phishing attempts where adversaries embed QR codes or malicious URLs within common document types to direct users to fake enterprise login pages for credential harvesting.
Detects the execution of known remote access tools (e.g., AnyDesk, SyncFuture) or processes originating from common user-writable directories (AppData, Temp, Local) that subsequently spawn other processes within these same user-writable directories. This pattern is commonly observed in malware staging or the misuse of remote support tools for unauthorized access.
Detects the execution of various suspicious file types (executable, scripts, shortcuts) from common Windows temporary directories (AppData\Local\Temp and Windows\Temp). The rule excludes common installers and binaries signed by reputable software publishers to reduce noise.
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