Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule performs a sweep across device file and process events to identify the execution or presence of files matching a curated list of 161 SHA256 hashes associated with twelve known malicious threat actors and families (Lynx, ANUBIS, Rhysida, LockBit, ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, Medusa, The Gentlemen, NetRunner, Genesis, Pay2Key, and Handala). The rule filters out events occurring in known EDR/AV quarantine or sandbox directory structures and dedupes hits on a per-device and per-hash basis within 24-hour windows to reduce alert noise.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and process events to identify the execution or presence of files matching a curated list of 161 SHA256 hashes associated with twelve known malicious threat actors and families (Lynx, ANUBIS, Rhysida, LockBit, ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, Medusa, The Gentlemen, NetRunner, Genesis, Pay2Key, and Handala). The rule filters out events occurring in known EDR/AV quarantine or sandbox directory structures and dedupes hits on a per-device and per-hash basis within 24-hour windows to reduce alert noise.
This rule monitors for the execution of an executable file (.exe) from a user's 'Downloads' directory followed shortly (within 5 minutes) by a network connection to port 4321, which is characteristic of the Bear C2 HTTPS-AES beacon pattern. This behavior is indicative of a potential secondary stage malware execution or C2 check-in after an initial user-driven download.
This rule detects the execution of a file with an .exe extension from the user's Downloads directory that has been previously tagged with the Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) Zone.Identifier. It correlates file creation events, the application of the MOTW alternate data stream, and subsequent process execution to identify potentially malicious downloaded executables.
This rule monitors for the execution of an executable file (.exe) from a user's 'Downloads' directory followed shortly (within 5 minutes) by a network connection to port 4321, which is characteristic of the Bear C2 HTTPS-AES beacon pattern. This behavior is indicative of a potential secondary stage malware execution or C2 check-in after an initial user-driven download.
This rule detects the execution of a file with an .exe extension from the user's Downloads directory that has been previously tagged with the Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) Zone.Identifier. It correlates file creation events, the application of the MOTW alternate data stream, and subsequent process execution to identify potentially malicious downloaded executables.
Detects HTTP GET requests to Cloudflare Pages subdomains (.pages.dev) ending in '/File_download', often used as a distribution point for malicious HTA (HTML Application) or WSF (Windows Script File) payloads in spearphishing campaigns.
Detects UAT-11587 diplomatic-lure LNK file exploiting ZDI-CAN-25373 whitespace padding to conceal a PowerShell command that extracts CanonStager (cnmpaui.exe/dll) from TAR archives into %TEMP%
Matches published SHA-256 hashes for the Kothamine Injector and Agent DLL, which drop MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll and inject into explorer.exe. Exact full-file SHA-256 match only, no fuzzy or partial matching, no additional PE structural checks.
Matches published SHA-256 hashes for the Kothamine Injector and Agent DLL, which drop MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll and inject into explorer.exe. Exact full-file SHA-256 match only, no fuzzy or partial matching, no additional PE structural checks.
Matches published SHA-256 hashes for the Kothamine Injector and Agent DLL, which drop MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll and inject into explorer.exe. Exact full-file SHA-256 match only, no fuzzy or partial matching, no additional PE structural checks.
Detects the 'ClickFix' technique where a user is socially engineered into copying a malicious command to their clipboard and pasting it into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R). The rule monitors for powershell.exe spawned by explorer.exe containing specific social engineering keywords or typical fileless download-execute patterns like 'irm', 'iex', or 'Invoke-RestMethod'.
This rule detects the suspicious use of signed Windows binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, mshta.exe, msiexec.exe) to execute remote content via URLs or scripts, or when triggered by common office applications and browsers. This behavior is often indicative of living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques used for download/execution of payloads or bypassing security controls.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via explorer.exe (typically initiated through the Windows Run dialog) where the command line references a WebDAV UNC path (containing DavWWWRoot). This behavior is characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks, where users are coerced into copying and pasting commands into the Run dialog that trigger remote script execution.
Sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over a rolling 30-day window for known RevStealer indicators: exact SHA-256 matches against all 13 published file hashes, and exact-host matches (via parsed URL host, not substring) against the confirmed C2 domain meta7.archscreen68.one. An empty, extensible IP list is included for when a malicious IP is published.
Detects the creation or writing of disk image files (.iso, .img, .vhd, .vhdx) followed by the execution of suspicious file types (.lnk, .exe, .js, .vbs, .cmd, .bat, .scr) by explorer.exe within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using container files to bypass security controls or execute malicious payloads from mounted images.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering attack where a user is instructed to use the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) to execute a malicious one-liner. This activity is characterized by explorer.exe spawning common command/script interpreters (powershell, cmd, mshta, etc.) containing typical download-and-execute strings (cradles), which bypasses browser-based download security controls.
Detects the creation of files on disk by a browser process where the Zone.Identifier metadata indicates the origin was a blob:, data:, or about:blank URI. This behavior is indicative of HTML smuggling, where malicious payloads are reconstructed client-side from within an HTML document, bypassing network-based security controls.
Detects the execution of programs directly from the root of a removable or virtual drive (e.g., ISO, IMG, VHD) via explorer.exe. This activity is a hallmark of phishing attacks that leverage container mounting to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security protections, as files extracted from or executed within mounted containers often fail to inherit MOTW metadata.
Detects incoming spearphishing emails that contain a ZIP archive attachment. The rule alerts if the archive contains an LNK file with a double extension (e.g., .pdf.lnk) or if the email subject contains specific social engineering lures related to food pricing or peace negotiations.
Detects the use of pcalua.exe to launch executables or scripts located in potentially transient or user-writable directories such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute payloads while bypassing security controls or masquerading as legitimate system processes.
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