Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
536 detections
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Detects when a web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera) initiates a process that is not another instance of itself. This could indicate a drive-by download, execution of malicious code, or other suspicious activity originating from a browser.
Detects network connections from common web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Electron) to loopback addresses (127.0.0.1 or Localhost) where the URL path contains sensitive keywords like /code, /textbox, /credentials, or /secrets. This behavior is often associated with browser-based exploitation attempts, such as targeting local development servers or internal browser automation interfaces to extract sensitive information.
Detects network connections from common web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Electron) to loopback addresses (127.0.0.1 or Localhost) where the URL path contains sensitive keywords like /code, /textbox, /credentials, or /secrets. This behavior is often associated with browser-based exploitation attempts, such as targeting local development servers or internal browser automation interfaces to extract sensitive information.
Detects AI-powered development tools like Claude Code (running via node) spawning shell interpreters, executing common setup/configuration scripts, or invoking network utilities during project initialization. This activity is indicative of indirect prompt injection attacks where an adversary lures an AI agent into executing malicious code from a repository.
Detects ClickFix social engineering lures where a web browser spawns script interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as base64-encoded payloads, remote download cradles, or execution with hidden window flags.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized installation of extensions in Visual Studio Code (VSIX) or plugins in JetBrains IDEs (IntelliJ, PyCharm, WebStorm). It flags installations that do not originate from verified official marketplaces, which may indicate the manual installation of malicious or supply-chain compromised development environment extensions.
Detects a multi-stage attack where an adversary uses a fake job interview theme to lure a user into cloning a malicious repository. The repository contains a Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration file that, when opened in an IDE like VS Code, Cursor, or Windsurf, leads to the execution of unauthorized or suspicious child processes.
Detects social engineering lures (like ClickFix, FileFix, and CrashFix) where a user is tricked into manually executing a malicious payload. This rule specifically looks for script interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBins) (rundll32.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvr32.exe, curl.exe, certutil.exe, bitsadmin.exe) being spawned as child processes of web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, iexplore.exe, brave.exe, opera.exe) or explorer.exe (indicating execution from a Run dialog). Exclusions are in place for common benign browser update processes.
Detects endpoint browser and email client processes initiating network connections to domains and IP addresses associated with HolaBrief and LoopedIn open-redirect infrastructure, commonly leveraged in invoice-themed phishing campaigns.
Detects PowerShell processes launched by web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer) or Windows Explorer, especially when using suspicious command-line arguments like encoded commands, Invoke-Expression, or web download functions. This behavior can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, often initiated through user interaction (e.g., clicking a malicious link or opening a crafted file).
Detects the post-download execution stage of the abdrizak PostCSS typosquatting Windows RAT campaign. Covers three indicators: (1) wscript.exe executing a .vbs file from %TEMP% or subdirectory (e.g. update.vbs from winPatch), (2) chost.exe or any process launching loader.py as a command-line argument, (3) cmd.exe using tar to extract a .zip archive from %TEMP%.
Detects execution and activity associated with the Grixba infostealer (often linked to Play Ransomware / Jumpy Pisces operations). The rule monitors for the execution of 'GT_NET.exe' from suspicious locations like 'C:\Users\Public\Music\', the loading or creation of the 'inf_g.dll' modular payload, and identifies a specific known Grixba v3 SHA-256 hash.
Detects known malicious invoice PDFs and email samples used in Crimson Kingsnake campaigns.
Detects 7-Zip (7z.exe / 7zG.exe) writing executable files to user-accessible directories, potentially leveraging CVE-2026-46331. This vulnerability allows an adversary to manipulate the Zone.Identifier Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of extracted files by embedding a crafted RAR5 stream, effectively setting the ZoneId to 0 (My Computer) and bypassing Windows SmartScreen warnings upon subsequent execution.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized installation of extensions in Visual Studio Code (VSIX) or plugins in JetBrains IDEs (IntelliJ, PyCharm, WebStorm). It flags installations that do not originate from verified official marketplaces, which may indicate the manual installation of malicious or supply-chain compromised development environment extensions.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain on macOS involving a browser or mail client spawning a shell to download a file (DMG) via curl/wget, followed by the mounting of that disk image, execution of an application bundle from the mounted volume, and a subsequent outbound network connection from that application. This behavior is indicative of a user-initiated malware execution chain.
This rule detects scenarios where Microsoft Teams initiates a potential screen-sharing session (via outbound network connections on specific ports) followed shortly by the access of VPN configuration files on the same host. This sequence may indicate an attacker using screen-sharing to view credentials or configuration details and subsequently attempting to utilize a VPN client.
Detects instances where DllHost.exe creates executable or script files within common writable directories such as Users, ProgramData, or Windows\Temp. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary staging malicious payloads or scripts to facilitate further execution.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized installation of extensions in Visual Studio Code (VSIX) or plugins in JetBrains IDEs (IntelliJ, PyCharm, WebStorm). It flags installations that do not originate from verified official marketplaces, which may indicate the manual installation of malicious or supply-chain compromised development environment extensions.
This rule detects instances where common productivity applications (like Office suite) or web browsers spawn child processes that create system mutexes. This is a common indicator of malicious activity where a benign-looking document or web-based threat launches secondary payloads or persistence mechanisms.
This rule detects instances where ImageMagick tools (magick.exe, convert.exe, mogrify.exe, identify.exe) launch Ghostscript (gswin64c.exe) from non-standard directory locations while passing specific flags (-dQUIET, -dSAFER, -dBATCH, -dNOPAUSE) that are frequently associated with exploitation payloads (e.g., ImageTragick).
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