Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,793 detections
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Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize hidden window styles and target suspicious filenames or external paths, often indicative of a dropper or malicious script stage.
Detects specific file artifacts associated with an AsyncRAT infection chain that leverages a renamed AutoIT interpreter. The rule looks for the presence of a renamed executable, an encrypted .ini loader script, and an unnamed binary payload staged within a temporary directory, as well as associated batch script activity.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Command Prompt with common adversarial flags (e.g., encoded commands, bypass, hidden windows) initiated by the Windows Explorer process. This pattern correlates the execution event with recent user interaction with the Windows Run MRU registry key, suggesting a possible manual execution of malicious commands via the 'Run' dialog box.
Detects usage of msiexec.exe to execute an MSI package from a remote URL. This technique is often used to download and execute malicious installers directly from the internet, bypassing local file storage.
This rule detects the execution of common command-line or scripting tools (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, ftp.exe) or .lnk file handling triggered by explorer.exe immediately following the mounting of a VHD or VHDX file. This behavior is indicative of an attacker mounting a malicious virtual disk image and executing payloads contained within it.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
Matches known Vidar Stealer sample SHA256 hashes spanning versions 2.0 through 3.4 as identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz
Detects execution of Windows Installer packages (MSI) masquerading as common software installers (Spotify, Zoom, Microsoft Teams) using known ChainScript-style naming patterns and suspicious command-line parameters (e.g., ALLUSERS=2, MSIINSTALLPERUSER=1) or invocation from common user-mode applications like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or explorer.exe.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
This rule monitors network connections, file events, and process execution command lines for references to a list of known malicious URLs, including indicators associated with ClearFake, IClickFix, AMOS, Remus, and Mozi botnet payloads.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known indicators of compromise, including specific SHA256 file hashes, a known malicious IP address, and URLs associated with identified threats. The detection spans file creation/execution, network connections, and URL visits to block or alert on interactions with suspicious infrastructure.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known indicators of compromise, including specific SHA256 file hashes, a known malicious IP address, and URLs associated with identified threats. The detection spans file creation/execution, network connections, and URL visits to block or alert on interactions with suspicious infrastructure.
Detects execution and network activity related to the PamStealer / Wavel malware campaign, including the JXA dropper and associated C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (e.g., JXA dropper, pkgunpack utility) and network connections to identified lure, distribution, and C2 domains and URLs used by the campaign.
Detects execution and network activity related to the PamStealer / Wavel malware campaign, including the JXA dropper and associated C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (e.g., JXA dropper, pkgunpack utility) and network connections to identified lure, distribution, and C2 domains and URLs used by the campaign.
Detects execution chains associated with the SideCopy threat group's ReverseRAT payload. The detection looks for mshta.exe being spawned by common shell processes (explorer, wscript, cmd, powershell) to execute remote HTA content or access 'docsportal.in'. It also monitors for subsequent reflective DLL loading via rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe, which is indicative of the final ReverseRAT payload activation.
Detects execution chains associated with the SideCopy threat group's ReverseRAT payload. The detection looks for mshta.exe being spawned by common shell processes (explorer, wscript, cmd, powershell) to execute remote HTA content or access 'docsportal.in'. It also monitors for subsequent reflective DLL loading via rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe, which is indicative of the final ReverseRAT payload activation.
Detects instances where common web browsers (chrome, msedge, firefox, brave) are spawned as child processes by suspicious parent applications or scripting environments such as PowerShell, CMD, WScript, MSHTA, or Office documents (Winword, Excel). This behavior is often indicative of malicious document execution, file-less malware techniques, or drive-by download attempts.
Detects the execution of a file with a '.Psh' extension named 'UBPPatch.Psh' that is launched by the process 'UBPUpdater.Exe'. This behavior is indicative of a masqueraded script execution where a suspicious binary or script is disguised with an unconventional extension to evade standard detection mechanisms.
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