Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

536 detections

This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the execution of processes named 'doxc' or 'hzwzucr_widsisa.exe', or processes matching specific file hashes, when originating from common user-writeable directories like 'ProgramData' or 'AppData'. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious payloads executing in non-standard or user-specific locations to achieve persistence or evasion.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
002
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
002
This rule detects potentially suspicious activity involving the 1C Enterprise software suite. It monitors for the execution of 'rmngr.exe' with debug flags or the spawning of processes by 'rphost.exe' that involve suspicious command files named with a 'v8_5fed' prefix located in temporary directories, which is indicative of potential exploitation attempts or unauthorized script execution within the application environment.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
101
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
001
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects activity associated with the 'Ghostcode' threat campaign by monitoring multiple telemetry sources. It identifies connections to known malicious IP addresses and domains, patterns consistent with phishing kit hosting, and specific URL structures used in credential harvesting or payload delivery. The rule correlates sign-in logs, device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry to identify potential compromise.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
This rule detects activity associated with the 'Ghostcode' threat campaign by monitoring multiple telemetry sources. It identifies connections to known malicious IP addresses and domains, patterns consistent with phishing kit hosting, and specific URL structures used in credential harvesting or payload delivery. The rule correlates sign-in logs, device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry to identify potential compromise.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
002
Detects the execution of 'SimpleService.exe' when the binary is located within a restricted subdirectory associated with JWrapper-Remote Access. This pattern may indicate the execution of unauthorized or restricted remote access tools.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the execution or file activity associated with the 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' installer. This rule monitors both process creation and file system activity to track the presence and usage of this specific installer executable, which may indicate the installation of potentially unauthorized or untrusted software.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the execution or file activity associated with the 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' installer. This rule monitors both process creation and file system activity to track the presence and usage of this specific installer executable, which may indicate the installation of potentially unauthorized or untrusted software.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
002
Detects the execution or file activity associated with the 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' installer. This rule monitors both process creation and file system activity to track the presence and usage of this specific installer executable, which may indicate the installation of potentially unauthorized or untrusted software.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
002
Detects process executions, file deletions, renames, and movements initiated by known SparroWocky malware files or suspicious DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll, DukeQt.dll). This monitors malicious lifecycle activity on endpoints.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
This rule monitors for the presence or execution of files matching a known set of SHA256 hashes associated with the 'DXSCAN' malware, utilizing both device file and process events.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
This rule monitors for the presence or execution of files matching a known set of SHA256 hashes associated with the 'DXSCAN' malware, utilizing both device file and process events.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
102
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
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