Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious commands written to the Windows RunMRU registry key, which stores the history of commands executed via the Windows Run dialog (Win+R). This activity is often associated with the "ClickFix" social engineering technique, where users are tricked into pasting and running malicious commands. The rule identifies various suspicious indicators, including fake verification messages, PowerShell commands with obfuscation or download cradles, mshta, wscript, curl, wget, rundll32, bitsadmin, ssh proxy abuse, and obfuscated command line arguments.
This rule detects network connections or URL click events to a list of domains known to be associated with phishing or malware distribution. The rule specifically looks for connections to these domains that also contain certain path segments like '/wlc/', '/load/', or '/success/', which are often indicative of malicious activity or payload delivery. It also broadly checks for any URL click events containing these suspicious domains.
This KQL Query helps to understand all the URL Redirections from URLs received by Email using the UrlChainId identifier on KQL that groups together all URLs that belong to the same “click/redirect chain”. When an message contains a URL, that URL may redirect through several intermediate URLs (trackers, shorteners, phishing, etc.) before land on the final site. KQL builds a URL chain from the original URL in the email through each redirect hop. All URLs that are part of a single chain share the same UrlChainId and for each hop. On the other hand, UrlChainPosition register the position of every URL, the original one = value 0 and the other redirections tagged with next numbers(1, 2, etc. ) The following query includes different options to classify the insights into four categories:
Tracking Domains
Redirecting to Different Countries
Redirecting to Different Domains
Number of Redirections
Tracking Domains
Redirecting to Different Countries
Redirecting to Different Domains
Number of Redirections
This rule detects network connections to or DNS requests for known malicious IP addresses and domains associated with phishing campaigns. The domains often mimic legitimate services like Zoom, Microsoft, and Google, indicating potential credential harvesting or malware distribution attempts.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests containing specific URL patterns associated with Calisto phishing campaigns. The patterns include '/vendor/plugx/', '/wp-content/plugins/(bungs|areada|leykos)/', '/prueba/phantomrise/', or '/plugins/unite/', combined with the 'utm_refferer=' parameter in the URI. This indicates an attempt to redirect users to malicious content, likely as part of a phishing attack.
Detects the execution of a command pattern associated with malicious .lnk files used in the SERPENTINE#CLOUD campaign. The threat actor uses a .lnk file to launch cmd.exe, which then uses robocopy to download a .wsf script from a WebDAV share hosted on a Cloudflare Tunnel, and finally executes it with cscript.exe.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with davclnt.dll to establish a WebDAV connection, a technique used by APT42 in the SpearSpecter campaign for initial access via malicious search-ms links. Specifically, it looks for rundll32.exe executing the DavSetCookie function from davclnt.dll and captures the WebDAV server from the command line argument.
Detects potential ClickFix malware execution patterns by monitoring registry modifications in RunMRU keys containing HTTP/HTTPS links.
ClickFix is known to be distributed through phishing campaigns and uses techniques like clipboard hijacking and fake CAPTCHA pages.
Through the fakecaptcha pages, the adversary tricks users into opening the Run dialog box and pasting clipboard-hijacked content,
such as one-liners that execute remotely hosted malicious files or scripts.
ClickFix is known to be distributed through phishing campaigns and uses techniques like clipboard hijacking and fake CAPTCHA pages.
Through the fakecaptcha pages, the adversary tricks users into opening the Run dialog box and pasting clipboard-hijacked content,
such as one-liners that execute remotely hosted malicious files or scripts.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with command-line arguments used to connect to a remote WebDAV share. This technique was observed in the SpearSpecter campaign where APT42 abused the 'search-ms' URI handler to deliver a malicious LNK file from an attacker-controlled WebDAV server.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of a Windows Shortcut Link (LNK) file containing an unusually large amount of padded whitespace in its command line arguments. This technique is often used to obfuscate malicious commands or exploit vulnerabilities like ZDI-CAN-25373, which was a zero-day exploit related to Windows shortcuts. The rule specifically looks for the LNK file header signature and then uses a PCRE to identify repeated whitespace characters (tab, newline, vertical tab, form feed, carriage return, space) within the file data, suggesting padding for obfuscation or to bypass security controls.
