Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query
Visualises malicious URL clicks that were allowed through Safe Links over time, helping analysts identify when users bypass security controls and click on malicious content.
Based on Defender for Office 365 workbook: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoftdefenderforoffice365blog/part-2-build-custom-email-security-reports-and-dashboards-with-workbooks-in-micr/4411303
Based on Defender for Office 365 workbook: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoftdefenderforoffice365blog/part-2-build-custom-email-security-reports-and-dashboards-with-workbooks-in-micr/4411303
Detects suspicious process creation where a web browser spawns a command interpreter or scripting host. This behavior is indicative of the "FileFix" attack, where users are socially engineered to paste malicious commands into the File Explorer address bar opened by a browser's file upload functionality.
Detects suspicious process creation where a web browser spawns a command interpreter or scripting host. This behavior is indicative of the "FileFix" attack, where users are socially engineered to paste malicious commands into the File Explorer address bar opened by a browser's file upload functionality.
'This content is employed to correlate with Microsoft Defender XDR phishing-related alerts. It focuses on instances where a user successfully connects to a phishing URL from a non-Microsoft network device and subsequently makes successful sign-in attempts from the phishing IP address.'
'It is reccomended that these Categories shoud be blocked by policies because they provide harmful/malicious content..'
In this query, we hunt for inbound emails having URLs from QR codes and suspicious keywords in subject
Query for SmartScreen application blocks on files with "Malicious" reputation, where the user has decided to run the malware nontheless.
Read more about SmartScreen here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-smartscreen/windows-defender-smartscreen-overview.
Data availability: These events are available only on Windows 10 version 1703 and onwards.
Tags: #SmartScreen.
Read more about SmartScreen here: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-smartscreen/windows-defender-smartscreen-overview.
Data availability: These events are available only on Windows 10 version 1703 and onwards.
Tags: #SmartScreen.
In this query, we are looking for Url clicks on emails which are generated the alert-A potentially malicious URL click was detected
Look for links opened from outlook.exe, followed by a browser download and then a SmartScreen app warning that was ignored by the user.
Read more about these events and this hunting approach in this post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/forums/editpage/board-id/WDATPActor/message-id/34.
Data availability: SmartScreen events are available only on Windows 10 version 1703 and onwards.
Tags: #EmailLink, #BrowserDownload, #SmartScreen.
Read more about these events and this hunting approach in this post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/forums/editpage/board-id/WDATPActor/message-id/34.
Data availability: SmartScreen events are available only on Windows 10 version 1703 and onwards.
Tags: #EmailLink, #BrowserDownload, #SmartScreen.
Query for links opened from mail apps - if a detection occurred right afterwards.
As there are many links opened from mails, to have a successful hunt we should have some filter or join with some other signal,.
Such as suspicious processes, network connections, etc.
Therefore, in this example, we query for alerts that might be related to links sent via email.
This could be indicative of a phishing or spear-phishing attacks.
Tags: #EmailLink, #Phishing, #GetNearbyAlerts.
Explaining the underlying data:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
As there are many links opened from mails, to have a successful hunt we should have some filter or join with some other signal,.
Such as suspicious processes, network connections, etc.
Therefore, in this example, we query for alerts that might be related to links sent via email.
This could be indicative of a phishing or spear-phishing attacks.
Tags: #EmailLink, #Phishing, #GetNearbyAlerts.
Explaining the underlying data:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
This query helps reviewing malicious email detections by detection methods
'Detects first connection to an unpopular website (possible malicious payload delivery).'
Jupyter, otherwise known as SolarMarker, is a malware family and cluster of components known for its info-stealing and backdoor capabilities that mainly proliferates through search engine optimization manipulation and malicious advertising in order to successfully encourage users to download malicious templates and documents. This malware has been popular since 2020 and currently is still active as of 2021.
The query helps detect emails associated with the open redirector URL campaign using Defender for Office 365 data.
Qakbot operators have been abusing the Craigslist messaging system to send malicious emails. These emails contain non-clickable links to malicious domains impersonating Craigslist, which the user is instructed to manually type into the address bar to access.
Use this query to locate emails and malicious downloads related to the IcedId activity that can lead to ransomware
The "Stolen Images" Bazarloader campaign uses fake copyright infingement contact form emails and malicious files pretending to contain "stolen images" to trick users into downloading the malware.
This query looks for a Word document attachment, from which a link was clicked, and after which there was a browser download.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
This query was originally published in a threat analytics report about the group known to other security researchers as APT32 or OceanLotus
This tracked activity group uses a wide array of malicious documents to conduct attacks. Some of their favorite techniques include sideloading dynamic link libraries, and disguising payloads as image files. The group has weaponized files with exploits for the following vulnerabilities:
1. CVE-2017-11882 - Software update
2. CVE-2017-0199 - Software update
The following query detects known malicious files associated with the group's campaigns.
See Detect malicious network activity associated with group known as "OceanLotus" for another query related to this group's activity.
This tracked activity group uses a wide array of malicious documents to conduct attacks. Some of their favorite techniques include sideloading dynamic link libraries, and disguising payloads as image files. The group has weaponized files with exploits for the following vulnerabilities:
1. CVE-2017-11882 - Software update
2. CVE-2017-0199 - Software update
The following query detects known malicious files associated with the group's campaigns.
See Detect malicious network activity associated with group known as "OceanLotus" for another query related to this group's activity.
This query helps reviewing list of top 10 URL domains attacking the organization
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