Detects suspicious execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands via clipboard manipulation, either through the Windows Run dialog (ClickFix) or File Explorer address bar (FileFix).
Attackers leverage social engineering campaigns—such as fake CAPTCHA challenges or urgent alerts—encouraging victims to paste clipboard contents, often executing mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or similar commands to infect systems.
Attackers leverage social engineering campaigns—such as fake CAPTCHA challenges or urgent alerts—encouraging victims to paste clipboard contents, often executing mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or similar commands to infect systems.
Detects potential FileFix attacks where a web browser spawns a suspicious child process (e.g., command prompt, PowerShell, MSHTA) via the file upload dialog's address bar.
Enhancement:
This query correlates two queries to find cases where a user accessed RunMRU and then executed a suspicious PowerShell command.
RMU flags are added to get more close records mapped with Registry Access to RunMRU (Clipboard Paste via Run Dialog) Copy Clipboard data.
Enhancement:
This query correlates two queries to find cases where a user accessed RunMRU and then executed a suspicious PowerShell command.
RMU flags are added to get more close records mapped with Registry Access to RunMRU (Clipboard Paste via Run Dialog) Copy Clipboard data.
Detects the presence of SVG files containing obfuscated JavaScript and redirection logic. This technique is used by phishing campaigns, such as Tykit, to redirect victims to malicious sites.
Checkpoint Researchers published an Article with a Behavior Analysis of the Pure Malware Family. This Query is based on the Analysis of the Researchers. thx to Checkpoint.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) that contains obfuscated commands, specifically looking for the presence of '$env:TEMP' and 'ActiveXObject' or a combination of 'split', 'reverse', and 'join' in the command line. This PowerShell execution is correlated with the creation of a .LNK file within a 5-minute window prior to the PowerShell process start, suggesting the LNK file might be used as an initial execution vector for the obfuscated PowerShell command. This pattern is indicative of malware like PureCoder.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) that contains obfuscated commands, specifically looking for the presence of '$env:TEMP' and 'ActiveXObject' or a combination of 'split', 'reverse', and 'join' in the command line. This PowerShell execution is correlated with the creation of a .LNK file within a 5-minute window prior to the PowerShell process start, suggesting the LNK file might be used as an initial execution vector for the obfuscated PowerShell command. This pattern is indicative of malware like PureCoder.
The following analytic detects the creation of .iso.lnk files in the %USER%\AppData\Local\Temp\<random folder name>\ path, indicating that an ISO file has been mounted and accessed. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, specifically monitoring file creation events in the Windows Recent folder. This activity is significant as it may indicate the delivery and execution of potentially malicious payloads via ISO files. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
Detects when a web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, Opera) initiates a process that is not another instance of itself. This could indicate a drive-by download, execution of malicious code, or other suspicious activity originating from a browser.
Detects a PowerShell command that carves an MSI file from a source file by searching for a specific byte sequence ('UUUU' or 0x55 four times). This novel technique has been used by a Chinese APT group as part of their infection chain, often initiated by a malicious LNK file.
Detects a PowerShell process launch shortly after a .LNK file was created by Discord. This pattern is indicative of malicious LNK files distributed via Discord to gain initial execution.
Detects a user authorizing a Salesforce application via the '/setup/connect' page. This specific TTP is associated with ShinyHunters vishing campaigns where attackers impersonate IT staff and trick employees into entering a connection code, thereby granting a malicious application access to the organization's Salesforce environment.
This KQL query is designed to enrich "Malicious URL Click" alerts by correlating them with user sign-in activity. It finds the affected accounts and then checks if they had a successful login from a new IP address around the time of the alert. The final output flags high-risk events where a user's URL click activity is immediately followed or preceded by a login from an IP they've never used before. This helps prioritize investigation into potentially compromised accounts.
This rule identifies users who clicked on URLs within emails from a specific sender. It correlates email events, URL information, and URL click events to pinpoint which users interacted with links in emails, particularly useful for tracking responses to potential phishing attempts from a compromised account.
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